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A common challenge organizations face is how to remain successful in a competitive
arena that is becoming increasingly turbulent. Resourcefulness and adaptability are presented
as crucial organizational abilities to strive for. This study introduces the contemporary
military organization as a typical example from which commercial organizations could
learn. After all, in order to repetitively conduct crisis response missions all over the globe,
under all kinds of climatic and operational circumstances, resourcefulness and adaptability
have become basic elements for successful expeditionary deployment. The study assumes
that giving insight into the way in which military crisis response organizations apply
commonly accepted organizational determinants to activate learning and reconfiguration
abilities, could serve as an interesting case for commercial organizations to take advantage
of. For most contemporary military organizations modular organizing has become an
important approach to increase operational adaptability. The cover photo presents a
typical outcome of this approach. It shows a combined arms team, from the Netherlands
armed forces, on its way to the village of Ferocia to search for improvised explosive devices.
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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
Many people feel that writing a dissertation thesis in combination with a 
full time job is like climbing the Mount Everest, only few reach the 
summit. Despite this general feeling, I embarked upon the scientific 
journey rather naïvely. I never doubted that I would succeed, which is of 
course a good thing, but at the same time I really underestimated my own 
perfectionism and the ins and outs of the research process itself. As a 
result, most of my deadlines were not met, and my scheduled end date had 
to be moved forward a number of times. In the end, my initial goal of four 
years had doubled into eight years. Reading these words one may think 
that I have reached the finish line exhausted. Luckily, this is not the case. 
Obviously, I am glad to have finished, but my energy-levels are still quite 
high. Probably, one reason stands out for my ongoing research enthusiasm: 
my strong personal connection with the study’s central case.  
 
When I left the Netherlands armed forces in 1996 the organization was in 
the early stages of its transformation process. Downsizing was one of the 
first organizational measures that had to be taken. For many young officers 
the career prospects became a lot less appealing. Many of them, including 
myself, decided to start a new career outside the military. For me, leaving 
the army has been one of the most difficult personal choices I have had to 
make until today. The armed forces are a special kind of organization to 
work in, you either love it or you hate it. The physical challenges, the 
adventurous job content, but also the tricky task-setting give the 
organization a unique culture of camaraderie and ‘getting things done’, 
which is nice to be part of. Nevertheless, speaking for myself, all these 
positive sentiments could not take away a feeling of turmoil and 
uncertainty that surrounded the reorganization taking place. Looking back 
at my decision to leave, I do not feel any regrets about how things have 
turned out. On the contrary, I feel privileged that in my current position at 
the Netherlands Defense Academy, I can still contribute to the 
organization, albeit in a completely different way than before.  
 
In this respect, I hope that the Netherlands armed forces’ senior 
management welcomes my research findings. On the whole, I strongly 
believe that what organizationally has been achieved over the last two 
decades is a major accomplishment. If you ask me, the prevailing opinion 
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that military organizations are inert and inflexible is being refuted by the 
empirical findings of this study. Yet, the study also warns for the fact that 
the scales of organizational flexibility can easily tip in the direction of 
improvisation. I, therefore, at the same time, would encourage military 
policymakers and politicians to not go in the defensive too much on the 
issue of short-term knowledge absorption and imperfect modularization 
that the study has brought to the surface. In my opinion, it would be better 
to take advantage of the conclusions and see them as positive feedback that 
could help the organization ahead. After all, over 1.200 field officers in 
active duty have contributed to this research project, which makes it a 
strong internal voice that deserves to be heard. 
 
Having said this, I do not really expect the organization to be closed or 
stubborn. The fact that the Netherlands armed forces’ senior management 
has facilitated me in conducting this research project makes clear that the 
top is eager to learn and is looking for ways to improve the organization. In 
this respect, I would like to seize the opportunity to thank the organization 
for its overall support. More specifically, I would like to thank the 1.533 
officers that have filled-in and returned the questionnaire and the 18 high-
ranking representatives that were willing to contribute to the session of 
focused interviews. In particular, I want to thank Lieutenant General van 
Osch, the former head of the Netherlands Defense Academy, who opened 
some very important doors for me. In addition, I thank all the other 
military colleagues at the Academy that helped met out on a number of 
issues, such as translating the survey questions to a military crisis response 
setting, reading draft versions of some of the chapters, and supplying me 
with current organizational information.  
 
Furthermore, I sincerely want thank my supervisors, Prof. Dr. Volberda 
and Prof. Dr. Soeters. Without their guidelines and professional feedback 
this dissertation thesis would never have become what it is today. 
Moreover, despite its rather long time-frame, they continued to believe in 
the scientific potential of this research project. I would also like to thank 
the entire promotion committee for their willingness to participate in the 
ceremony; and, more importantly, to reflect upon the structure and 
outcome of this thesis. 
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I also would like to extend some words of thanks to a number of close 
colleagues. Tom and Ivar, thank you for founding Karapax, which has been 
a distraction but also a motivation. Let’s find out what the future has in 
store for us as entrepreneurs. Eric-Hans, thank you for your motivational 
support and I hope that our shared scientific interest will lead to high-
quality publications in the future. Paul, thanks for your conceptual ideas 
and your academic advice. Manon and Bart, I would like to thank you both 
for acting as my statistical feedback group, but also for the chit-chat 
conversations we had during lunch. Robert, thanks for your humorous way 
of putting the dynamics of the PhD process into perspective. Jos and 
Jacqueline, thank you both, for pulling me from behind my desk every 
morning to drink a cup of coffee and talk about the normal things in life. 
Finally, Myriame, thanks for getting us accredited! 
 
Bart, you were best man at my wedding, and now you are my personal 
assistant during the dissertation ceremony. So, in two very important 
personal events you have played a key role. As you know, our friendship is 
very precious to me. It is, therefore, very special to have you right beside 
me during the final stage of my PhD journey. What, perhaps, has touched 
me most is that despite your busy personal and business life abroad you 
insisted on fulfilling this role. I want to very much thank you for that. 
 
Stefan, when defending this thesis you will be the second man assisting 
me. For you to play this role is also very special to me. We have known 
each other ever since I started my officers’ education at the Royal Military 
Academy. We were roommates during basic infantry training, and after 
leaving the Academy we have always kept a close contact. I left the army, 
you stayed, but my choice has never affected our friendship. All in all, it 
was quite obvious for me to ask you to be my second aide during the PhD 
closing act. Thanks, Steef! 
 
Furthermore, I would like to say a word of thanks to my in-laws, Jeanne 
and Fred. Fred, you have experienced the demanding process of writing a 
dissertation thesis yourself. Your words that this solitary exercise is all 
about perseverance and character have motivated me to continue and to go 
for quality. Jeanne, it is great to have a mother in-law with whom you can 
talk about cycling. Especially the incentive you came up with that a new 
 VIII 
customized mountain bike would be waiting for me at the finish line has 
stimulated me to give the thesis its final push. 
 
Naturally, I would also like to thank my father and mother. Kees and 
Yvonne, although the two of you most of the time, probably, did not have a 
clue of what I was doing, you were proud of me anyway and supported me 
all the same. In return, this is perhaps also a good moment to express how 
grateful I am to have you as my parents. I highly value your different 
personalities and admire the way in which you have raised me. Without the 
two of you I would not have been the person that I am today and I would 
certainly not have achieved the same things in life. I owe a lot to you! 
 
Last, and most importantly, I would like to thank Aukje for supporting me 
the entire period. All the more, because this period has not only from a 
professional perspective been important, but perhaps even more so from a 
family perspective. In 2005 we got married; in 2007 our first daughter 
Meike was born, followed in 2009 by Evelien our second girl. Although 
these events have made us very happy, they have also stirred-up the life 
that we were used to living. Finding a new balance in life and safeguarding 
professional goals and ambitions, such as writing a dissertation thesis, are 
two things that sometimes are difficult to combine. Nevertheless, I think 
that we have been very successful in doing just that. After all, when I focus 
on the outcome of this important period, I am not only proud of the thesis 
that I have written, but I am also very happy with the new life that we are 
living. Aukje, I really love you and I am looking forward to seeing our 
girls grow up, together with you.    
 
 
Erik de Waard, 
 
Breda, January 2010 
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CHAPTER 1 CONTEXT, AIM, AND QUESTIONS 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
A common organizational challenge that many of todays profit 
organizations face is how to remain successful and vital in a competitive 
arena that is becoming increasingly volatile. Over the last two decades 
rapid technological changes, the continuous fragmentation of markets, the 
convergence of different industries, the shortening of product life-cycles, 
and the enormous growth in telecommunications and inexpensive 
computing have made the competitive environment more turbulent than 
ever before (Lei, Hitt, & Goldhar, 1996). Being confronted with 
environmental turbulence means that organizations have to cope with a 
business environment that is highly dynamic, complex, and unpredictable 
at the same time (Volberda, 1996).  
 
Dynamism refers to the changeability of competitive forces over time. The 
level of dynamism is based on both the frequency and the intensity of the 
competitive changes taking place. Environmental complexity has to do 
with the number and heterogeneity of factors and actors involved in the 
competition process, but also with the interrelatedness of these factors and 
actors. Unpredictability is a dimension that relates to the ambiguity and 
vagueness of cause-effect relationships within the competitive force field. 
Environmental unpredictability depends to a large extent on the availability 
and clarity of competitive information and on an organization’s openness 
towards important signals coming from the environment (Volberda, 1998). 
 
On the whole, the increasing level of environmental turbulence has put a 
strain on organizations to become more innovative and proactive. Making 
sense of what the business environment is about and relating these ideas to 
one’s own strategic position, paradigm, and way of doing things is an 
ongoing process for every organization. In a rather stable, simple, and 
predictable environment organizations probably have little trouble in 
mapping out their competitive moves. Under turbulent circumstances this 
process is less straightforward. Generally speaking, organizations then face 
the challenge of deliberately trying to shape the competitive landscape to 
Context, aim, and questions 
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their own advantage and thus have to play an active interpretation role. 
Organizations that assume the environment to be not analyzable and that 
take no concrete action to unravel important competitive forces and 
factors, run the risk of becoming a plaything of surrounding environmental 
dynamics (Daft & Weick, 1984). 
 
With this competitive challenge in mind, D’Aveni (1994) has introduced 
the term hypercompetition. He defines hypercompetitive behavior as a 
“process of continuously generating new competitive advantages and 
destroying, obsoleting, or neutralizing the opponent’s competitive 
advantage, thereby creating disequilibrium, destroying perfect competition, 
and disrupting the status quo of the marketplace” (D'Aveni, 1994: 218). 
His general idea comes down to the fact that under turbulent circumstances 
organizations continuously and deliberately need to challenge the existing 
status quo with their environment, aiming for consecutive, short-term, 
competitive advantages (D'Aveni, 1994; Sanchez, 1995; Teece, Pisano, & 
Shuen, 1997; Tushman & O'Reilly, 1996).  
 
In the following academic debate on temporary advantages survival or 
organizational success is being presented as a result of activating 
innovative, quick response, flexible capabilities (Volberda, 1996). Teece et 
al. (1997: 515) use the term dynamic capabilities. In their seminal article 
they unravel the concept of dynamic capabilities as follows: “The term 
‘dynamic’ refers to the capacity to renew competences so as to achieve 
congruence with the changing business environment…………The term 
‘capabilities’ emphasizes the key role of strategic management in 
appropriately adapting, integrating, and reconfiguring internal and 
external organizational skills, resources, and functional competences to 
match the requirements of a changing environment.” 
 
So far, literature on dynamic capabilities has had a strong conceptual 
character; for the main concern has been to firmly position the concept 
within its academic field (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Helfat & Peteraf, 
2003; Makadok, 2001; Winter, 2003; Zollo & Winter, 2002; Zott, 2003). 
Problematic is the fact that the body of empirical evidence, on how the 
concept works out in practice, has become rather fragmented; mainly, 
because it is being dealt with in separate research streams and not 
specifically under the umbrella of dynamic capabilities (Eisenhardt & 
Context, aim, and questions 
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Martin, 2000). Both critiques and advocates argue that it is important to 
now move the concept beyond its conceptual and dispersed status and start 
operationalizing the promising ideas with dedicated empirical evidence 
(Helfat, et al., 2007; Priem & Butler, 2001; Williamson, 1999). 
 
The empirical work that already exists concentrates on organizational 
learning as the most important competence for dealing with 
hypercompetition. The central idea is that only through continuous learning 
organizations can keep changing and innovating and, by doing so, stay 
ahead of the game. Within this general line of thinking two sub-streams of 
dynamic capabilities have emerged. The first stream relates organizational 
learning to certain managerial capabilities, such as external knowledge 
integration (Tripsas, 1997), strategic decision-making (Adner & Helfat, 
2003), strategic resource utilization and coordination (Majumdar, 1999), 
market orientation (Menguc & Auh, 2006), and strategic political 
management (Oliver & Holzinger, 2008). The second stream links the 
desired organizational learning ability to specific organizational 
capabilities, such as research and development (Helfat, 1997), new product 
development (Deeds, DeCarolis, & Coombs, 1999; Marsh & Stock, 2006), 
marketing (Song, Droge, Hanvanich, & Calantone, 2005), and leadership 
(Pablo, Reay, Dewald, & Casebeer, 2007).  
 
The advantage of these contributions is that organizations receive 
information on which specific dynamic capabilities to invest in when 
striving for temporary competitive advantages. It must, however, also be 
said that the emphasis of the vast majority of the contributions specifically 
relates the aspect of stimulating innovation or strategic renewal. After all, 
knowledge integration, strategic decision-making, research and 
development, new product development, and marketing are capabilities 
that primarily focus on the aspect of stirring up the existing quo by 
proactively seeking new competitive alternatives. An aspect that, so far, 
has remained rather underexposed in this academic debate refers to the 
underlying organizational determinants that may help to quickly and 
decisively render the activation of these sorts of managerial and 
organizational dynamic capabilities on a continuous basis. 
 
Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary defines a determinant as “a thing 
that decides whether or how something happens” (Hornby, 2005: 416). The 
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point is that on meta-level organizations confronted with hypercompetition 
need specific organizational determinants that can deal with the paradox of 
duality (Volberda, 1996). On the one hand too much managerial emphasis 
on strategic renewal and innovation can create chaos. On the other hand a 
too strong focus on existing rules, routines, and procedures can lead to 
rigidity in the organization. The dilemma that organizations face, when in 
hypercompetition, is to balance these two contradictory requirements. In 
this respect, one important practical question left open, in the theoretical 
debate on dynamic capabilities, is which organizational determinants 
matter in the challenging process of quickly and repetitively initiating 
strategic changes and at the same time avoiding to become organizationally 
exhausted.  
 
1.2 THE WESTERN MILITARY CRISIS RESPONSE 
ORGANIZATION 
 
This study aims to make progress on this issue by introducing the 
contemporary Western expeditionary military organization as a typical 
example of a quick response organization for commercial firms to learn 
from. This choice is debatable according to several scholars. For example, 
Soeters, Van Fenema, and Beeres (2010) make clear that the military is a 
very unique organizational species with such specific characteristics that it 
becomes problematic to make one-on-one comparisons with other 
organizations, profit or non-profit. Moreover, Builder (1989) and Worley 
(2006) believe that it is actually impossible to approach the military or 
armed forces as an unequivocal organizational system. They argue that the 
military as a single entity does not exist. In reality, it is a network of 
different Services (Air force, Army, and Navy) that are separate 
organizations in themselves with their own task domains and cultural 
identities.   
 
At the same time, it is also not uncommon to use the military as a sort of 
mirror for commercial business organizations. Especially within the 
strategic management domain scholars regularly use military examples and 
principles as the starting point of a discussion on the dynamics of 
competitive rivalry. Historically-grounded, military, basic principles such 
as a clear objective, maintaining the initiative, concentration, flexibility, 
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surprise, and simplicity are transformed into general strategic management 
lessons to successfully help fight competitive battles within the business 
domain. The general competitive lessons to be learnt are often illustrated 
with specific historical facts of military campaigns or operations that have 
taken place (Quinn, 1988; Resteigne & Soeters, 2009). To a large extent 
this study is based on the same philosophy. 
 
Research into high reliability organizations (HROs) is also worth 
mentioning in this discussion on the military as a role model for 
commercial business organizations (Eisenhardt, 1993; Roberts, Stout, & 
Halpern, 1994; Rochlin, LaPorte, & Roberts, 1987; Sagan, 1993; Weick, 
2001; Weick & Roberts, 1993). HRO research is specifically interested in 
the organizational characteristics of those organizations that have to 
function within dynamically complex and sometimes dangerous 
circumstances; and whose malfunctioning could have far-reaching 
consequences, such as the loss of human life or major environmental 
catastrophes. HRO theory relates, for example, to aircraft carrier 
operations, nuclear weapons operations, and friendly fire incidents to learn 
how organizational practices can help to minimize the risk of critical errors 
or accidents from occurring. These lessons are perceived to be helpful for 
commercial organizations as well. The general idea is that dealing with the 
increased uncertainty of today’s continuously changing business 
environment asks for the presence of HRO-like, mindful practices in order 
to remain reliable, efficient, and effective, despite the ongoing focus on 
strategic renewal (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001).  
 
In a way, Aupperle (1996) combines both of the above approaches by 
using the historical, military example of Xenophon’s Anabasis to 
investigate the underlying organizational characteristics of spontaneous 
and effective organizational reconfiguration within a hostile environment. 
With this article he actively wants to contribute to the discussion on 
dealing with hypercompetition. He argues as follows: “A historical case is 
used as a time-bridge to reveal the importance of rapid and substantive 
organizational redesign when confronting highly competitive and quickly 
shifting environments”. Aupperle uses Morgan’s (1986) organism, brain 
and cultures metaphor to draw conclusions on the organizational 
implications of the current competitive goal of creating continuous 
renewal. He concludes that in Xenophon’s Anabasis especially the cultural 
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metaphor stands out in the process of organizational reconfiguration. He 
puts it as follows: “Most importantly, the Greek army succeeded not 
because it possessed a superior strategy, better soldiers, greater resources, 
or advanced technology……The Greek culture became the strategy –the 
strategy of continuous, ad-hoc adjustment to unique and adverse 
conditions” (Aupperle, 1996: 458).  
 
Based on this historical example he (1996: 458) concludes that in the 
current hypercompetitive business arena “there is a need for 
transformational cultures characterized by human and visionary values 
which openly encourage renewal and continuous improvement…….Such a 
transformational organization would possess a cultural ethic where all 
employees personalize the need to advocate and facilitate change.” The 
main question is, of course, how to actually realize an organizational 
culture like this. In this respect, Aupperle (1996) points to the added value 
of trying to incorporate Morgan’s (1986) brain and organism metaphor into 
the organization. The brain metaphor stimulates openness, the exploration 
of divergent viewpoints, and the development of creative solutions down to 
the lowest organizational levels. The organism metaphor supports the need 
for constant architectural adjustment in response to environmental 
turbulence. 
 
This study makes a big jump in time and transfers Aupperle’s historical 
insights to a contemporary military setting. Just like in the commercial 
word the buzz word of the current international security environment has 
become ‘uncertainty’. Uncertainty exists about the potential sources of 
military threats, their time and place of occurrence, and the form that they 
will eventually take. Experiences over the last two decades have shown 
that Western armed forces have been deployed for a variety of reasons, in a 
variety of forms, to a variety of regions. In the Gulf War of 1990 a rather 
conventional large-scale mechanized battle between different states was 
fought. The Balkans became a textbook example of limited warfare based 
on peace enforcement and peacekeeping principles. In Rwanda a 
humanitarian intervention was conducted by Western military forces. More 
recently, Afghanistan and Iraq have become examples of crisis areas in 
which counterinsurgency operations and reconstruction tasks are taking 
place simultaneously. Moreover, ever since the 9/11 attacks on the World 
Trade Center in New York the Western security community has 
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increasingly been preoccupied with fighting the long war against terrorists, 
extremists, or fundamentalists at home and abroad. 
 
With this new security environment Western armed forces are facing the 
complex challenge of quickly and effectively responding to unforeseen 
threats or crisis situations (De Waard & Kramer, 2008; De Waard & 
Soeters, 2007). As a result they have been pushed to find ways to 
simultaneously deal with strategic and operational turbulence (Evans, 
2003). First of all, Western armed forces are confronted with a changeable 
strategic security context, asking for organizational competences that 
support the generation and mobilization of different operational 
alternatives. Secondly, this demand of operational customization has to be 
combined with an effective military performance during each individual 
mission, over and over again. What makes it even more complex is that 
most missions have hypercompetitive-like characteristics themselves. After 
all, deployment generally takes place under circumstances, in which 
military units constantly and quickly need to react to changing local 
circumstances to keep or regain the initiative, always have to cope with 
intelligent actors actively trying to undermine their operations, 
continuously have to realize a high speed of reaction to stay ahead of their 
opponents, and have to bare in mind all the time that their malfunctioning 
could ultimately have far-reaching consequences (Kramer, 2007).  
 
Refocusing on Aupperle’s (1996) discussion of Xenophon’s Anabasis, an 
interesting question is whether or not current Western armed forces have 
internalized the proposed metaphors into their organizational systems. In 
this respect, it should be said that in the historical example the Greek 
responded to a powerful opponent that tried to destroy their entire 
civilization; whereas, contemporary western armed forces do not face this 
one-off dramatic challenge of large-scale societal destruction. In their crisis 
response role Western armed forces act more or less as the protectors of 
universal human rights and international law. The fact that, in most cases, 
they do not primarily fight for personal freedom or to safe their country or 
civilization, but to go there where the international community deems 
necessary to just do their “job”, makes the positive effect of an 
overarching, national supra-culture probably less strong. It could be argued 
that within such a situation of less profound, intrinsic ideological 
motivation, the focus shifts towards the use of concrete organizational 
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characteristics to still create an organizational culture that supports 
decisiveness and repetitive resourcefulness under threat. In this respect it 
must, however, also be said that for those Western countries that have 
actually suffered terrorist attacks at home this assumption is probably less 
applicable. These countries do strongly belief that fighting terrorists in, for 
example, Afghanistan is a matter of national security. 
 
Nevertheless, this study is especially interested in the organizational 
determinants that are used to incorporate the brain and organism metaphor 
into Western crisis response organizations. Xenophon’s Anabasis assumes 
that what contemporary Western military organizations need pursuing are 
those organizational determinants that not only activate learning to learn 
abilities but also facilitate the process of architectural adaptation. The 
study assumes that giving insight into the way in which Western military 
crisis response organizations apply commonly accepted organizational 
determinants to activate learning and reconfiguration abilities could serve 
as an interesting case for commercial organizations to take advantage of.  
 
The Netherlands armed forces have been selected as the study’s unit of 
analysis. This choice is based on the fact that this organization is a typical 
example of a quick response contemporary Western military organization 
with a main focus on conducting crisis response tasks. Moreover, the 
organizational transformation process that the Dutch have set in motion 
after the ending of the Cold War, to optimize their organization for its new, 
vast and unpredictable task environment, is part of a major trend 
influencing the entire transatlantic security community. Experiences so far 
indicate that within this general trend most Western countries have adopted 
a similar approach towards force transformation. So, basically the Dutch 
situation serves as an exemplary case of how most Western militaries have 
organizationally reacted to their turbulent security environment. 
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1.3 RESEARCH AIM AND QUESTIONS 
 
The reasoning above has resulted in the following primary research goal: 
to contribute to the theoretical status of the Dynamic Capability Approach 
by analyzing how the Netherlands armed forces apply commonly accepted 
organizational determinants, to activate learning and reconfiguration 
capabilities, in order to respond quickly and deal adequately with the 
turbulence of the security environment in general and the individual 
mission contexts in particular.  
 
Apart from strengthening the theoretical status of the Dynamic Capabilities 
Approach by offering specific empirical insights the study also has a 
secondary more practical focus. After all, by conducting this study the 
Netherlands armed forces receive a more comprehensive look at the 
implications of key organizational choices the organization has made after 
the ending of the Cold War. Therefore, the study’s secondary aim is: to 
supply the Netherlands armed forces with valuable knowledge on the 
practical results of key organizational choices that have been made to live 
up to the new crisis response role.  
 
In order to achieve both objectives the following central research question 
forms the core of this study:  
How do organizational learning and reconfiguration determinants 
matter in quickly responding to and adequately dealing with 
environmental turbulence when taking the Netherlands armed forces as 
a typical example of a quick response organization? 
 
Based on the central research question three sub-questions can be 
identified that the study seeks to address: 
 
Sub-question 1: Which key determinants help quick response 
organizations to realize innovative organizational learning and 
architectural reconfiguration? 
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Sub-question 2: What has been the contribution of these organizational 
determinants to the Netherlands armed forces’ crisis response 
performance? 
 
Sub-question 3: What are the policy implications of these organizational 
determinants according to senior officers and civil servants of the 
Netherlands armed forces? 
 
 
1.4 RELEVANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
 
Three main groups may benefit from this dissertation thesis. First, the 
study offers both relevant empirical and conceptual knowledge to 
academics in the field of business. The study contributes to the 
development of the Dynamic Capability Approach and the Resource-Based 
View by providing statistical and qualitative evidence on how an 
organization actually uses organizational determinants to deal with 
environmental turbulence. Moreover, the comprehensive analysis of the 
organizational adjustments the Netherlands armed forces have initiated 
after the ending of the Cold War, gives a holistic and evidence-based view 
of a major strategic change process in the public domain. Second, the 
Netherlands armed forces, as facilitators of this research project, receive 
in-depth information on how their organizational choices have worked out 
in practice and may take advantage of these insights. Third, Western armed 
forces in general may profit from the empirical findings of this study. The 
need to quickly adapt to the turbulent security environment is not a unique 
Dutch phenomenon, but part of a major trend influencing the entire 
transatlantic security community. Yet, conceptual models and general 
directions seem to dominate the international discussion on force 
transformation (McAllister Linn, 2005), neglecting the need of countries 
for information on practical experiences and results (Codner, 2005). Thus, 
a detailed analysis of the Netherlands armed forces’ organizational 
approach to live up to the demands of the changing security environment 
may be a useful reference point for other Western armed forces following a 
similar developmental path.  
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1.5 THESIS SET-UP 
 
The overall architecture of the thesis is based on the so called empirical 
cycle (De Groot, 1961). The general idea is that by repeatedly going 
though this cycle the available body of scientific knowledge is 
incrementally being improved. The cycle itself is presented in figure 1-1 
and constitutes of five different phases. Van der Velde, Jansen, and 
Anderson (2004) describe these phases as follows. First observation, this is 
the phase in which the researcher makes a general inventory of the 
scientific organizational phenomenon being studied, based on existing 
theoretical insights. Second induction, in this phase the researcher tries 
through alternative theoretical reasoning to uncover not yet investigated 
correlations between existing theoretical concepts or variables. Third 
deduction, this is the phase in which the researcher finalizes his process of 
theoretical conjecture by formulating specific, testable hypotheses. Fourth 
testing, within this phase actual empirical inquiry must help the researcher 
in determining the value of his hypotheses by analyzing if they are being 
confirmed or have to be rejected. Fifth evaluation, in this phase the 
researcher reflects upon the added value of his newly discovered 
theoretical insights regarding the tenability in different contexts and 
situations. 
 
 
Figure 1-1: The empirical cycle 
(De Groot, 1961) 
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So far, the theoretical contributions to the Dynamic Capabilities Approach 
have focused on the first three phases of the empirical cycle. Due to a lack 
of empirical testing, phase four and five, the Dynamic Capabilities 
Approach has not yet received the status of a sound theoretical construct. 
On the contrary, its position has frequently been challenged in the 
academic community of business research. For example, Williamson 
(1999:1093) states that “there being no apparatus by which to advise firms 
on when and how to reconfigure their core competences, the argument 
relies on ex post rationalization: show me a success story and I will show 
you (uncover) a core competence.” Priem and Butler (2001) have also 
taken on the challenge of examining the theoretical state and the usefulness 
of the capability perspective for strategic management research. They 
conclude that it does not presently meet the empirical content criterion 
required of theoretical systems. As a result the competence and capability 
perspective remains tautological and vague and appears to be a fad of 
management scholarship. Yet, apart from their harsh critique, they also 
acknowledge the added value of the approach for business strategists. One 
of their main suggestions, in this respect, is that by concentrating on 
answering the ‘how’ questions with strong empirical data the perspective 
might still achieve a solid theoretical status and become a powerful 
strategic management tool.  
 
This study aims to go through the empirical cycle in its entirety. In order to 
do so, conceptual knowledge that already exists is used to fill-in phase one, 
two, and three and come up with relevant testable hypotheses. The testing 
and evaluating steps of the phases four and five are linked to a specific 
case. As mentioned earlier, the Netherlands armed forces are selected as a 
typical example of a quick response organization from which commercial 
organizations confronted with hypercompetition can learn. In short, this 
military organization has to be capable of functioning effectively within all 
kinds of turbulent crisis arenas, in which it has to cope with environmental 
forces that could be interpreted as extreme metaphors of the conditions that 
commercial organizations are also confronted with when competing in a 
hypercompetitive business setting. The study’s main assumption is that the 
meta organizational determinants that are used to combine strategic 
flexibility with continuous operational effectiveness probably have an 
added value in the less extreme business context as well.   
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The general structure of the empirical cycle has been transformed into the 
concrete research design presented in figure 1-2. 
Following this introductory chapter, chapter 2 is devoted to answering the 
first sub-question and has a theoretical character. This part ends with a 
comprehensive research model of the key organizational determinants to 
deal with environmental turbulence. 
Chapter 3 covers the general research strategy and the methodological 
foundations of the empirical study. In this chapter the study’s research 
design will be expounded, explaining which research techniques have been 
used and why. 
Chapter 4 is an empirical chapter. Based on a large-scale survey this 
chapter will answer the second sub-question. To be precise, the research 
model will be related to the Netherlands armed forces’ crisis response 
performance, and its proposed interrelationships will be tested statistically 
within this specific military domain. 
In chapter 5 the third research question will be answered. In this chapter 
the study’s main variables are being discussed with representatives of the 
Netherlands armed forces’ senior management to derive concrete policy 
implications. Eighteen high-ranking officials, military and non-military, of 
the Dutch Ministry of Defense have been interviewed for this purpose. 
In chapter 6 the theoretical value of the research findings is being 
discussed. This chapter contributes to the development of the Dynamic 
Capabilities Approach by discussing the pros and cons of specific 
organizational determinants in dealing with environmental turbulence.  
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis with answering the central research 
question. Furthermore, in this chapter practical recommendations will be 
made to the Netherlands armed forces’ policymakers.  
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Figure 1-2: Structure and overview of the study 
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CHAPTER 2 ORGANIZATIONAL DETERMINANTS 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The previous chapter has explained that, so far, the Dynamic Capabilities 
Approach has paid little attention to the functioning of dynamic 
capabilities over a longer period of time. Especially the question of how 
consecutive temporary advantages can be created, without running the risk 
of becoming organizationally exhausted, has remained unanswered. It 
could be argued that organizational determinants play a central role in this 
balancing act. After all, when everything in the organization has to be put 
upside down for each attempt to create a temporary advantage, the 
organization is in serious jeopardy of becoming fatigue, because of all this 
bending, stretching, and changing. This chapter aims to uncover those key 
organizational determinants that stimulate organizational learning and 
support architectural adaption while simultaneously organizational stability 
is being safeguarded. In order to derive these determinants the inside-out 
strategic management paradigm has been selected as the study’s theoretical 
point of reference, because this is the research stream from which the 
Dynamic Capabilities Approach originates. 
 
The chapter is structured as follows. First, the chapter goes deeper into the 
evolution of the concept of dynamic capabilities. Second, the concept itself 
will be unraveled, focusing on the relationship between capabilities, 
resources, routines and processes, and on the fact that dynamic capabilities 
can either have a search and selection function or a configuration and 
deployment function. Third, based on the assumption that ambidexterity is 
a crucial organizational dynamic capability to strive for, when in 
hypercompetition, key organizational determinants supporting 
ambidexterity’s contradictory demand of combining organizational change 
or exploration with organizational stability or exploitation are investigated. 
Within this discussion absorptive capacity and modular organizing are 
being introduced as important determinants. Existing literature makes clear 
that both determinants have the potential to activate a combination of 
operational, structural, and strategic flexible dynamic capabilities, 
concretizing the organizational ambidexterity demand. Moreover, lateral 
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coordination is being presented as a complementary organizational 
determinant that acts as a facilitator for both absorptive capacity and 
modular organizing. Fourth, the chapter pays specific attention to the 
relative effects of the different determinants, appointing predominance to 
absorptive capacity because of its overarching orchestration role. Fifth, 
apart from the fact that absorptive capacity and modular organizing support 
the activation of a mixture of dynamic capabilities, the chapter explains 
that these two determinants also have the built-in capacity to convert from 
a prudent to a more ad hoc way of reacting to environmental opportunities 
or threats. Based on all this theoretical reasoning a comprehensive research 
model is being presented in the chapter’s final paragraph. 
 
2.2 THE EVOLUTION OF DYNAMIC CAPABILITIES 
 
The development of increasing hypercompetition within the business arena 
has resulted in doubts on the relevancy of the leading paradigm of 
successful competitive behaviour. Since roughly the 1980s the strategic 
management community had taken a strong governance perspective on 
business competition. In short, scholars propagated that organizations 
incrementally had to react to strategic developments and specific actions of 
rivalling firms to constantly create a fit with the surrounding business 
environment (Andrews, 1971; Ansoff, 1965; 1998). Organizations had to 
look for ways to keep restoring the status quo between environmental 
demands and organizational performance, aiming for a strong long term 
competitive position. In this process a key role was appointed to the 
organization’s senior management. First, this management had to 
strategically position the organization within its industry or sector, taking  
forces into account such as the power of buyers and suppliers, the threat of 
new entrants and substitute products or services, and the competitive 
moves of rivalling firms (Porter, 1980). Second, senior management was 
held responsible for utilizing the tools of game theory to shape the way in 
which the strategic conflict was being fought, such as making specific 
investment, patenting, pricing, and advertising decisions (e.g. Dixit, 1980; 
Gilbert & Newberry, 1982; Milgrom & Roberts, 1982; Schmalensee, 
1983). In hindsight, Hamel and Prahalad (1994) refer to the outside-in 
approach, emphasizing the fact that organizations primarily responded to 
opportunities in the market environment that suited their existing 
organizational resources and competences best.  
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Since the 1990s this ultimate goal of achieving a long term defensible 
competitive position through a combination of incremental strategic 
manoeuvring and organizational change has been losing ground rapidly. 
The shortening of product lifecycles, converging markets, globalization 
and customization have made the business environment more complex and 
volatile than ever before. These new circumstances asked for the 
organizational ability to radically change, innovate, and to rapidly create 
alternative strategic options (Sanchez, 1993); demands that could not be 
supported enough by the prevailing outside-in approach. 
 
Based on the reinvention of Penrose’s (1959: 24) early description of the 
organization as a “collection of productive resources”, the strategic 
management focus gradually shifted towards internal organizational 
aspects as active drivers for strategic renewal. Wernerfelt (1984) was one 
of the first scholars showing renewed interest in analyzing firms from the 
resource side. He has introduced the Resource-Based View of the firm 
(RBV), in which he focuses on the relationship between profitability and 
resources, and ways to manage the firm’s resource position over time. His 
work has been a starting point for others to elaborate on the added value of 
resources in creating competitive advantages.  
 
Barney (1991: 101), one of Wernerfelt’s predominant followers, defines 
firm resources as “all assets, capabilities, organizational processes, firm 
attributes, information, knowledge, etc. controlled by a firm that enable the 
firm to conceive of and implement strategies that improve its efficiency 
and effectiveness”. Furthermore, he explains that resources can be 
categorized into three groups: physical capital resources (e.g. a firm’s 
infrastructure and technological equipment), human capital resources (e.g. 
the know-how of a firm’s staff and managers), and organizational capital 
resources (e.g. a firm’s planning and control system). He stresses the fact 
that to achieve sustained competitive advantage a firm must exploit those 
resources that add value, are rare, difficult to imitate, and non-
substitutable. Hamel and Prahalad (1994) have named this RBV the inside-
out approach; for, it is the stretching and leveraging of internal 
organizational resources and competences that has to create new 
opportunities in the business environment. The competence perspective on 
gaining competitive advantage has in the following years been embraced 
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by many other business researchers (e.g. Combs & Ketchen Jr, 1999; Litz, 
1996; Powell, 1992; Rindova & Fombrun, 1999).  
 
However, soon after the introduction of the RBV its universal rule of 
exploiting unique resources to create phases of sustainable competitive 
advantage has also been brought up for debate. In a turbulent business 
environment a large stock of valuable resources is nice to have, but, 
according to Teece, Pisano, and Shuen (1997), it does not make the real 
difference. Pointing to firms that have actually been successful in global 
competitive battles, they explain that what organizations really need to 
excel are dynamic capabilities. They stress that competing is not a static 
game or analysis. It is a dynamic process of developing, accumulating, 
combining, and protecting unique skills and capabilities. What 
organizations, therefore, should pursue, in a business environment that 
continuously changes, are capabilities that help to pro-actively shape the 
competition process. To be more precise, capabilities are needed that are 
dynamic so that they can help to repetitively break the existing competitive 
status-quo and create short-term consecutive temporary advantages. In 
order to achieve this situation of continuous strategic renewal Zollo and 
Winter (2002) stress the fact that dynamic capabilities generally arise from 
an organization’s ability both learn and unlearn. Table 2.1 summarizes the 
development of competitive paradigms since the 1980s. 
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Inside-out approach 
 
  Outside-in 
approach 
Resource Based View Dynamic Capabilities 
View 
Leading 
scholars  
Porter (1980) 
Ansoff (1965)   
Andrews (1971) 
Wernerfelt (1984)  
Barney (1991) 
Teece (1997; 2007) 
Winter (2003) 
Helfat et al. (2007) 
Strategic aim Create defensible 
long term position 
Create phases of 
sustainable  
advantage 
Create consecutive 
temporary 
advantages 
Competitive 
focus 
Industry-level forces 
and strategic moves 
Unique resources and 
competences 
Dynamic capabilities 
Managerial 
ambition 
Incremental strategic 
adjustments 
Waves of strategic 
renewal 
Ongoing strategic 
renewal 
Key adjective Reactive  Adaptive Proactive 
Key verb Fitting Stretching Learning 
Table 2-1: Strategic management paradigms 
Derived from López (2005) and Hamel and Prahalad (1994) 
 
 
2.3 DYNAMIC CAPABILITIES, WHAT ARE THEY? 
 
Now that we know why and how the idea of dynamic capabilities has 
entered the strategic management domain, the next step is to explain what 
dynamic capabilities actually are and how they work. In a recent review on 
dynamic capabilities Helfat, Finkelstein, Mitchell, Peteraf, Singh, Teece, 
and Winter (2007: 4) define a dynamic capability as follows. “A dynamic 
capability is the capacity of an organization to purposefully create, extend, 
or modify its resource base”. A key element in this definition is the 
organization’s resource base, which they describe as “all tangible, 
intangible, and human resources, as well as the capabilities which the 
organization owns, controls, or has access to” (Helfat, et al., 2007: 4). Two 
important nouns in this second definition are resources and capabilities. 
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The former refers to firm-specific assets crucial for the ‘input-throughput-
output’ process, which can be categorized into physical resources, financial 
resources, human resources, and intellectual resources (e.g. Johnson, 
Scholes, & Whittington, 2006). The latter refers to “the ability of an 
organization to perform a coordinated set of tasks, utilizing organizational 
resources, for the purpose of achieving a particular end result” (Helfat & 
Peteraf, 2003: 999). In other words, linking resources in a coherent way to 
reach a certain organizational goal transforms resources into capabilities.  
 
At the heart of this transformation process are organizational routines 
(Helfat & Peteraf, 2003; Winter, 2003; Zollo & Winter, 2002) or sets of 
routines called processes (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). Zollo and Winter 
(2002) differentiate between operating routines and search routines. “The 
first type of routine involves the execution of known procedures for the 
purpose of generating current revenue and profit, while the second seeks to 
bring about desirable changes in the existing set of operating routines for 
the purpose of enhancing profit in the future” (Zollo & Winter, 2002: 341). 
Manufacturing or supply chain routines are, because of their repetitive 
stable patterns of behaviour, presented as typical examples of operating 
routines. Routines or sets of routines that incorporate change, such as 
research and development, strategic decision making, and alliance 
building, are placed under the umbrella of search routines. There is broad 
consensus about the fact that because of their change capacity search 
routines are directly related to dynamic capabilities. They are perceived as 
the underlying processes by which dynamic capabilities are put into action, 
or as mechanisms to develop new or modify existing capabilities.  
 
Furthermore, two categories of processes or routines can be derived from 
the definition introduced at the beginning of this paragraph, namely search 
and selection processes and configuration and deployment processes. The 
former deal with content related ‘what’ questions about the organization’s 
strategic direction. Organizations have to activate the learning capabilities 
to gather knowledge from the environment and translate this information 
into viable new business solutions on a continuous basis. This intentional 
search and selection process is captured in the definition’s words: “to 
purposefully create, extend, or modify”. However, to successfully execute 
the managerial plans the organization also needs a “resource base” that has 
the capacity to keep adjusting to the fluctuating strategic demands. 
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Therefore, the latter processes, relate to “how” questions, regarding the 
configuration and deployment of new or existing resources in such a way 
to achieve congruence with the changing competitive moves. This 
indicates that a tight interaction between search and selection and 
configuration and deployment processes exists. They, therefore, also 
should be analyzed in close connection to judge their practical outcome 
properly. Helfat et al. (2007) speak of combining content and process to 
understand the functioning of dynamic capabilities. 
 
This assumption seems appropriate. After all, under disruptive 
circumstances, “where management must periodically destroy what has 
been created in order to reconstruct a new organization better suited for the 
next wave of competition or technology” (Tushman & O'Reilly, 1996: 24), 
balancing search and selection with configuration and deployment will 
probably be the key to repetitive success. The crucial point is that too much 
emphasis on strategic change, innovation and renewal, without properly 
embedding the change strategies in the organization may create chaos. Yet, 
a too strong focus on improving existing organizational routines stimulates 
conservatism and may lead to rigidity in the organization (Volberda, 1998; 
Weick, 1979). Both directions are dangerous and can lead to business 
decline (Hambrick & D'Aveni, 1988). To overcome this dilemma Ashby 
(1956) beliefs that organizations need a variety of dynamic capabilities at 
least as great as the variety of disturbances they encounter from the 
environment.  
 
Following this line of reasoning, Volberda (1996, 1998) argues that when 
organizations are faced with hypercompetition they should simultaneously 
pursue three different types of flexible dynamic capabilities. First, 
organizations need strategic flexible dynamic capabilities to react swiftly 
and adequately to strategic, competitive developments. He points, for 
example, to processes or routines that help to dismantle existing strategies, 
apply new technologies, develop new products, seek new product-market 
combinations, and anticipate competitive changes. It could be argued that 
Volberda’s (1998) strategic manoeuvring capabilities rely on the search 
and selection processes advocates of the dynamic capabilities view refer to.  
 
Second, organizational performance under turbulent circumstances also 
depends on structural flexible dynamic capabilities, meaning that the 
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organization’s architectural system must have sufficient built-in flexibility 
to reconfigure the resource base in response to changes in demand or 
source capacity. In this respect one could think of routines that, for 
example, stimulate customized production, job rotation, co-makership, and 
co-design. Third, organizations need operational flexible dynamic 
capabilities to cope with the everyday instabilities within their task 
environment. This last form of capabilities asks for routines that, for 
instance, can help to vary the organization’s production volume, keep 
inventories under control, or support the deployment of flexible workers. 
There seems to be a strong relationship between the activation of structural 
and operational dynamic capabilities and organizational processes 
focussing on configuration and deployment. 
 
In order to cope with hypercompetition Volberda, furthermore, explains 
that this mix of different types of flexible dynamic capabilities should 
possesses a certain form of hierarchy.  His main assumption is that 
strategic renewal and organizational adaptation can only prosper if, above 
all, the controllability of the organization is safeguarded. In this respect, a 
sort of causal hierarchy is expected, starting with the operational flexible 
dynamic flexible capabilities that lay the foundation for the activation of 
structural flexible dynamic flexible capabilities; and subsequently the 
organization’s structural flexible dynamic capabilities create a solid base 
for the deployment of strategic flexible dynamic capabilities. Only when 
this hierarchical aligned mixture of dynamic capabilities exists strategic 
and structural flexible dynamic capabilities can fulfil their disequilibrium-
creating key roles successfully.  
 
Because of the tight relationship between search and selection and 
configuration and deployment processes dynamic capabilities seem to 
become rather idiosyncratic or firm-specific. Yet, Eisenhardt and Martin 
(2000) make clear that this assumption is only partially true. Based on a 
number of concrete business examples they explain that dynamic 
capabilities are in detail certainly unique but that the underlying processes 
can also be quite common across firms.  Using cross-functional teams is, 
for example, a common approach for many organizations to stimulate the 
capability of new product development. However, within this common 
direction organizations have been able to positively distinguish themselves. 
Some organizations specifically excelled in assembling effective multi-
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functional teams, some in applying workable knowledge creation routines 
within their teams, or others in effectively using their team leaders to 
buffer the team from outside interferences.  This example shows that a 
dynamic capability and its underlying processes can be equal across firms, 
but it is the firm-specific interpretation of the actual routines to use that 
leads to a different practical emphasis. Figure 2.1 schematically 
summarizes the insights discussed in this paragraph. These insights have 
also led to the study’s first hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Organizations that possess a combination of strategic, 
structural, and operational flexible dynamic capabilities perform 
successfully within turbulent environments. 
 
 
 
Figure 2-1: The ‘what’ and ‘how’ of dynamic capabilities 
Derived from Helfat et al. (2007) 
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2.4 ORGANIZATIONAL DETERMINANTS OF DYNAMIC 
CAPABILITIES 
 
Helfat and Peteraf (2009) have recently pointed out the basic chain of logic 
in leading dynamic capabilities articles (see figure 2.2 below). As already 
mentioned, they explain that dynamic capabilities rest on organizational 
processes. These processes are schematically presented as the determinants 
of the organization’s search, selection, reconfiguration, and deployment 
capabilities. It must, however, be said that based on earlier work of Teece 
(2007)  Helfat and Peteraf use the terminology opportunity identification, 
investment, and reconfiguration capabilities instead of search, selection, 
reconfiguration, and deployment capabilities.   
 
 
Figure 2-2: The logical chain of dynamic capabilities 
Derived from Teece (2007) and Helfat & Peteraf (2009) 
 
 
So far, the academic debate on dynamic capabilities has focused on 
stimulating strategic renewal or innovation. The central idea is that only 
through innovative business concepts, new products or product features 
firms can challenge their opponents and stay ahead of the game. Helfat and 
Peteraf (2009) explain that the existing body of work engages the 
innovation process from three different angles. First, one way to become 
more innovative is for organizations to improve their ability to identify 
new business opportunities, which means investing in dynamic 
capabilities, such as external knowledge integration (Tripsas, 1997), 
market orientation (Menguc & Auh, 2006), strategic political management 
(Oliver & Holzinger, 2008), and strategic decision-making (Adner & 
Helfat, 2003). Second, organizations can also concentrate on their potential 
to actually transform promising business opportunities into commercially 
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viable solutions. Dynamic capabilities, such as research and development 
(Helfat, 1997), new product development (Deeds, et al., 1999), and 
acquisition (Capron, Dussauge, & Mitchell, 1998), dominate this research 
stream. Third, organizations can stimulate innovation by the 
reconfiguration of new and existing processes and routines. Within this 
theoretical discussion dynamic capabilities, such as morphing (Rindova & 
Kotha, 2001), patching (Eisenhardt & Brown, 1999), and alliance-building 
(Draulans, De Man, & Volberda, 2003; Gerwin & Ferris, 2004; Powell, 
Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996; Sivadas & Dwyer, 2000), are being 
presented. The advantage of these contributions is that organizations 
receive information on specific dynamic capabilities that stimulate 
innovation. Yet, refocusing on figure 2-2, the academic main focus seems 
to be on the dynamic capabilities squares of opportunity identification, 
investment, and reconfiguration.  
 
Concentrating on the box ‘processes’, recently the idea has taken root that 
ambidexterity is an important organizational dynamic capability to invest 
in when in hypercompetition (Jansen, Tempelaar, Van den Bosch, & 
Volberda, 2009; O'Reilly & Tushman, 2008). In short, ambidexterity 
means two-headedness in a sense that organizations should combine their 
striving for innovativeness with safeguarding organizational alignment 
(Benner & Tushman, 2003; He & Wong, 2004; Holmqvist, 2004; Rivkin & 
Siggelkow, 2003; Sidhu, Commandeur, & Volberda, 2007; Tushman & 
O'Reilly, 1996). Organizational learning and organizational design are the 
two most commonly mentioned drivers for achieving organizational 
ambidexterity. In this respect, Hanssen-Bauer and Snow (1996: 413), state 
that “without the ability to learn and to restructure internal and external 
relationships, companies in hypercompetitive environments inevitably will 
lose to compete successfully”.  
 
Generally speaking, business scientists believe that organizational learning 
is a crucial organizational ability for the development of dynamic 
capabilities and the evolution of operating routines (Zollo & Winter, 2002). 
Complementary to organizational learning organizational design has been 
introduced as an important enabler to deal with environmental turbulence, 
in a sense that an organizational framework with reconfiguration 
possibilities is needed to support the organization’s successive strategic 
changes (Staber & Sydow, 2002). In line with these ideas, Volberda (1996, 
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1998) identifies the managerial task of creating dynamic capabilities and 
the organizational design task of safeguarding the controllability of the 
organization as two crucial drivers to merge ambidexterity’s contradictory 
demands of organizational change and stability. In the next two paragraphs 
absorptive capacity and modular organizing are being introduced as 
organizational determinants that have the potential to respectively fulfil 
this managerial and organizational role. Absorptive capacity is being 
presented as a meta-managerial learning ability that supports the process of 
creating a mixture of dynamic capabilities needed to cope with the 
demands of the organization’s varied business environment. The selection 
of modular organizing is based on Teece’s (2009: 44) idea that an 
architectural framework based on the principles of decentralization, near-
decomposability, and loose coupling could serves as a “key 
(micro)foundation of dynamic capabilities” because of the ability to 
continuously align and realign assets. 
 
Absorptive Capacity 
 
The discussion on organizational learning brings to the surface the problem 
of openness that all organizations have to face. Making sense of what the 
business environment is about and relating these ideas to one’s own 
strategic position, paradigm, and way of doing things is an ongoing process 
for every organization (Weick, 1979). In this respect, a growing body of 
literature suggests that all organizations faced with the dynamism, 
complexity, and uncertainty of today’s business environment need to strive 
for absorptive capacity as a sort of meta-learning capability; for it is the 
organization’s interpretative capability that really makes the difference. 
After all, in the end it all comes down to answering the “what” and “how” 
questions in the best possible way and consequently choosing those 
strategic, structural, and operational dynamic capabilities to invest in that 
suit the environmental dynamics best.  
 
Cohen and Levinthal (1989) were the first ones to introduce the concept of 
absorptive capacity. They explain that: “most innovations result from 
borrowing rather than invention……The ability to exploit external 
knowledge is thus a critical component of innovative capabilities. We 
argue that the ability to evaluate and utilize outside knowledge is largely a 
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function of prior related knowledge……Thus, prior related knowledge 
confers an ability to recognize the value of new information, assimilate it, 
and apply it to commercial ends. These abilities collectively constitute 
what we call a firm’s absorptive capacity” (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990: 
128).  
 
So, according to them an organization’s absorptive capacity depends above 
all on its level of prior related knowledge. One of their main assumptions is 
that organizational learning is a cumulative process, from which the 
outcome improves when it is based on what is already known. Another key 
assumption they make is that an organization’s possession of related 
expertise will help to better interpret signals coming from the environment, 
which subsequently helps to proactively develop viable new business 
opportunities.   
 
After the introduction of their basic idea Cohen and Levinthal’s construct 
has gotten a lot of academic support. For example, Lane and Lubatkin 
(1998) divide the concept of absorptive capacity into three sub capabilities: 
(1) the ability to recognize and value new external knowledge (know-
what); (2) the ability to assimilate new external knowledge (know-how), 
and (3) the ability to commercialize new external knowledge (know-why). 
Zahra and George (2002) have further unravelled these capabilities and 
introduced knowledge acquisition, assimilation, transformation, and 
exploitation as the four distinct dimensions of absorptive capacity. 
 
Knowledge acquisition refers to an organization’s processes and routines 
that help to identify and acquire external knowledge of strategic 
importance. Knowledge assimilation refers to those organizational 
processes and routines that support analyzing, processing, interpreting, and 
understanding the externally obtained knowledge. Knowledge 
transformation refers to the possession of specific organizational routines 
and processes that facilitate the process of combining existing knowledge 
with the newly acquired and assimilated knowledge. Knowledge 
exploitation refers to routines and processes that make it possible for an 
organization to incorporate the newly acquired, assimilated and 
transformed knowledge into its operations. These knowledge processes 
link the concept of absorptive capacity to the idea that deliberate learning 
stimulates the evolution of dynamic capabilities.  In this respect, Zollo and 
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Winter (2002) argue that dynamic capabilities emerge from a recursive 
learning cycle, in which knowledge evolves through a series of 
interconnected stages similar to the ones discussed above.  
 
On the whole, it could be argued that knowledge acquisition and 
assimilation have much in common with the “what- function” of 
organizational search and selection processes. In addition, knowledge 
exploitation and transformation resemble the “how-function” of 
organizational configuration and deployment processes introduced by 
advocates of the dynamic capabilities view. Basically, absorptive capacity 
is being presented as an organizational learning ability with the same two-
headed focus. First, there is the strategic focus of deriving new commercial 
advantages from externally obtained knowledge. Second, there is the 
practical focus of how the commercial plans can be concretised into usable 
organizational practices. Generally speaking, absorptive capacity 
represents an organizational meta-learning ability that serves the goal of 
comprehensive interpretation before the actual process of organizational 
enactment is put into motion. To be more precise, it acts as an 
organizational determinant that fuels and directs the organization’s 
strategic decision making process  by helping to successfully answer the 
“what” and “how” questions. By doing so, absorptive capacity directly 
seems to contribute to the creation of a fit between the organization’s 
strategic, structural, and operational dynamic capabilities. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Absorptive capacity is positively related to an organization’s 
strategic, structural, and operational flexible dynamic capabilities. 
 
Modular Organizing 
 
In the search for alternative organizational structures Daft and Lewin 
(1993: i) explain that: “The trend appears to be moving away from the 
paradigm within which organizations strive for mass production 
efficiencies, hierarchical organization, and bureaucratic structures that 
provide central control over activities divided into small parts”. The 
traditional, bureaucratic structure is, according to them, loosing ground 
rapidly, because it cannot combine the high levels of speed, quality, and 
productivity needed in today’s highly competitive, technology-driven, 
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global businesses arena. Moreover, it does not support the organizational 
ability to change rapidly and adapt easily to the continuously changing 
competitive circumstances. The new hypercompetition paradigm suggests 
that organizations have to aim for forms and functions that help them to 
rapidly attract and give up competencies (Baker, 1992; Ciborra, 1996).  
 
In this search for new organizational structures Schilling (2000) has 
identified three factors, typical for the hypercompetitive environment, that 
have stimulated the migration toward increasing modularity. First, 
environmental urgency, divided into speed of technological change and 
increasing global competitive intensity, has pushed organizations to look 
for ways to innovate faster and to adjust easier. Second, heterogeneity of 
customer demands, in desired function or scale, has stimulated an 
organizational focus on customization. Third, the heterogeneity of inputs, 
such as differential capabilities among firms and diversity in technological 
options, has boosted inter-firm product cooperation. 
 
Table 2-2 gives some definitions of modularity. All the definitions stress 
the fact that modularity is about independent or autonomous subsystems 
functioning together. The concept has gained importance because of its 
adaptability potential needed in today’s turbulent business environment. 
Schilling (2000) explains the advantage of a modular system to be the 
capability of separating and recombining independent components into 
new configurations. Modular principles have been adopted by a number of 
industries; examples are: Woolsey (1994) for the aircraft industry, Lima 
(1997), Marx et al (1997), Nevins and Whitney (1989), and Tully (1993) 
for the automobile industry, Galvin and Morkel (2001) for the bicycle 
industry, Cusumano (1991) and Greenbaum (1997) for the computer 
software industry, and Langlois and Robertson (1992) and Baldwin and 
Clarke (1997) for the computer hardware industry. 
 
Modularity theorists base their thinking primarily on Simon’s (1962) work 
on the architecture of complexity. Simon sees all complex systems –
biological, technical, or social- as hierarchically nested entities. He 
explains that each system is composed of interrelated finer subsystems, 
which in turn consist of finer subsystems themselves, and so on until 
ultimately the level of elementary particles is reached. The challenge in 
modular design is to find a structure that yields the best system 
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decomposition, meaning to set the boundaries in such a way that 
interdependencies between subsystems are minimized and the system can 
almost be cleanly decomposed (Langlois, 2002). This principle, known as 
near-decomposability, lays the foundation for the modularity design’s 
potential to simultaneously activate strategic, structural, and operational 
flexible dynamic capabilities (Garud, Kumaraswamy, & Langlois, 2003; 
Karim, 2006; Sanchez, 1996). 
 
Author Definition 
Samchez & Mahoney 
(1996) 
“Modularity is a special form of design which 
intentionally creates a high degree of 
independence or ‘loose coupling’ between 
component designs by standardizing component 
interface specifications.” 
Baldwin & Clark 
(1997) 
“Modularity is building a complex product or 
process from smaller subsystems that can be 
designed independently yet function together as a 
whole.” 
Schilling (2000) “Modularity is a general systems concept: it is a 
continuum describing the degree to which a 
system’s components can be separated and 
recombined, and it refers both to the tightness of 
coupling between components and the degree to 
which the “rules” of the system architecture 
enable (or prohibit) the mixing and matching of 
components.” 
Langlois (2002) “Modularity is a general set of design principles 
for managing the complexity of large-scale 
interdependent systems. It involves breaking up 
the system into discrete chunks that communicate 
with each other through standardized interfaces 
or rules and specifications.” 
Table 2-2: Definitions of modularity 
 
 
Sanchez (1995) argues that resource flexibility is an important source for 
achieving strategic flexibility. He explains that resource flexibility 
increases when: “there is a larger range of alternative uses…..the costs and 
difficulty of switching are lower…..the time required to switch is lower”. 
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Organizational modularity is a typical design strategy that has the potential 
to create these conditions. Based on the principle of near-decomposability 
resources are being confined to modular component structures. In general, 
a module can be seen as an independent sub system, except for the 
restriction that the output has to comply with the general rules or 
specifications of the overall system it is entirely free in its own design. In 
this respect, Brusoni (2005: 1886) states that: “each module, at the 
extreme, could become the sole business of a specialist firm, which would 
have complete design authority over the specific module on which it 
focuses”. Standardized interfaces allow the mixing and matching of these 
independent modules into different constellations. This ease of 
recombining modules has stimulated the development of different sorts of 
strategic flexible dynamic capabilities. For example, modular design has 
made it possible to rather easily invent and apply new technologies, 
develop new products, and add new features to existing products (e.g. 
Brusoni, 2005; Langlois & Robertson, 1992; Loch, Terwiesch, & Thomke, 
2001; Sanchez, 1995, 1996; Sanchez & Mahoney, 1996; Ulrich, 1995; 
Worren, Moore, & Cardona, 2002). 
 
To understand the relationship between modular design and the activation 
of structural flexible dynamic capabilities it is useful to focus on the 
contrast with traditional design strategies. The traditional design 
methodology is characterized by highly integrated and tightly coupled 
component designs. Sanchez et al. (1996) explain that tightly coupled 
component designs require intensive managerial coordination, since a 
change in the design of one component is likely to require extensive 
compensating changes in the design of many interrelated components. 
Sanchez et al. (1996: 65) states that modularity “is a special form of design 
which intentionally creates a high degree of independence or ‘loose 
coupling’ between component designs by standardizing component 
interface specifications.” The standardization process creates, what 
Sanchez et al. (1996) call embedded coordination. Basically, by controlling 
only the required output of components, effective coordination can be 
achieved without the continual exercise of managerial authority.  
 
Modularity’s underlying philosophy of loose coupling has positively 
influenced the activation of certain structural flexible dynamic capabilities. 
For example it has offered organizations the possibility to reorganize their 
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internal production processes in such a way that economies of scope and 
scale could be obtained simultaneously (Brusoni & Prencipe, 2006; 
Langlois, 2000). Moreover, the widely embraced standardization approach 
has also stimulated the development of modular value networks between 
organizations (Anand & Daft, 2007; Krikke, Le Blanc, & Velde, 2004; 
Majumdar, 1997; Mikkola, 2003). In this respect, Schilling and Steensma 
(2001) argue that organizations increasingly rely on modular 
organizational forms, such as contract manufacturing, alternative work 
arrangements, and alliance formations, to create the adaptability potential 
needed to operate successfully within the current turbulent competitive 
business environment. They state that “by breaking their hierarchies down 
into components that can be fluidly recombined in a variety of production 
configurations, firms can more quickly adapt to diverse customer needs 
and changing environments” (Schilling & Steensma, 2001: 1163).  
 
The positive relationship between modular design and the activation of 
operational flexible dynamic capabilities also relates to the advantages of 
loosely coupled systems. According to Galbraith (1973) reducing the need 
to process information should be an alternative strategy for organizations 
to follow when uncertainty keeps rising to a level that using basic 
managerial techniques alone is no longer sufficient. One of the main 
options that he, in this respect, proposes is that organizations should try to 
create self-contained tasks. Modularity’s principle of designing a system 
made up of loosely coupled component structures strongly complies with 
Galbraith’s idea. Generally speaking, by using fixed, self-supporting, 
autonomous modules and by controlling only the required output of these 
modules an organizational system is created that can benefit from specific 
advantages such as the localization of adaptation and trouble, and the 
reduction of costs for coordination (Orton & Weick, 1990; Weick, 1976). 
These advantages effectively seem to contribute to the generation of very 
useful operational flexible dynamic capabilities. In this respect, one could 
think of having the ability to deal with time delays, change production 
sequences, adjust the overall production process by using other materiel or 
production devices, and to react to short term fluctuations in a firm’s level 
of activity by building in different sorts of slack (Perrow, 1984; Sagan, 
1993). 
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Hypothesis 3: Modular organizing is positively related to an 
organization’s strategic, structural, and operational flexible dynamic 
capabilities. 
 
Lateral Coordination 
 
Moreover, within the general debate on organizational learning and 
organizational design as key drivers to deal with hypercompetition 
collaboration processes play a predominant role. The main idea is that 
successful competitive performance depends strongly on the ability of 
organizations, business units, subsidiaries and functional departments to 
cooperate, share knowledge and jointly develop new products, services or 
technologies (Argyris, 1992; Ashkenas, Ulrich, & Kerr, 1995; Kogut & 
Zander, 1992). In this theoretical discussion on intra and inter-
organizational networking lateral coordination is being presented as an 
organizational determinant that facilitates the organization’s absorptive 
capacity as well as its modular organizing ability. In doing so, lateral 
coordination basically plays a twofold indirect role in the process of 
activating a mixture of strategic, structural, and operational flexible 
dynamic capabilities. 
 
The facilitating role of lateral coordination on a firm’s absorptive capacity 
asks for a refocus on the work of Zahra and George (2002). Apart from the 
introduction of the four dimensions of absorptive capacity, they also pay 
attention to its antecedents. Based on Cohen and Levinthal’s (1990) 
seminal article, they argue that social integration mechanisms have a 
positive effect on organizational knowledge absorption, because they 
facilitate the flow of information within the organization. Cohen and 
Levinthal (1990) argue that although an organization’s absorptive capacity 
strongly relies on the knowledge and learning skills of its employees, it is 
more than just the sum of the absorptive capacities of these individual 
members. Especially assimilating and exploiting newly acquired 
knowledge asks, according to them, for organizational structures, 
processes, and routines that stimulate the transfer of knowledge across and 
within subunits.  
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Todorova and Durisin (2007) have worked out this idea. They explain that 
each of the four dimensions of absorptive capacity can be conceptualized 
as a set of social interactions; and, therefore, the knowledge processes that 
take place between them have to be influenced by social mechanism. 
Lateral coordination is believed to be one of the most important social 
mechanisms involved. For example, Kogut and Zander (1992) argue that 
the process of transferring and sharing knowledge between different 
knowledge areas depends to a large extent on the presence of combinative 
capabilities. Lateral coordination, between different individuals and units 
is, in this context, being presented as a key combinative capability. Taking 
up Kogut and Zander’s ideas, Van den Bosch, Volberda, and De Boer 
(1999) have hypothesized a strong direct effect of coordination capabilities 
on a firm’s absorptive capacity. In follow-up research conducted at a 
European multi-unit financial services firm Jansen, Van den Bosch, and 
Volberda (2005) conclude that coordination capabilities specifically 
enhance the organization’s potential for knowledge acquisition and 
assimilation. 
 
The general idea that lateral coordination stimulates the transfer of 
knowledge, developing a richer knowledge environment and, 
consequently, increasing the level of innovation is also supported by 
various other empirical studies from outside the absorptive capacity 
domain. See for example, Van de Ven (1986) and Tsai (2002) point to the 
added value of informal lateral relations in the sharing of knowledge; 
Tushman (1977) discusses the effect of using liaisons as special boundary 
spanners on the process of organizational innovation; Cummings (2004) 
stresses the positive effect of multifunctional teams on external knowledge 
sharing; and besides liaison positions, Gupta and Govindarajan (2000) also 
mention the positive influence of task forces and permanent committees on 
the flow of knowledge across organizational boundaries. 
 
Hypothesis 4: As an antecedent for absorptive capacity, lateral 
coordination is indirectly related to an organization’s strategic, structural, 
and operational flexible dynamic capabilities. 
 
Apart from its stimulating effect on an organization’s absorptive capacity, 
lateral coordination also influences the organization's modular organizing 
potential. A point of concern worth mentioning regarding modular 
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organizational design is the fact that Baldwin and Clark (1997) have 
derived their modularity rules from the development of the IBM 
System/360 family of mainframe computers. By speaking in terms of rules 
and parameters, they have adopted a strong ‘engineering’ approach to 
modular design. The problem is that their technical insights coming from 
modular product design can only partially be applied in the context of 
social systems, such as team-based organizations.  
 
Practical business experiences have shown that in reality Simon’s (1962) 
concept of near-decomposability is difficult to achieve. Simon (1962) 
describes near-decomposability as breaking up the system in separate 
modules, whereas the interactions among the modules are weak but not 
negligible. Modularity theory strongly relates to this concept because it 
creates autonomous sub-units that can easily be recombined into other 
configurations. Ethiraj and Levinthal (2004b: 172) have analyzed 
modularity and innovation in complex organizational systems, and based 
on their research findings have come to the following conclusion: 
“Designers engage in acts of creation, but unlike a divine creator, they lack 
omniscience. Choices of modules are guesses about appropriate 
decompositions –decompositions that even in reality are only partial.” 
Basically, they conclude that suitable partitions, capturing the nearly 
decomposable structure of complex organizational systems, are not self-
evident. This leads to situations in which firms end up with organizational 
systems that are either characterized by an excessive level of integration or 
an overly refined level of modularization. 
 
The fact that it is very difficult to create autonomous organizational 
modules puts a strain on the aspect of interfaces. So far, modularity theory 
has primarily focused on the need for compatible technology to achieve 
synthesis within modularly built products or inter-organizational value 
networks (Langlois & Robertson, 1992). However, one can imagine that to 
reach a satisfactory plug-and-play end state within a social system 
consisting of suboptimal organizational modules the coupling and de-
coupling processes should not only be based on technical aspects, but also 
on organizational aspects (Hellström & Wikström, 2005).  
 
Various scholars have pointed to lateral coordination as a crucial 
organizational mechanism to deal with this issue. For example, Mohrman, 
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Cohen and Mohrman (1995) argue that the complexity of today’s multi-
team collaboration structures asks for mutual adjustment with other teams, 
organizational elements, or incumbents. Ancona and Caldwell (1992) have 
acknowledged the importance of inter-team collaboration as well, and 
have, therefore, focused their scientific attention on the external activities 
teams use in the interaction with their task environment. They conclude 
that a combination of ambassador and coordinator activities positively 
influences team performance. The former category refers to activities such 
as protecting the team form outside pressure, persuading others to support 
the team, and lobbying for resources. The latter category refers to activities 
such as discussing problems with others, obtaining feedback, and 
negotiating with outsiders. All in all, their findings support the idea that 
lateral coordination is an important ability for teams to make local, ad-hoc 
choices on how to deal with problems, deviations and new information.  
 
Sinha and Van de Ven (2005) have specifically linked the implications of 
today’s hypercompetitive business environment to the aspect of work 
design within organizations and have come to the same basic conclusion. 
They argue that since outsourcing, relational contracts, strategic alliances, 
and value chain networks are becoming the predominant organizational 
form for doing work, “the use of cross-functional, non-hierarchical 
methods of integration is emerging to coordinate modular work designs 
that are distributed within and between organizations” (Sinha & Van de 
Ven, 2005: 393). Hoegl et al. (2004) have investigated this assumption in 
an actual modular, multi-team, project context. They have found out that 
task interdependencies, originating from a system’s sub optimal 
architecture, indeed lead to a situation in which teams become dependent 
on the input of other teams for the execution of their main tasks. Teams, 
therefore, have to put extra energy into, for example, synchronizing 
technical data and attuning activities to meet their time schedules and stay 
within their budgets. Moreover, they stress the fact that many complex 
modular projects are characterized by high levels of uncertainty, which 
makes it necessary to have lateral coordination mechanisms available that 
help to effectively react to changing or new circumstances.  
 
Hypothesis 5: As an antecedent for modular organizing, lateral 
coordination is indirectly related to an organization’s strategic, structural, 
and operational flexible dynamic capabilities. 
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The relationship between Modular Organizing and Absorptive 
Capacity 
 
Apart from their direct effects on the development of a mixture of different 
types of dynamic capabilities, strategic management theory also has 
hypothesized a strong interrelationship between modular organizing and 
absorptive capacity. Grant’s (1996) identification of three different types of 
knowledge absorption has been the starting point of this assumed 
relationship. First, he mentions the scope of knowledge absorption that 
refers to the spectrum of specialized knowledge an organization has access 
to. Second, he introduces the flexibility of knowledge absorption that refers 
to the ability to tap into additional sources of knowledge or reconfigure an 
organization’s existing knowledge base. Third, he recognizes the efficiency 
of knowledge absorption that refers to the productivity of a firm in utilizing 
the knowledge that its individual organizational members possess  
 
Van den Bosch et al. (1999) have analyzed the impact of three basic 
organizational forms, the functional, divisional, and matrix form, on these 
different types of knowledge absorption. They argue that the functional 
form has a negative impact on absorptive capacity, because under turbulent 
circumstances the functional compartmentalization hampers the internal 
and external communication flow too much. The divisional form is 
perceived to have a moderate impact on absorptive capacity. On one hand 
the autonomy of divisions or business units stimulates decentralized 
reciprocity with the business environment; on the other hand the 
autonomous position of these subsystems could also handicap the transfer 
of knowledge between them. They believe the matrix form to have a 
positive impact on absorptive capacity, because matrix structures have the 
ability to combine functional expertise with the formation of rather 
autonomous (temporary) structures. This dual character enables the 
allocation of available means and persons to various projects, which 
positively influences the scope and flexibility of knowledge absorption 
(Van den Bosch, et al., 1999: 555). On the whole could be argued that the 
matrix form supports the demand of multiplexity better than the other 
organizational forms. Staber and Sydow (2002: 414) define multiplexity as 
“the number and diversity of relations between actors in organizations or 
inter-organizational networks”. According to them, multiplexity is 
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important because it makes it possible to gain access to different sources of 
knowledge, improving the organization’s innovative ability. 
 
Van den Bosch et al. (1999) have conducted two qualitative case studies to 
analyze their hypotheses. They focused on the transformation process that 
two Dutch publishing firms have gone trough since the 1980s to develop 
from mainly folio businesses into hybrid businesses capable of 
commercializing both folio and new media products and services. The 
results show that during this process one of these publishers largely 
retained its functional design at the macro level. However, at the micro-
level, within a newly erected new business development department, the 
organization increasingly started using inter and intra organizational 
project structures. This type of organizing is also being referred to as a 
project matrix design (Gobeli & Larson, 1987). The other publisher 
changed its macro structure twice. First, the functional form was 
abandoned and converted into a divisional form. Later, this divisional form 
was changed into a matrix design. For both publishers the decision to 
change their design characteristics was based on the fact that they wanted 
to increase their level of multiplexity. 
 
It could be argued that the proposed mixing and matching merits of 
modular design strongly relate to the knowledge absorption advantages of 
the project matrix and the permanent matrix form discussed above. The 
general idea of product modularity is to be capable of creating new system 
configurations through the recombination of new or existing components. 
When this principle of reconfiguration is being applied to a context of 
modular organizing, organizational structures emerge that have matrix-like 
advantages. Using Karim’s (2006: 799) words: “reconfiguring structures 
and their resources makes it possible for firms to use resources in new 
combinations, improving the effectiveness of resources and furthering 
innovation”. So, here too functional expertise is being recombined into 
new temporary structures, stimulating organizational learning and 
innovativeness through the transfer and sharing of new and existing 
knowledge and resources.  
 
Hypothesis 6: Modular organizing is positively related to absorptive 
capacity. 
Organizational determinants 
 39 
2.5 THE RELATIVE EFFECTS OF THE DIFFERENT 
DETERMINANTS 
 
After having derived absorptive capacity, modular organizing, and lateral 
coordination from strategic management theory as three critical 
organizational determinants for dealing with environmental turbulence, the 
next step is to focus on their relative effects. Although the theoretical 
review has made clear that these three determinants in close connection are 
capable of activating a broad mixture of flexible dynamic capabilities, it is 
useful additional information for organizations to learn what the division of 
power is like between the three determinants. Moreover, existing research 
has hardly paid attention to the underlying organizational processes for 
activating dynamic capabilities, let alone giving insight into the relative 
power effects of usable organizational determinants.  
 
The predominance of Absorptive Capacity 
 
Lane, Koka and Pathak (2006) have assessed 289 papers on absorptive 
capacity. They argue that it is a key determinant that basically surpasses all 
organizational capabilities, processes, and routines. Initially absorptive 
capacity was introduced as a driver to improve an organization’s R&D 
processes; and R&D spending was used as a concrete indicator for a firm’s 
level of absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). By relying solely 
on this performance indicator Lane et al. (2006) argue that the concept has 
too much been treated as a static resource instead of the meta-learning 
capability that follow-up research presents it to be. In this respect, they 
explain that the commercial outputs that absorptive is made responsible for 
exceeds the development of new products, technologies, or patents. 
Knowledge outputs with commercial value, such as new business concepts, 
technical innovations, and operational improvements can also be the 
outcome of a firm’s absorptive capacity. This general ability makes 
absorptive capacity a managerial dynamic capability of strategic 
importance. After all, facilitating the transfer, sharing, integration, and 
creation of knowledge in order to stir-up the existing status-quo by creating 
innovating business solutions, covering the organization’s entire sphere of 
influence, assumes it to be a deliberate process with an integral focus. It 
can be perceived as a meta-determinant that on a repetitive basis helps the 
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organization’s senior management to move from its starting position to a 
new ‘desired’ competitive end state, taking into account the search and 
selection dimension as well as the configuration and deployment 
dimension of dynamic capabilities.  
 
Approaching absorptive capacity as a key managerial learning capability, 
that stimulates a wide range of organizational reactions, reaching from the 
strategic down to the operational level, ties it to the construct of asset 
orchestration brought forward by advocates of the dynamic capabilities 
approach. In short, Helfat et al. (2007: 26) state that an important 
managerial task is “to collect information, analyze it, synthesize it, and act 
on it inside the firm” in order to successfully anticipate changes in the 
competitive environment. So, assessing signals from the environment, 
relating this information to one’s own business processes, and then 
translating the insights gathered into new viable business solutions is 
basically what both asset orchestration and absorptive capacity are about. It 
could even be argued that asset orchestration and absorptive capacity refer 
to the same capability.  
 
Given the fact that absorptive directs both the organization’s strategic 
moves and the reorganization of its internal routines and processes it is 
probably fair to say that this orchestration function makes it the most 
important organizational determinant of all. A significant part of its 
function is, after all, to set the preconditions for subordinate capabilities, 
routines, and processes. To be more specific absorptive capacity has to 
make it possible to understand the demands coming from the environment, 
translate these demands into, for example, a suitable organizational 
architecture, and ultimately decide on a number of concrete design issues. 
Therefore, the choice to implement a modular organizational design is, 
basically, the outcome of a firm’s absorptive capacity and important 
decisions on, for example, the partition of modules, the configuration of 
the separate modules, and the interactions between modules are also a 
result of this overarching strategic interpretation process. 
 
Hypothesis 7: Absorptive capacity has the strongest relative effect on an 
organization’s strategic, structural, and operational flexible dynamic 
capabilities. 
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Knowledge absorption: Modular Organizing versus Lateral 
Coordination 
 
Recapitulating, existing research has pointed out that organizational form 
and combinative capabilities are antecedents for an organization’s 
absorptive capacity (Van den Bosch, et al., 1999). In this work the question 
which of the two has the upper hand in the process of organizational 
knowledge absorption remains, however, unanswered. What this research 
does show is that only after changing the organizational form it became 
possible for organizations to exploit the knowledge transfer and sharing 
potential of the available combinative capabilities to their full potential. 
This seems to indicate that a proper organizational design is a prerequisite 
for a successful knowledge absorption process. Regarding the 
organizational determinants modular organizing and lateral coordination, 
this would mean that the former plays a more profound role than the latter. 
 
Although this assumption sounds logical, there are is also evidence 
available that judges in favour of the organizational determinant lateral 
coordination. To be more precise, Ahuja (2000) makes an explicit 
connection between innovativeness and organizational form. He explains 
that network forms consisting of partners with many interlocking and 
redundant ties, such as the matrix form that Van den Bosch et al. (1999) 
describe, primarily facilitate the development of trust and cooperation. 
Networks of many non-overlapping, weak ties yield more information 
benefits, according to him. In other words, loose ad-hoc networks between 
individuals that strongly rely on lateral relations and that are not hampered 
by the existence of structural, functional, or hierarchical boundaries, and 
do not have to comply with enforced explicit time and financial 
constraints, are in a better position to exchange information freely. Based 
on this theoretical insight it is also reasonable to suggest that, between the 
two determinants, lateral coordination has the most profound influence on 
a firm’s absorptive capacity. Because the available scientific sources are 
pointing in opposite directions on this issue two contradicting hypotheses 
have been formulated.    
 
Hypothesis 8a: Modular organizing has a stronger relative effect on 
absorptive capacity than lateral coordination.  
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Hypothesis 8b: Lateral coordination has a stronger relative effect on 
absorptive capacity than modular organizing.  
 
 
Modular Organizing and the effect of Lateral Coordination 
 
Regarding the relationship between lateral coordination and modular 
organizing the theoretical insights have made clear that the desired goal of 
creating a system that consists of subsystems that have no or minimal 
exchange or transaction processes with other external modules is difficult 
to achieve in a social system’s context. As a result organizations have to 
invest in lateral coordination mechanisms in order to achieve a sufficient 
level of system integration. This is an interesting situation that cannot be 
taken for granted too easily. After all, it could mean that the much 
propagated advantages of loose coupling, based on the ideal situation that a 
module is a completely independent sub system with only a module input 
and output, are perhaps being exaggerated (Orton & Weick, 1990; Weick, 
1976). Taking a more subtle stand point, it could also mean that despite the 
need to laterally coordinate a workable situation could still be created and 
the advantages of loose coupling would only mildly be affected.  
 
To come to a judgement on this issue, it is useful to relate to Ethiraj and 
Levinthal (2004a: 432) who conclude that: “Local and incremental 
processes can be used to identify useful, if not optimal modules in 
structures that have some inherent hierarchy and decomposability”. The 
point is that this condition of structures having some inherent hierarchy 
and decomposability seems to be applicable to most organizations. After 
all, dividing labor and grouping specialized functions along certain 
hierarchical lines and functional boundaries is a common organizational 
approach (Mintzberg, 1983). This implies that the derivation of clearly 
decomposable structures is in most cases feasible. 
 
However, when these structures are not real modules, because they rely on 
too many functional and hierarchical interdependencies, coordination 
mechanisms become vital. Within the realm of organizing this is not a 
remarkable situation. Of old, coordination mechanisms have been 
presented as integrators to organically merge the surplus of organizational 
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relationships into a workable overall system (Galbraith, 1973; Lawrence & 
Lorsch, 1967; Mintzberg, 1979; Thompson, 1967). Therefore, the fact that 
coordination mechanisms are needed in modularly built organizations is 
not surprising.  
 
Moreover, the fact that a certain level of lateral coordination is needed 
does also not entail that all advantages of loose coupling will be lost or 
badly hampered. In this respect, a defendable view point could be that the 
relationship between lateral coordination and modular organizing is 
curvilinear. In short, it seems obvious that an excessive level of lateral 
coordination should be avoided because it fosters chaotic communication, 
which will have a negative impact on the smoothness of cooperation and 
thus organizational performance. Yet, if the level of lateral coordination 
can be minimized, for example by containing it to certain key persons, 
activities, or milestones, loose-coupling advantages can probably still be 
obtained. What organizations, therefore, should always be aware of is the 
fact that a transition point exists between a beneficial and excessive level 
of lateral coordination. Once this invisible line is crossed and the level of 
lateral coordination become to high, the organization will most likely 
encounter a drop in performance due to all kinds of adjustment problems.   
 
Hypothesis 9: Lateral coordination has a moderately positive effect on 
modular organizing. 
 
 
2.6 COMBINING AD HOC AND HIGHLY PATTERNED 
CHANGE MODES 
 
So far, the theoretical narrative has pointed out that the organizational 
determinants absorptive capacity, modular organizing, and lateral 
coordination form a tightly interrelated triad that helps to activate a 
mixture of strategic, structural, and operational flexible dynamic 
capabilities. This mixture is deemed necessary to cope with the wide 
variety of environmental forces an organization in hypercompetition has to 
deal with. Time or speed of reaction is an important factor that, as yet, has 
remained untouched in this debate on dealing with environmental 
turbulence. 
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When specifically focusing on the wide spectrum of competitive demands 
organizations are confronted with under turbulent circumstances, a picture 
would emerge similar to what is presented below. On the left, most 
advantageous side of this spectrum, organizations have to be capable of 
absorbing clear and slowly developing external non-critical influences. 
Most of the time influences like this fit the organization’s existing mixture 
of flexible dynamic capabilities and do not ask for radical changes or 
innovations. On the right side of the spectrum, organizations have to be 
capable of creating a temporary advantage by pro-actively engaging a 
suddenly enfolding window of opportunity or threat situation. In this case, 
a too strong focus on the alignment of strategic, structural, and operational 
dynamic capabilities may take to long, or it would prevent organizations 
from being genuinely creative and innovative. In the end this could be 
harmful, because opposed to well-considered interpretation, immediate and 
innovative action will most likely be the key to success under these 
circumstances. Of course, in between these extremes numerous alternative 
situations can occur, varying from for example reacting upon a very 
suddenly rising convenient threat, to incrementally developing a 
commercial innovation, or timely anticipating an unforeseen competitive 
move.  
 
In this respect, Volberda (1998: 91) refers to a distinction between acting 
decisively and prudently. The former, means that management 
immediately decides to act upon an emerging environmental influence. The 
latter, implies that management only acts when the situation develops into 
a clearer picture, which improves the possibility to react adequately. In 
sum, it could be argued that hypercompetition compels organizations to 
constantly weigh the pros and cons of two different types of competitive 
demands: (1) to react adequately, (2) to react quickly. For competitive 
developments that belong to the left side of the spectrum mentioned above 
the first demand will dominate at the expense of a high speed of reaction. 
Under these circumstances the main concern is that an organization takes 
adequate measures to prevent a slowly emerging convenient situation from 
turning into something more serious. After all, if a predictable situation 
gets out of control because of malpractice the costs in time, energy, and 
money that have to be made in order to ‘repair’ the situation will really be 
unnecessary. When the occurring competitive influences belong to the mid 
section of the spectrum, balancing the two demands is achievable, because 
the changes are to a large extent foreseeable and they do not carry 
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immediate danger. However, when the forces are unforeseeable and 
critical, thus belonging to right side of the spectrum, the scale will tip in 
favour of the quickness of the reaction. Although this stimulates 
improvisation based on principles such as learning by doing and trial and 
error, which means taking risks, the alternatives of taking more time or 
doing nothing at all would probably lead to a situation much worse within 
a disruptive environment. Figure 2-3 below tries to visualize this trade-off.  
 
 
Figure 2-3: The spectrum of hypercompetition 
 (derived from Volberda (1998)) 
 
Within the dynamic capabilities research stream this difference between 
structured action and improvisation has also been noticed. Winter (2003) 
makes a distinction between a highly patterned change mode and an ad hoc 
way of problem solving. To his opinion the largest part of the competitive 
spectrum consists of first order change inputs that can largely be solved 
with first order dynamic capabilities.  In this respect one could think of 
capabilities that would change de product, the production process, the 
scale, or the markets served. The outcome of applying these capabilities is 
that the organizational reactions get a routine and highly patterned 
character. Yet, regarding ad hoc problem solving he states the following 
(Winter, 2003: 992-993): “Ad hoc problem solving is not routine; in 
particular, not highly patterned and not repetitious…..it typically appears 
as a response to novel challenges from the environment or other relatively 
unpredictable events. Thus, ad hoc problem solving and the exercise of 
dynamic capabilities are two different ways to change.”  
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Nonetheless, when organizations have to function within a 
hypercompetitive environment they have to be capable of dealing with 
both urgent ad hoc problems and first-order change demands. Therefore, 
organizations need organizational determinants that not only support a 
patterned way of reacting, but also have the potential to be switched into a 
sort of improvisation mode when this becomes necessary. Based on 
existing theoretical insights the assumption is defendable that absorptive 
capacity and modular organizing are determinants that can actually play 
this dual role.  
 
As explained in the preceding theoretical discussion both determinants 
contribute to the development of a mixture of flexible dynamic 
capabilities. Thus, in terms of Winter (2003), absorptive capacity and 
modular organizing facilitate the exercise of dynamic capabilities, which 
leads to a highly patterned and routine type of reaction. This conclusion is, 
basically, a reiteration of what we already know. As yet, the relationship 
between the two determinants and ad hoc problem solving or improvisation 
has not been explicitly discussed. 
 
The premise that absorptive capacity’s focal point is to exploit knowledge 
on external stimuli can be the starting point of this discussion. It could be 
argued that when a stimulus is unexpected, time is scarce, and the risks are 
high absorptive capacity has a built-in possibility to compress and simply 
its four sequential knowledge absorption stages to come to a quick, yet 
more ad hoc, way of reacting. The key to this compression and 
simplification process can be found in the aspect of associative learning 
that individuals and organizations alike, in general, rely on for problem 
solving or enhancing their knowledge base (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; 
Zollo & Winter, 2002). Cohen and Levinthal (1990: 129) explain it as 
follows: “the more objects, patterns and concepts that are stored in 
memory, the more readily is new information about these constructs 
acquired and the more facile is the individual in using them in new 
settings”. 
 
Relating this notion to absorptive capacity and the challenge of ad hoc 
problem solving paints a picture in which organizations take past 
experiences as a predominant, hardly debatable, point of reference for the 
sequence of acquiring, assimilating, transforming, and exploiting external 
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knowledge.  The emphasis will be placed on absorptive capacity’s first two 
stages, where the organization has to pigeon-hole the new, unexpected 
stimulus into a known category of prior knowledge. The measures that the 
organization has to take to deal with the new situation, or in other words 
the outcome of the knowledge transformation and exploitation stages,  will 
to a large extent be based on how the organization has reacted during 
earlier events. As a result of this approach the organization can increase its 
speed of reaction and at the same time take advantage of earlier lessons. 
Yet, a major drawback is that real innovative behaviour is not to be 
expected, since the organization acts upon existing mental models. Another 
point of concern is that engaging a new type of situation with old tactics 
carries an inherent level of risk. 
 
Knowledge on the improvisation potential of modular organizing can be 
drawn from Weick’s (1982) seminal insights. He explains that each 
organization has to retain a sort of architectural slack, so that it has a 
flexibility potential readily available to react to sudden, unexpected 
opportunities or threats. In line with Weick’s reasoning Quinn (1980) and 
D’Aveni (1994) also believe that organizations should try to design 
flexibility into their operations in order to react swiftly to changes in the 
environment. To create such an internal context Weick refers to the 
differences between tightly and loosely coupled systems. According to 
Weick a tightly coupled system is best suited for adapting to well-known 
circumstances. Loosely coupled systems, he argues, are better capable of 
dealing with unforeseen changes, because they support ”opportunistic 
adaptation” (Weick, 1982: 387). In accordance with Weick’s ideas Quinn 
(1980) argues that a manifestation of designed flexibility is the ability to 
quickly and easily switch between resources.  
 
Sanchez (1995) explains in this respect that “the services of resources are 
obtained through resources use, and a firm’s strategic flexibility (i.e. its set 
of strategic options), therefore, is constrained by the ways in which a firm 
can use available resources. Strategic flexibility, thus, depends jointly on 
the inherent flexibilities of the resources available to the firm and on the 
firm’s flexibilities in applying those resources to alternative courses of 
action” (Sanchez, 1995: 138). He, furthermore, makes clear that modular 
design, because of its loose coupling advantages, works as a lever to 
increase an organization’s resource flexibility. It is to be expected that 
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when changes in the competitive environment are labelled unpredictable 
this, probably, has to do with the fact that rivalling firms have been able to 
commercialize an unexpected, configuration of new and/or existing 
resources. The advantage of a modular organizational system seems to be 
that, under these circumstances, the opposing firm can relatively easy 
adjust to this new situation by decisively reconfiguring his own resource 
base. Moreover, when a modularly built organization is not so much 
confronted with an acute and serious threat, but wants to take advantage of 
a suddenly emerging window of opportunity it can also take advantages of 
its potential to quickly recombine its resource base into the desired 
configuration without having to turn the entire organization upside down. 
 
On the whole, these insights imply that absorptive capacity and modular 
organizing are organizational determinants that not only have an indirect 
effect on organizational performance through the activation of a broad 
mixture of flexible dynamic capabilities, but can also directly influence 
performance by facilitating a second, immediate, ad hoc problem solving 
type of approach. 
 
Hypothesis 10: Absorptive capacity is directly related to organizational 
performance within turbulent environments. 
 
Hypothesis 11: Modular organizing is directly related to organizational 
performance within turbulent environments. 
 
 
 
2.7 RESEARCH MODEL 
 
This chapter’s theoretical reasoning has resulted in the research model 
presented in figure 2-4. One should take notice of the fact that the model 
itself is being placed within a turbulent environmental context. The 
model’s main assumption is that under turbulent circumstances absorptive 
capacity and modular organizing, with lateral coordination as an important 
antecedent, positively contribute to the activation of a mixture of strategic, 
structural, and operational flexible dynamic capabilities, concretizing the 
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crucial demand of organizational ambidexterity. Moreover, the model 
presents a second outcome effect, namely a direct effect of both absorptive 
capacity and modular organizing on a firm’s overall performance. This 
second effect is being determined by the fact that these two determinants 
can also play a facilitating role when the organization has to convert from a 
prudent to a more ad hoc way of problem solving. 
 
 
 
Figure 2-4: Research Model 
 
Every numbered arrow in the research model represents a specific 
hypothesis. The numbers in the model correspond with the numbers of the 
hypotheses mentioned in the text. Four relationships have double numbers. 
This has to do with the fact that these hypotheses deal with the relative 
effect or strength of a proposed relationship. Hypothesis 7 assumes that 
absorptive capacity has the most profound influence on the activation of a 
broad mixture of flexible dynamic capabilities. Therefore, the arrow 
between AC and DCM is drawn thicker. The same schematic principle has 
been applied to hypothesis 8a and 8b, which state that respectively modular 
organizing or lateral coordination has the strongest impact on absorptive 
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capacity. Therefore, the arrows between MO and AC and LC and AC are 
also drawn thicker. Hypothesis 10 concentrates on the relationship between 
lateral coordination and modular organizing. Here, the assumption is that 
modular organizations can only properly function if the necessary level of 
lateral coordination is kept at a moderate level. Because a rather weak 
positive relationship is expected, the arrow between LC and MO is dashed.  
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has analyzed, through the strategic management inside-out 
lens, which organizational determinants play an important role in the 
competitive challenge of dealing with hypercompetition. Absorptive 
capacity and modular organizing have been identified as determinants of 
predominant value because they are capable of activating a combination of 
operational, structural, and strategic flexible dynamic capabilities, 
concretizing the overarching demand of organizational ambidexterity. 
Lateral coordination has been presented as a third determinant of major 
importance, because it facilitates the knowledge absorption process needed 
for innovativeness, but it also positively influences the reconfiguration 
capabilities of a modular organizational system. Furthermore, the 
theoretical investigation has made clear that, apart from activating a 
mixture of flexible dynamic capabilities, absorptive capacity and modular 
organizing can also directly affect a firm’s performance. This second 
outcome effect is being determined by the fact that these two determinants 
have the built-in capacity to help the organization to convert from a 
prudent into a more ad hoc way of problem solving. 
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CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The previous chapter has given insight into the main organizational 
determinants and dynamics for dealing with hypercompetition. The next 
step is to provide a methodological framework to operationalize the 
proposed theoretical assumptions in a structured way. Methodology can be 
referred to as the procedural framework, within which a research project 
takes place. It deals with the logical relationship between philosophical 
paradigm, research design, and research techniques. This chapter covers 
the specific methodological foundations of this study. First, the study’s 
general philosophical rationale will be described. Second, the specific 
research design of this study will be set out in more detail, introducing the 
survey as the study’s overarching research method. Third, the research 
techniques that were actually used to retrieve evidence will be discussed 
separately. Per research technique the data collection process will be 
described, also paying attention to the important methodological issues of 
instrument and construct validation.  
 
3.2 THE POSITIVIST APPROACH 
 
The philosophical stance or paradigm of this research project is known as 
positivism. Taking this standpoint “implies that the researcher is working 
with an observable social reality and that the end product of such research 
can be the derivation of laws or law-like generalizations similar to those 
produced by the physical and natural scientists” (Remenyi, Williams, 
Money, & Swartz, 2002). Generally speaking, the positivist approach uses 
observations of the world around us to create or expand scientific 
knowledge. Looking at this study, the Netherlands armed forces, its 
organizational characteristics, and external environment are, in 
combination, acknowledged as an observable social reality from which 
unique empirical evidence can be obtained to strengthen the theoretical 
status of the Dynamic Capability Approach.  
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Observations of the world around us can, however, from a scientific point 
of view be made in different ways. The passive observation method is 
most frequently used in positivist business research (Remenyi, et al., 
2002). This project also uses the passive observation method, meaning that 
the researcher collects evidence from a variety of sources (e.g. interviews, 
policy documents, questionnaires), after which he reflects the evidence 
gathered upon the specific variables being studied. Figure 3-1 presents a 
model that shows the main research phases of the passive observation 
method.  
 
 
 
Figure 3-1: The passive observation research method 
(Remenyi, et al., 2002) 
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This research project follows the same phases as presented in the model. 
The study has started with a literature review on the theoretical concept of 
dynamic capabilities. This step has led to a twofold conclusion. First, the 
concept is still missing necessary empirical comprehensibility. Second, the 
organizational practicalities to facilitate the everyday functioning of 
dynamic capabilities over a longer period of time have remained largely 
untouched in the academic debate so far (phase 1). Next, a more focused 
assessment of existing strategic management theory has been set in motion 
to find out which organizational determinants specifically matter in dealing 
with the challenges of environmental turbulence. The key variables 
absorptive capacity and modular organizing, with lateral coordination as an 
important facilitator for both, have been derived from this analysis (phase 
2). A deeper investigation into the outcome effects of these determinants 
has led to the conclusion that in combination they support the activation of 
a mixture of operational, structural, and strategic dynamic capabilities. 
Together, these first two phases have resulted in a theoretical conjecture in 
the form of a research model that can be split up into twelve separate 
hypotheses (step 3 and 4).  The next step has been to translate the research 
model into a questionnaire and an interview protocol (phase 5). The former 
has been distributed among a large group of officers to develop a broad 
understanding of the interrelationships between the determinants being 
studied. The latter has been developed to complement the large scale 
quantitative survey approach and gain specific in-depth qualitative 
knowledge on the policy implication of these organizational determinants 
(phase 6). The data coming out of the questionnaire have been statistically 
analyzed, using SPSS and AMOS structural equation modeling techniques. 
The interview results have been analyzed by using first level and pattern 
coding techniques (phase 7). Finally, reflecting on the complete set of 
evidence gathered has led to a refinement of the dynamic capabilities 
theory by explaining why and how the organizational determinants 
extracted from strategic management theory could matter in dealing with 
hypercompetition (phase 8). 
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3.3 THE RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
Philips (1971: 93) defines research design as “the blueprint for the 
collection, measurement, and analysis of data”. The quality of such a 
blueprint depends to a large extent on choices the scientist has to make in 
advance of his actual empirical research process (Blumberg, Cooper, & 
Schindler, 2008), such as: what kind of answers is the study looking for 
and which research method is needed in order to find them? what kind of 
sample should be used to draw valid conclusions? which specific 
techniques can be used to collect valuable data? 
  
Research method and sampling 
 
When concretizing the first of these three questions for this specific study, 
it is important to refocus on the study’s primary goal of contributing to the 
theoretical status of the Dynamic Capabilities Approach. Being primarily 
interested in theory development the study is, basically, looking for 
answers that could help to create a broad view of a complex social 
organizational phenomenon with the intention of further generalization. 
After all, this study’s main assumption is that the Netherlands armed 
forces’ organizational approach to deal with environmental turbulence 
could be translated into more general lessons for commercial organizations 
confronted with hypercompetition.  
 
However, the study’s central research question is a “how” question, 
stressing its explanatory aim. In this question it is the depth of enquiry, or 
in other words the search for rich and complex evidence, that dominates to 
deliver in-depth insight into the complex phenomenon being studied. By 
offering comprehensive, detailed empirical evidence on how specifically 
the Netherlands armed forces apply commonly accepted organizational 
determinants to activate organizational learning and reconfiguration 
capabilities, in order to counter the turbulent security environment, should 
help to strengthen the general theoretical status of the Dynamic Capability 
Approach.  
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To balance the study’s breadth versus depth dimension a large-scale survey 
was conducted, supplemented with data coming from focused interviews. 
For the survey a large number of questionnaires was distributed among a 
specific sample population within the Netherlands armed forces. This 
group consisted of Majors, Lieutenant-Colonels, and Colonels from all 
four Operational Commands of the Netherlands armed forces. The 
sampling deliberately concentrated on the middle and higher officer 
echelons as the comprehensive research required respondents who not only 
had experience with and knowledge of missions abroad, but, quite 
emphatically, also had an insight into all sorts of strategic and 
organizational aspects of the Netherlands armed forces.  
 
Although the Netherlands armed forces organization consists of four rather 
autonomous operational Commands (Navy Command, Army Command, 
Air Force Command, and the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee1), the 
officers were explicitly asked to describe the armed forces collectively. 
After all, the main concern was to gain an overall understanding of the 
extent to which the variables, derived from strategic management theory, 
also played their predicted role in the Netherlands armed forces as a whole. 
Moreover, crisis response operations are increasingly becoming a joint 
effort of all four Commands, which makes it interesting to find out how the 
organization’s collective functioning within crisis response circumstances 
is being judged by its members.    
 
The focused interview technique was used to strengthen the survey data 
with more practical and detailed information. A focused interview is a 
specific type of interview, in which the researcher poses a certain set of 
pre-planned semi-structured questions. The advantage of this way of 
interviewing is to corroborate certain facts that in the eyes of the researcher 
have already been established. The specific goal of this study’s session of 
focused interviews was to gain more insight into the practical implications 
of absorptive capacity, modular organizing, and lateral coordination as 
basic organizational determinant to give direction to the organization’s 
search, selection, reconfiguration and deployment processes.  
                                                 
1
 The Royal Marechaussee is an organization with tasks within the military domain, such 
as military police and security sector reform tasks. However, the Royal Marechaussee also 
conducts specific police tasks in a national setting, such as border control, immigration, 
and criminal investigation activities. 
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The interviewees were selected because of their knowledge of the 
organizational implications of crisis response deployment. When using 
people as a main source of evidence, Verschuren and Doorewaard (1999) 
argue that it is important to know which information role these people 
actually play. A distinction should be made between people acting as 
respondents, informants, or experts. A respondent is a person supplying 
information about him or herself. An informant provides information about 
other persons or issues not directly relating to him or herself. An expert is a 
person who acts as a supplier of specific knowledge.  
 
The people interviewed in this study clearly wore two hats. On one hand, 
they played the role of experts; in a sense that organizational members, 
who had knowledge of the strategic considerations underlying the 
organizational adjustments that had been made since the ending of the 
Cold War, and with a helicopter-view on the operational consequences of 
these strategic choices, were deliberately selected for the interviews. On 
the other hand, they also acted as respondents by giving individual 
opinions based on their own crisis response experiences. 
 
As mentioned above, the Netherlands armed forces organization consists of 
four operational Commands. The Chief of Defense directs the Operational 
Commands and bears primary responsibility for the execution of military 
operations2. For this primary task he can rely on three staff departments. 
First, the Directorate Operations (abbreviation in Dutch: DOPS) is an 
advisory-body focusing on policy issues regarding running missions. 
Second, the Directorate Operational Readiness (abbreviation in Dutch: 
DAOG) is an advisory-body that helps to translate the political military 
ambitions into concrete deployment decisions on the necessary quantity 
and quality of troops. This department basically formulates the actual 
preparation and formation demands to prolong running missions and to 
initiate new ones. Third, the Directorate Operational Policy, Requirements, 
and Integral Planning (abbreviation in Dutch: DOBBP) has a long-term 
focus. This directorate has two main tasks. Its first task is to uncover 
critical developments that may influence the Netherlands armed forces 
                                                 
2
 This text is based on the brochure: Introducing the Central Staff of the Netherlands 
Ministry of Defense. 
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organization in the future. Its second task is to fathom the organizational, 
human resources’, and technological implications of these developments.  
 
To cover the information spectrum from running missions to future 
operational developments a number of representatives of all directorates 
has been selected and interviewed. Moreover, to bridge the gap between 
strategic apex and Operational Commands the operational commanders of 
Navy Command, Army Command, Air Force Command, and the Royal 
Netherlands Marechaussee have been added to the sample. Because of 
their position within the organization these directors could give a balanced 
judgment about the practical implications of certain strategic decisions. 
Furthermore, a staff officer of Task Force Urzugan has been added to the 
sample to obtain recent information on the practical outcome of the 
strategic choices that have been made. In total the sample consisted of 
eighteen senior officials, military and non-military (see Appendix I for an 
overview of the incumbents). 
 
3.4 THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
The total number of Majors, Lieutenant-Colonels, and Colonels from all 
four Operational commands was targeted as the study’s research 
population, leading to a headcount of 4085 potential respondents. Because 
the study focuses on the Netherlands armed forces’ crisis response setting, 
it was decided to exclude certain functional specialists from the target 
group, such as military physicians, advocates, and officers of the territorial 
reserve. Based on this empirical refinement a mailing of 3,706 
questionnaires was sent out. In total 1,533 persons filled out and returned 
the questionnaire. The dataset was cleaned up by leaving out the 
questionnaires with missing values on the model and background variables. 
However, of the 1,465 respondents that remained, 211 had no actual 
mission experience.  These questionnaires were also disregarded, leading 
to a total number of usable questionnaires of 1,253 and, thus, a response 
rate of approximately 34%. The sample was tested for representativeness 
by comparing the distribution of the respondents with the composition of 
the initial target population. Although some minor deviations became 
apparent, the overall distribution was judged satisfactory with an average 
response rate of 30% per Operational Command and rank level. Table 3-1 
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presents the composition of the target population, the sample population, 
and the percentage of the sample population versus the target population. 
 
 
 MAJOR LTCOL COL TOTAL 
1 1,060 695 138 1,893 
2 370 258 48 676 
ARMY 
3 34% 37% 34% 35% 
1 620 364 95 1,079 
2 169 101 26 296 
AIR FORCE 
3 27% 27% 27% 27% 
1 518 339 100 957 
2 122 85 29 236 
NAVY 
3 24% 25% 29% 25% 
1 92 44 20 156 
2 29 12 4 45 
MARECHAUSSEE 
3 31% 27% 20% 28% 
1 2,290 1,442 353 4,085 
2 690 456 107 1,253 
TOTAL 
3 30% 31% 30% 30% 
(1) Target population; (2) Sample population; (3) Sample versus target population 
Table 3-1: Research sample 
 
 
The background variable mission experience was measured by asking how 
many times the respondents had been on an operational deployment 
abroad. They had to fill in the name of the mission and specify the duration 
of the mission in months. To be counted as a single operational 
deployment the duration of a mission had to be at least two months. Table 
3-2 shows the categorization of mission experience over rank and 
Operational Command. 
 
The actual crisis response missions in which the respondents had 
participated were numerous and took place all over the world. An overview 
of the respondents’ most recent operational deployment is given in table 3-
3. A number of smaller missions, and missions further back in time, are 
labeled “other”. Missions such as, UNIFIL, UNPROFOR, UNTAC, 
UNMIL, UNMIH, and UNTAES are placed in this collective category. 
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Number of deployments 
 1 2 3 4 5 (sub)total 
MAJOR 138 132 59 25 16 370 
LTCOL 118 78 40 14 8 258 Army 
COL 26 16 4 2 0 48 
676 
MAJOR 76 49 20 12 12 169 
LTCOL 43 31 20 3 4 101 Air Force 
COL 14 8 2 1 1 26 
296 
MAJOR 43 29 31 11 8 122 
LTCOL 31 32 14 5 3 85 Navy 
COL 13 8 3 4 1 29 
236 
MAJOR 20 7 2 0 0 29 
LTCOL 6 4 2 0 0 12 Marechaussee 
COL 4 0 0 0 0 4 
45 
 
Total 532 394 197 77 53 1,253 
Table 3-2: Operational experience 
 
 
 Army 
Air 
Force 
Navy Marech. Total 
Individual deployment 47 17 4 6 78 
ISAF 141 99 27 2 272 
OEF 20 26 50 0 96 
SFIR 59 13 24 6 103 
EUFOR 33 3 2 3 41 
SFOR 209 38 2 10 259 
IFOR 23 5 2 1 31 
AFOR 0 5 2 0 7 
KFOR 44 6 7 2 59 
UNMEE 3 8 16 2 29 
Navy deployment 0 0 69 0 69 
Air Force deployment 0 48 0 0 48 
Other 97 28 31 13 161 
Total 1,253 
Table 3-3: Most recent deployment 
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Instrument and construct validation 
 
Likert-type scales were developed to measure the model variables (see 
Appendix II). Wherever possible, existing scales were used. However, a 
new scale had to be developed to measure modular organizing, because no 
usable alternative one was found in literature. Moreover, with a Western 
military expeditionary organization as the study’s central case, a general 
point of concern became to translate the existing individual scale items 
from a commercial business context into a military crisis response context. 
A number of these changes were rather straightforward, such as replacing 
the word “team” for “unit”. Yet, others turned out to be more fundamental. 
To give an example, competitors, suppliers, and customers are univocal 
entities within the commercial business jargon. However, applying these 
terms in an international, political-driven, crisis response setting, would 
certainly lead to ambiguous interpretation.  
 
To overcome this problem, experts, with knowledge of both the business 
and military domain, were consulted to help with the actual translation 
process. The resulting draft questionnaire was then discussed with a 
methodologist to get feedback on wording issues and the nature of the 
questions. After corrections had been made the draft questionnaire was 
pre-tested within a small group of ten military experts, coming from 
different services and officer ranks. Based on their remarks, on wording, 
layout, and length, the questionnaire was adjusted to its final form.  
 
The variable dynamic capabilities mixture consisted of Volberda’s (1996, 
1998) separate scales for measuring operational, structural, and strategic 
flexible dynamic capabilities. Given the rather small number of items in 
each scale and the fact that the items had to be translated from a business 
context into a military context, the separate reliability scores decreased to 
unsatisfactory levels. To be precise, the scales for strategic, structural, and 
operational dynamic capabilities scored Cronbach’s alphas of respectively 
0.52, 0.55, en 0.61. However, when the three separate scales were 
combined into one overall scale (DCM) the Conbrach’s alpha increased to 
a score of 0.70. An alpha of 0.70 is generally used as the lower limit for 
scale reliability (Field, 2005). To respectively measure operational, 
structural, and strategic flexible dynamic capabilities questions where 
asked, such as: during crisis response operations Dutch units can easily 
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adjust to changing operational circumstances; the Netherlands armed 
forces have the capacity to easily shift functions and tasks in case a crisis 
response operation requires this; if needed the Netherlands armed forces 
can add new types of missions to its existing operational product portfolio. 
 
To measure absorptive capacity Volberda’s metaflexibility scale was used, 
mainly because at the time of developing the questionnaire the absorptive 
capacity construct was still in its conceptual stage, so no usable scales were 
available yet. Although it may seem as sailing under false colors, this 
feeling is not entirely true. This scale was deliberately chosen, for 
Volberda’s explanation of metaflexibility shows remarkable resemblance 
with what later was to be named absorptive capacity: “At a higher level of 
the organization there must therefore be a reflective capacity to effectuate 
an appropriate composition of the flexibility mix and design of the 
organization. This so-called metaflexibility can be viewed as 
management’s supporting monitoring system or learning system” 
(Volberda, 1998: 198). Moreover, the scale he developed to measure 
metaflexibility actually captures the main learning processes of absorptive 
capacity in concrete survey questions. Translating the scale and applying it 
to a military setting had resulted in a satisfactory Cronbach’s alpha score of 
0.74. One of the questions posed sounds, for example: the Netherlands 
armed forces systematically keep track of technological developments that 
could influence operational tasks and performance.  
 
To measure the contextual variable environmental turbulence again an 
available scale of Volberda (1996, 1998) was used. The scale, consisting of 
13 items, covers the dimensions dynamism, complexity, and 
unpredictability. Some examples of the questions asked are: changes in the 
area of operation were very intense; in the area of operation everything was 
interrelated; and, it was very hard to predict what was going to happen in 
the area of operation. Although the original scale had to be translated to a 
military crisis response context it still reached a Cronbach’s alpha score of 
.84.  
 
Three exploratory factor analyses were conducted to validate Volberda’s 
constructs within a military crisis response setting. Because the sample size 
exceeds 250, a combination of the Kaiser criterion and the scree plot were 
used to decide on how many factors to extract from the separate factor 
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analyses (Field, 2005).  All analyses resulted in the extraction of a single 
factor to respectively measure dynamic capabilities mixture, absorptive 
capacity, and environmental turbulence.   
 
In addition to Volberda’s scales, Jaworski and Kohli’s  (1993) scale was 
embraced to measure organizational performance. This three-item scale 
proved to be reliable with a Cronbach’s alpha score of 0.80. Furthermore, 
Hoegl, Weinkauf and Gemuenden’s (2004) scale on inter-team 
coordination was used to measure lateral coordination. Their scale is 
based on two fundamental forces that stimulate the need to coordinate: (1) 
task interdependencies and (2) emerging changes within the task 
environment. They have captured these two forces in five items focusing 
on task execution, information sharing, and conflict resolution dynamics 
between teams.  
 
Within a military setting, however, two distinct forms of cooperation 
between teams or units can be recognized. First, coordination between 
units from different Operational Commands takes place. Military jargon 
speaks of joint cooperation. Second, crisis response operations also depend 
to a large extent on multinational, or what is known as combined, 
cooperation. Therefore, in translating Hoegl, Weinkauf and Gemuenden’s 
original scale to a crisis response context their items had to be addressed 
twice. The result has been a 10-item scale covering the same elements in 
both a combined and joint context. Some examples of the scale items are: 
during crisis response operations interrelated processes, tasks, and 
activities are well coordinated with units from other countries, or during 
crisis response operations Dutch units have no problems in coordinating 
with each other. After running a factor analysis, again using the Kaiser 
criterion in combination with the scree plot, a single factor was extracted. 
The scale reliability was 0.74, which is sufficient, yet lower than the 
original scale (α = 0.85). Again, the translation of the scale items to a 
military crisis response setting probably accounts for this difference. 
 
For measuring modular organizing a new scale was developed, embarking 
upon earlier work of Sanchez and Mahoney (1996) and Worren, Moore, 
and Cardona (2002). The main assumption is that a modular organization is 
built upon an architectural system capable of recombining organizational 
elements into tailor-made configurations. In order to make this 
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architectural system work, organizations should also strive for 
organizational and technological interoperability. Organizational 
interoperability means that by using standardized interfaces, such as 
standardized rules, procedures, and programs a plug-and-play situation is 
created, in which organizational modules can be clicked together, removed, 
replaced, and reconnected fairly easy. This same principle applies to the 
organization’s technological resource base. To reach the desired plug-and-
play end state it is of equal importance for an organization to have 
compatible technological means available. Moreover, looking at the human 
side of the matter, a modular organization needs people with a broad 
operational knowledge base and a cooperative mindset to be able to 
function properly within different operational contexts and in varying 
organizational constellations.  
 
Based on this theoretical assessment a scale, consisting of 14 items, was 
developed covering these four aspects to measure modular organizing. 
Questions where formulated, such as: to execute crisis response operations 
the Netherlands armed forces merge units, parts of units, and individuals 
into tailor-made formations, or during crisis response operations 
standardized work processes, such as doctrines, standard operating 
procedures, and drills, make it possible to cooperate with units from other 
services and countries. A factor analysis resulted in the extraction of a 
single factor. Despite the fact that four items had factor loadings below 
0.40, they were kept in the newly developed scale to reach the minimum 
reliability limit of 0.70.  
 
3.5 THE FOCUSED INTERVIEW 
 
The session of focused interviews started with a profound analysis of three 
key Defense Bills to gain insight into the actual strategic organizational 
choices that have been made after the ending of the Cold War to counter 
the new turbulent crisis response environment. All in all, two reasons stand 
out for specifically choosing the Defense Bills of 1993, 2000, and 2003. 
First, the information in these documents represents a written down 
rationalization of the main steps and key arguments underlying the 
Netherlands armed forces’ strategic transformation process. Second, these 
three policy documents have played a leading role in the transformation 
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process itself, serving as ex-ante road maps to steer the actual change 
process. In a general sense, this study assumes the policy documents to be 
the concrete outcome of the Netherlands armed forces absorptive capacity 
process.   
 
The qualitative data-analysis program Kwalitan (Wester & Peters, 2004) 
was used to analyze the policy documents. The program was mainly 
selected because of its functionalities to support the process of first-level 
coding and pattern coding (Miles & Huberman, 1994). First-level coding 
supported dividing the text files into logical segments of data. Next, pattern 
coding helped to uncover sub-themes within these different segments. The 
first-level coding process made clear that all three Defense Bills were 
structured roughly the same, covering the following main steps: (1) 
scanning the environment, (2) formulating a suitable defense policy, (3) 
defining the organizational adjustments, (4) selecting assets, and (5) 
explaining the financial consequences. For this study step 3 was perceived 
most relevant. Applying the principles of pattern coding to this step 
resulted in three main themes: (1) a discussion on the general 
organizational adjustments needed, (2) a discussion on the personnel 
adjustments needed, and (3) a discussion on the materiel adjustments 
needed.    
 
Within these themes three main transformation choices could be 
distinguished: (1) The crisis response deployment strategy of the 
Netherlands armed forces was to be based on the formation of tailor-made 
organizational modules that, most of the time, had to function within larger 
multi-national task forces; (2) taking part in expeditionary crisis response 
operations asked  for an interoperable, multi-functional technological 
resource base; (3) and taking part in expeditionary crisis response 
operations asked for a cooperative mindset of the participating Dutch units. 
 
These three choices were used as a first step in the interview to investigate 
the variable absorptive capacity. To be precise, they were presented to the 
interviewees to, first of all, verify whether the choices identified were also 
being acknowledged by representatives of the Netherlands armed forces’ 
current senior management; and second, to analyze how in hindsight these 
representatives judged the practical value of the key organizational choices 
made by their predecessors.  
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The next step in the interview was to unravel the variables absorptive 
capacity, modular organizing and lateral coordination individually. First, 
Zahra and George’s (2002) sub dimensions knowledge acquisition, 
assimilation, transformation, and exploitation were used to categorize the 
answers on the organization’s current absorptive capacity process. Second, 
based on Baldwin and Clarke’s (1997) design rules for modular systems 
specific questions were formulated to learn more about the supporting 
architecture, interfaces, and standards of modularly built military task 
forces. Third, existing work of Kogut and Zander (1992) and Van den 
Bosch et al. (1999) was used to find out which combinative capabilities, 
with a primary focus on lateral coordination, were used to integrate the 
different organizational elements of a composite military task force.  
 
The interview’s third part focused on the outcome effects of the 
organizational choices that had been made. Specific attention was paid to 
the general organizational challenge of balancing strategy, structure, and 
operational practices. First, the interviewees were asked if the strategy of 
mixing and matching smaller organizational elements into tailor-made task 
forces hampered the operational performance in a crisis area, because the 
units deployed were not enough settled in. Second, each interview ended 
with asking the interviewees to give their opinion on the success of the 
Netherlands armed forces’ crisis response performance in general.  
 
The theoretical insights used made it possible to largely pre-code the 
interviews, which resulted in a rather strict interview protocol (see 
Appendix III). The interviews themselves were not recorded, since the pre-
coding approach made it possible to categorize and write down the answers 
given during the interview process itself. Moreover, with this structured 
interview technique a large amount of relevant information could be 
gathered in a relatively short period of time. Given the fact that time was a 
scarce resource, since senior officials were being interviewed, this positive 
side-effect came in helpful. Another advantage of the pre-coding exercise 
was that the results could be compared very easily across the different 
interviewees. Before actually starting off the session the interviews a high-
ranking officer at the Netherlands Defense Academy, with relevant 
operational and managerial experience, was invited to participate in a trial 
run of the interview. This test offered relevant information on the duration 
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of the interview and the quality of the interview questions. Based on this 
information some refinements were made to the interview protocol.  
 
After conducting the interviews, the field notes were converted into a 
comprehensive text file. This file was sent back to the interviewees for 
confirmation. In a few cases some minor adjustments had to be made to the 
text. When all text files were approved another process of first-level and 
pattern-coding started. For this purpose a checklist matrix was developed. 
Miles and Huberman (1994: 105) define such a matrix as follow: “A 
checklist matrix is a format for analyzing field data on a major variable or 
general domain of interest. The basic principle is that the matrix includes 
several components of a single coherent variable, though it does not 
necessarily order the components.”   
 
The Microsoft Office’s Excel program was used to create this checklist 
matrix. The matrix consisted of rows and columns. The rows were drawn 
from the main topics of the interview protocol; the columns were used to 
present the answers of the individual interviewees on a certain topic (see 
Appendix IV). After the matrix had been filled with the answers of the 
experts, the next step was to cluster the answers given. Now, the actual 
process of first level and pattern coding could be started. The first step of 
this process was to group similar answers together, giving insight into the 
most important arguments and considerations. These groups of answers 
were then related to the underlying theoretical concepts to uncover relevant 
themes. Chapter 5 will be entirely devoted to discussing the actual results 
of this first level and pattern coding exercise. 
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3.6 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has discussed the study’s methodological foundations. The 
survey has been presented as the overarching research method. The main 
assumption is that a survey has the capacity to create a broad overview of 
the complex interaction process taking place between the variables 
absorptive capacity, modular organizing, lateral coordination, dynamic 
capabilities mixture, and performance. Within the context of this survey 
two specific research techniques were used. First, a questionnaire was 
distributed among a large group of mid and high level officers. Basically, 
this questionnaire was used to find out whether or not the variables and 
dynamics of the research model, which was introduced at the end of 
chapter 2, were indeed applicable to the turbulent crisis response context of 
the Netherlands armed forces. Second, to color the general quantitative 
picture with more specific and relevant practical information a session of 
focused interviews was conducted to gain more insight into the policy 
implications of actually applying the organizational determinants 
uncovered from strategic management theory. 
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CHAPTER 4 THE SURVEY FINDINGS 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Based on chapter’s 2 theoretical reasoning this chapter will investigate how 
absorptive capacity, modular organizing, and lateral coordination have 
contributed to the crisis response performance of the Netherlands armed 
forces. For this purpose, chapter 4 discusses the results of a questionnaire 
that has been distributed among a sample of 1,253 Dutch officers, varying 
in rank from Major to Colonel. Basically, this chapter analyzes whether the 
organizational dynamics to deal with hypercompetition, compressed in 
chapter 2’s research model, also persist within a turbulent crisis response 
environment. The structure is as follows. First, before testing the proposed 
research model in its entirety the outcome of a number of necessary basic 
statistical SPSS tests will be discussed. Second, Structural Equation 
Modeling (SEM) will be introduced as the study’s statistical backbone. In 
this paragraph, five predominant fit indexes for reporting SEM results will 
be presented. Third, the actual SEM results will be reported. Fourth, 
specific attention will be paid to the effects of the combined variable 
Dynamic Capabilities Mixture (DCM) that in reality consists of three 
separate scales to measure operational, structural, and strategic dynamic 
capabilities. 
 
4.2 INITIAL ANALYSES IN SPSS 
 
The questionnaire was first of all tested for common method variance by 
conducting Harman’s one-factor test. The unrotated principal component 
factor analysis, principal component analysis with varimax rotation, and 
principal axis analysis with varimax rotation all revealed the presence of 
multiple factors. The first two of these factors accounted for 60 % of the 
total variance. Moreover, the first (largest) factor did not account for a 
majority of the variance. Thus, no general factor became apparent, which 
eased the concerns about potential problems associated with common 
method bias. 
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Second, a correlation analysis was run to find out if significant 
relationships existed between the model variables. Table 4-1 presents the 
correlation matrix and includes three important descriptive statistics of all 
model variables, namely mean, standard deviation, and Cornbach’s alpha. 
Apart from the variable Environmental Turbulence (ET) the matrix 
indicates significant relationships between all other model variables. The 
fact that no linear correlations were found between ET and MO, DCM, and 
P was not a real point of concern. After all, within the research model ET 
is treated as a background variable and not as a predictor, mediator, or 
moderator variable. What this study is primarily interested in is the 
question whether or not the interrelationships between the dependent and 
independent variables change when the level of environmental turbulence 
changes. 
 
 
 M SD α 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. MO 3.51 0.37 0.70 1      
2. LC 3.17 0.43 0.74 0.41** 1     
3. AC 3.09 0.59 0.74 0.46** 0.40** 1    
4. DCM 3.43 0.38 0.70 0.46** 0.42** 0.46** 1   
5. P 4.01 0.52 0.80 0.32** 0.24** 0.35** 0.33** 1  
6. ET 3.49 0.51 0.84 -0.01 -0,09** -0.07* 0.03 0.04 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
 
Table 4-1: Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations 
 
 
Third, the question whether or not differences existed between early and 
late respondents was investigated. A t-test showed no significant 
differences between these two groups on all model variables. 
 
Fourth, because the Netherlands armed forces organization in reality 
consists of four rather autonomous Operational Commands, with their own 
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specific task domains, a one-way ANOVA analysis was conducted to 
compare the means of all the model variables and see if significant 
differences between the organizational parts would emerge. Table 4-2 
presents the results of this analysis. The table makes clear that for the 
variables Performance and Environmental Turbulence significant 
differences between Operational Commands indeed occur.   
 
 
 N M SD F Df Sig. 
Army 676 3.16 .44 
Navy 236 3.23 .39 
Air Force 296 3.15 .44 LC 
Marechaussee 45 3.24 .42 
2.27 3, 1249 .079 
Army 676 3.08 .61 
Navy 236 3.11 .57 
Air Force 296 3.08 .58 AC 
Marechaussee 45 3.21 .57 
.74 3, 1249 .530 
Army 676 3.52 .36 
Navy 236 3.46 .36 
Air Force 296 3.54 .38 MO 
Marechaussee 45 3.52 .27 
2.21 3, 1249 .085 
Army 676 3.44 .38 
Navy 236 3.43 .37 
Air Force 296 3.40 .37 DCM 
Marechaussee 45 3.44 .34 
.99 3, 1249 .394 
Army 676 4.04 .52 
Navy 236 3.84 .52 
Air Force 296 4.08 .50 P 
Marechaussee 45 4.06 .45 
10.99 3, 1249 .000 
Army 676 3.53 .50 
Navy 236 3.44 .47 
Air Force 296 3.45 .52 ET 
Marechaussee 45 3.45 .50 
3.10 3, 1249 .026 
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
 
Table 4-2: One-way ANOVA on Operational Commands 
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A post-hoc analysis (Hochberg) made clear that the respondents from Navy 
Command scored significantly lower on P than the respondents from the 
other Operational Commands. With an average performance rating of 3.84 
the opinion with regard to operational performance is still very positive, 
but in comparison with the others it is significantly lower. Although the 
ANOVA also pointed to a significant difference between the Operational 
Commands on the variable ET the Hochberg post-hoc analysis did not 
support this conclusion. Only after running the LSD post-hoc analysis 
(LSD) a significant difference between the Commands came to the surface. 
This analysis showed that Army Command and the Royal Marechaussee 
scored significantly higher on ET than Navy and Air Force Command.  
 
 
 N M SD F Df Sig. 
INDIV 78 3.58 .47 
ISAF 272 3.65 .47 
OEF 96 3.48 .49 
SFIR 103 3.60 .43 
EUFOR 41 3.11 .45 
SFOR 259 3.31 .49 
IFOR 31 3.43 .40 
AFOR 7 3.63 .56 
KFOR 59 3.65 .42 
UNMEE 29 3.39 .46 
NAVY  69 3.30 .50 
AIR 
FORCE  48 3.33 .58 
ET 
OTHER 161 3.60 .49 
11.41 12, 1240 .000 
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
 
Table 4-3: One-way ANOVA on mission context 
 
 
Fifth, given the fact that environmental turbulence is a critical background 
variable in this study’s research model, another one-way ANOVA was 
conducted to compare means of the variable ET, discriminating between 
different missions. Table 4-3 shows the results of this analysis. The table 
makes clear that the level of environmental turbulence varies from mission 
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to mission. The overall mean of this variable is 3.49; however, when 
concentrating on the separate missions ups and downs can be found with 
scores ranging from 3.65 to 3.11. A post-hoc analysis (Hochberg) showed 
that these peaks have led to significant differences between certain 
missions. Of the missions in which all Operational Commands had 
participated a significant contrast was found between SFOR and EUFOR 
as missions with a moderate level of environmental turbulence, and ISAF, 
OEF, and SFIR as missions with a high level of environmental turbulence.  
 
The sixth analysis was triggered by the existing academic debate on 
absorptive capacity, in which prior knowledge is being presented as a key 
factor for recognizing, assimilating, transforming, and exploiting new 
external knowledge. One of the variables measured in the questionnaire is 
mission experience. So, an interesting analysis to do was to compare the 
means of respondents with little and respondents with much operational 
crisis response experience. Therefore, the sample population was divided 
into two groups. Respondents who had been on a crisis response mission 
once or twice were labeled as being moderately experienced. Respondents 
who had been deployed three times or more were labeled as being highly 
experienced.  
 
After this step an independent t-test was run to compare the means of all 
model variables between the two groups (see table 4-4). The results 
showed a significant difference between the moderately and highly 
experienced respondents on the variable environmental turbulence. 
Moreover, with a score of .05 the differences in group scores on the 
variable performance proved to be just marginal significant. A remarkable 
additional result was, in this respect, that the respondents with a moderate 
level of mission experience were more positive about the Netherlands 
armed forces performance in comparison with the highly experienced 
respondents. 
 
The survey findings 
 74 
 
  N M SD t df Sig. 
Moderate 926 3.18 .42 LC High 327 3.16 .46 .99 1251 .32 
Moderate 926 3.10 .58 AC High 327 3.05 .62 1.56 1251 .12 
Moderate 926 3.52 .36 MO High 327 3.49 .37 1.33 1251 .18 
Moderate 926 3.43 .37 DCM High 327 3.42 .39 .69 1251 .49 
Moderate 926 4.03 .52 P High 327 3.97 .52 1.94 1251 .05 
Moderate 926 3.47 .50 ET High 327 3.54 .50 -2.17 1251 .03 
Table 4-4: T-test moderate versus high level of operational experience 
 
 
Based on the ANOVA and T-test results it was decided to use Structural 
Equation Modeling (SEM) techniques to go deeper into three specific 
empirical issues. First, given the fact that the sample population consists of 
respondents of different Operational Commands it was deemed important 
to find out if the proposed research model in its entirety would also persist 
within these different sub groups. The main statistical issue to address was 
whether or not group dependency would have an interaction effect on the 
model’s structure and interrelationships. After all, before a clear-cut 
opinion could be given on the way in which the Netherlands armed forces, 
as a whole, use organizational learning and reconfiguration determinants to 
develop and deploy dynamic capabilities, it was important to make sure 
that all Operational Commands also separately supported the default 
model. This issue became especially important after the ANOVA results 
had shown that Navy Command scored significantly lower on the model’s 
dependent variable performance. 
 
Second, based on the significant differences that had emerged in the level 
of environmental turbulence between different mission contexts the 
research model was also tested in its entirety within these different 
operational settings. In this respect, the main question to answer was 
whether or not an increase or decrease in the level of environmental 
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turbulence would have an effect on the overall structure of the model and 
on the strengths of the interrelationships between the variables within the 
model. The ANOVA results that had made clear that the SFOR and ISAF 
mission significantly differed on the variable environmental turbulence 
made it possible to use these specific missions to find out how the model 
would behave under SFOR’s conditions of moderate environmental 
turbulence and compare this situation with the ISAF model that represents 
a context of high environmental turbulence. 
 
Third, after finding out that differences existed (albeit in one case only 
marginal) between respondents with a moderate level and a high level of 
operational experience on crucial model variables, a logical follow-up step 
was to find out if these differences would also have an effect on the 
research model as a whole. Moreover, based on existing theoretical 
insights on the construct of absorptive capacity it became especially 
interesting to focus on possible differences in the relationship between the 
variables absorptive capacity and organizational performance.  
 
 
4.3 STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODELING 
 
As explained above this study relies on SEM techniques to test the 
proposed research model in its entirety. Covariance analysis and 
covariance structure modeling are other terms used for the same statistical 
approach, stressing the fact that SEM is primarily based on covariance 
statistics. AMOS Version 6  was selected as the actual software program 
for running the SEM analyses (Arbuckle, 2005). 
 
A structural equation model can be defined as a complex composite 
statistical hypothesis that describes relations of dependency—usually 
accepted to be in some sense causal—between variables (McDonald & Ho, 
2002). For the interplay between theory and empirical data SEM is a very 
useful technique, mainly because it gives the researcher the possibility to 
model relationships among multiple predictor and criterion variables 
(Chin, 1998). Yet, it is important to realize that SEM is not a universal 
remedy to fathom any given model. Kline (2005) explains that SEM has 
above all an a priori character, meaning that the researcher should 
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beforehand supply as much information as possible about the perceived 
interrelationships between the variables under investigation. Only if this is 
the case, SEM can really add value and give relevant information about the 
fit between the researcher’s empirical data and the model he or she 
proposes. Because this study is based on a well formulated research model 
with complex interactions between variables, which was very hard to test 
as a whole by relying on traditional linear regression techniques alone, 
SEM was chosen as the main statistical method. 
 
In most cases SEM analyses are conducted upon research models that 
combine observed and latent variables. These kinds of models are named 
structural models. This study uses existing scales to measure its variables 
and, therefore, only consists of observed variables. In this respect 
McDonald (1996: 239) notes that “a random variable is observable if and 
only if its values can be obtained by means of a real-world sampling 
experiment”. A model that solely consists of observed variables is in SEM 
terminology known as a path model. See figure 4-1 for this study’s path 
model that was drawn using the AMOS software package. 
 
The rectangles in figure 4-1 represent the observed variables. Between 
these variables single headed arrows are drawn. These arrows symbolize a 
proposed, direct effect of one observed variable on another. More 
specifically, they represent the hypotheses formulated in chapter 2. The 
variable lateral coordination (LC) is an exogenous variable, meaning that 
its causes are unidentified. This is shown schematically in de model by the 
fact that no directed arrows are ending on LC. The variables absorptive 
capacity (AC), modular organizing (MO), dynamic capabilities mixture 
(DCM), and performance (P) are endogenous. In this case the presumed 
causes of the variables are considered known and made explicit in the 
model. This situation is schematically concretized in figure 4-1 by the fact 
that each endogenous variable has at least one directed arrow ending on it, 
originating from either LC or of one of the other endogenous variables. 
The small circles with outgoing arrows, positioned over each endogenous 
variable, are known as disturbances (named e1 to e4). A disturbance 
represents, per endogenous variable, all causes of this variable that the path 
model does not take into account.  
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Figure 4-1: Default path model 
 
 
Fit indexes 
 
As explained earlier AMOS was used to test the overall fit of the model 
and the statistical significance of each of the hypothesized direct effects 
between the observed variables. The predominant fit statistic in reporting 
SEM results is the model Chi-square. The Chi-square statistic (χ2) tests the 
null hypothesis that the model is correct. Kline (2005) explains that it is the 
failure to reject the null hypothesis that supports the researcher’s model. In 
other words, the researcher believes in his model and nothing but his 
model until empirical evidence makes this assumption very incredible. 
Basically, the model is given the benefit of the doubt. Compared to 
traditional statistical testing this logic implies inverse reasoning. After all, 
normally the null hypothesis relates to the situation in which the 
researcher’s predication is wrong and that the presupposed effect does not 
exist. In this case it is the rejection of the null hypothesis that supports the 
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researcher’s ideas. Put it differently, the null hypothesis gets the benefit of 
the doubt and the researcher sticks to it as long as possible. Only if the null 
hypothesis becomes very incredible it is legitimate for the researcher to 
reject the null hypothesis and to accept his own alternative hypothesis.  
 
Technically, the Chi-square test assesses the discrepancy between the 
variance/covariance matrix implied by the path model and the 
variance/covariance matrix coming from the actual empirical sample. Only 
if the associated level of statistical significance (P) exceeds .05 it is 
allowed to accept the researcher’s model. This is where the contrast 
between traditional testing and SEM becomes apparent. After all, in 
traditional testing P should be less than .05 in order to reject the null 
hypothesis and accept the researcher’s alternative hypothesis. 
 
As a fit index the Chi-square test has been under debate for a long time. 
One of the big issues is that it is being influenced too much by sample size. 
Kline states (2005: 136): “Specifically, if the sample size is large, which is 
required in order to interpret the index as a test statistic, the value of χ2 may 
lead to rejection of the model even though differences between observed 
and predicted co-variances are slight”. As a result, a number of alternative 
fit indexes have been developed. These indexes are less affected by sample 
size and come with specific interpretive norms. However, a large number 
of these fit indexes are available, which makes it difficult for the researcher 
to choose. In this respect Tabachnik and Fidell (2007) state that “good-
fitting models produce consistent results on many different indices in 
many, if not most, cases. If the indices lead to similar conclusions, the 
issue of which indices to report is a matter of personal preference and, 
perhaps, the preference of the journal editor”. This study follows the 
existing norm in behavioral science research and reports the four most 
commonly used indexes in this domain (Kline, 2005; McDonald & Ho, 
2002). These specific indexes are discussed in more detail below. 
 
The root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA; Steiger, 1990) 
does not assume a perfect fit between the researcher’s model and the 
sample population. It basically serves as a badness of fit index that uses the 
non-centrality parameter (δ) to measure the degree of falseness of the null 
hypothesis. A general rule followed when reporting SEM results is that an 
RMSEA  ≤ .05 indicates a small error of approximation, values between 
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.05 and .08 represent a reasonable error, and all values above .10 are 
perceived unsatisfactory (Browne & Cudeck, 1993). Together with the 
RMSEA overall value computer programs, such as AMOS, also present a 
90% confidence interval. When using the RMSEA value as a model fit 
indicator, this interval has to be reported. The lower bound should be less 
than .05 and the upper bound must not exceed .10.  
 
The comparative fit index (CFI; Bentler, 1990) compares the researcher’s 
model with an independent, ‘baseline’ model. The baseline model assumes 
that no population co-variances among the observed variables exist.  
Comparing the two models makes it possible to assess the relative 
improvement of fit of the researcher’s over the baseline model. If the 
researcher’s model does not indicate a considerable improvement, there is 
no reason to defend it as the best one available. The prevailing norm is that 
CFI values exceeding .90 suggest a reasonably good fit (Hu & Bentler, 
1999). 
 
The standardized root mean square residual (SRMR) transforms the 
variance/covariance matrix of the path model and the variance/covariance 
matrix of the actual empirical sample into correlation matrices. 
Subsequently, the differences between the observed and predicted 
correlations are measured. Kline (2005) offers as a rule of thumb that an 
SRMR overall value of less than .10 is generally considered favorable.   
 
The goodness-of-fit index (GFI; Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1981) calculates a 
weighted proportion of variance in the sample covariance accounted for by 
the path model’s estimated covariance matrix (Bentler, 1983; Tanaka & 
Huba, 1989). Tanaka and Huba (1989) argue that the GFI is comparable 
with the R2 in multiple regression. A GFI score of 1.0 suggests a perfect 
fit, values exceeding .90 indicate a good fit, and values close to zero 
indicate a poor fit (Kline, 2005).  
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4.4 AMOS RESULTS 
 
Before testing the research model in AMOS, first, the potential problem of 
all variables converging on one common factor had to be addressed. After 
all, why go defending a complex composite model if a simpler version also 
fits the empirical data. Based on the norm values of the different fit indexes 
discussed above this assumption could unambiguously be rejected (see 
table 4-5). 
 
 
Chi-square Df P RMSEA CFI SRMR GFI 
1112.477 6 .000 
.384 
L90: .365 
H90:.403 
.178 .290 .178 
Table 4-5: Fit indexes one-factor model 
 
 
Testing the proposed research model in AMOS  
 
After this potential problem was ruled out the main focus shifted towards 
the proposed path model. First, the default model was tested against the 
complete set of empirical data. The analysis did not lead to a very good 
model fit (see default model table 4-6). Especially the Chi-square and 
RMSEA fit indexes received unsatisfactory scores.  
 
After this negative result the model was subjected to a more thorough 
analysis. The main concern was that perhaps a suggested or missing 
relationship hampered the overall power of the model. Based on existing 
theoretical insights, not taken into account in the default model, it was 
argued that maybe a direct relationship between LC and DCM was missing 
in the proposed model. In short, these existing sources made clear that 
apart from its specific facilitating role in modular organizing and 
absorptive capacity, lateral coordination could also in a broader sense 
contribute to balancing the necessary mixture of dynamic capabilities.  
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A general assumption that over the years has persisted within management 
literature is that lateral coordination should be the key mode of 
coordination within dynamic, complex, and uncertain environments 
(Galbraith, 1981; Mintzberg, 1983; Thompson, 1967). The central idea is 
that when the level of environmental uncertainty increases it becomes more 
important to invest in organizational alignment and connectedness 
(Jaworski & Kohli, 1993; Rowley, Behrens, & Krackhardt, 2000). Because 
of its informal and boundary-spanning character lateral coordination is not 
only perceived to be an ideal instrument to integrate different 
organizational teams but also to connect different hierarchical levels 
(Henderson & Cockburn, 1994; Matusik, 2002; Peters & Waterman, 1982), 
functional areas (Barki & Pinsonneault, 2005; Gupta & Govindarajan, 
2000), and ideological standpoints (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995).  
 
Based on these ideas a second SEM analysis was run, this time 
incorporating a direct relationship between LC and DCM into the default 
path model. The results of this analysis are also presented in table 4-6 
(refined model). A major improvement can be seen. The Chi-square 
dropped from 57.1 to 1.5, reaching a probability level of .225, which 
means that the null hypothesis that supports the research model was not 
rejected at the .05 and .01 level. All other fit indexes also reached 
satisfactory values. The RMSEA is smaller than .05 which indicates a 
small error of approximation. The CFI and GFI exceed .90 and the SRMR 
has a value of less than .10. 
 
 
Model Chi-
square Df P RMSEA CFI SRMR GFI 
Default 57.1 2 .000 
.148 
L90: .117 
H90:.183 
.959 .042 .982 
Refined 1.5 1 .225 
.019 
L90: .000 
H90:.081 
1.0 .007 1.0 
Table 4-6: Model fit of default and refined path model 
 
 
The adjustment made to the default model has led to the refined model 
presented in figure 4-2. Apart from identifying an additional relationship 
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between LC and DCM, the results in this figure also reveal that the 
proposed relationships, which make up the overall structure of the research 
model, are indeed significant (p<0.001). To be more specific this means 
that the hypotheses 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, and 11 are being supported by the 
empirical evidence. See table 4-7 for an overview of the hypotheses 
formulated in chapter 2 and the results coming out of the SEM analysis. 
 
Next to this confirmation of the path model’s proposed general structure, 
the SEM-analysis also provides relevant insight into the strengths of the 
model variables and their interrelationships. Figure 4-2 presents the 
standardized regression weights of the relationships between the model’s 
variables and the explained variances of these separate variables.  
 
In general, the scores show that Lateral Coordination (β= .20), Absorptive 
Capacity (β= .26), and Modular Organizing (β= .26) more or less equally 
influence the organization’s dynamic capabilities mixture. Together these 
three variables account for a substantial part (32%) of the variation in the 
composition of this mixture. Moreover, the model makes clear that with 
just these three organizational enablers 18% of the variation in 
performance under turbulent circumstances can, directly or indirectly, be 
accounted for. Given the complex force field within which crisis response 
operations take place, 18% actually represents a profound part of the 
overall performance. After all, important external factors, such as politics, 
finances, opposing forces, international law, climate, and terrain, are not 
addressed in the research model.  
 
Knowing that the hypotheses 7, 8a, 8b, and 9 all give a verdict on the 
strength of a specific path in the research model, the information provided 
in figure 4-2 is also important for the confirmation or rejection of these 
four remaining hypotheses.  
 
Hypothesis 7 states that Absorptive Capacity has the strongest influence on 
an organization’s Dynamic Capabilities Mixture. The regression weights 
do not really confirm this hypothesis. The influence of AC on DCM is just 
as strong as the other path of MO on DCM, in both cases the regression 
weight is .26. What the results do make clear is that both AC and MO 
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stronger influence DCM than LC does. Moreover, the direct effect of AC 
on P (β= .20) is slightly stronger than MO directly on P (β= .14). 
 
Between Modular Organizing and Lateral Coordination, hypothesis 8a 
assumes a stronger effect of Modular Organizing on Absorptive Capacity. 
Based on the empirical results this hypothesis can be supported. After all, 
with a score of .36 MO has a stronger effect on AC than LC does (β= .26). 
Because of this outcome, the alternative hypothesis 8b that states that LC 
has a stronger influence on AC than MO needs to be rejected.   
 
Hypothesis 9 suggests that Lateral Coordination ought to have a 
moderately positive effect on Modular Organizing. Again, the empirical 
results seem to indicate otherwise. With a regression weight of .41 LC has 
a rather strong influence on modular organizing. After all, comparing this 
score with the other regression weights in the model makes clear that the 
relationship between LC and MO is the strongest of them all. Moreover, 
the 17% explained variance of modular organizing that lateral coordination 
solely accounts for is also quite high. 
 
 
 
Figure 4-2: Refined path model 
The survey findings 
 84 
 
No. Hypothesis Result 
1 Organizations that possess a combination of strategic, 
structural, and operational flexible dynamic 
capabilities perform successfully within turbulent 
environments. 
Supported 
2 Absorptive capacity is positively related to an 
organization’s strategic, structural, and operational 
flexible dynamic capabilities. 
Supported 
3 Modular organizing is positively related to an 
organization’s strategic, structural, and operational 
flexible dynamic capabilities. 
Supported 
4 As an antecedent for absorptive capacity, lateral 
coordination is indirectly related to an organization’s 
strategic, structural, and operational flexible dynamic 
capabilities. 
Supported 
5 As an antecedent for modular organizing, lateral 
coordination is indirectly related to an organization’s 
strategic, structural, and operational flexible dynamic 
capabilities. 
Supported 
6 Modular organizing is positively related to absorptive 
capacity. 
Supported 
7 Absorptive capacity has the strongest relative effect on 
an organization’s strategic, structural, and 
operational flexible dynamic capabilities. 
Rejected 
8a Modular organizing has a stronger relative effect on 
absorptive capacity than lateral coordination. 
Supported 
8b Lateral coordination has a stronger relative effect on 
absorptive capacity than modular organizing. 
Rejected 
9 Lateral coordination has a moderately positive effect 
on modular organizing. 
Rejected 
10 Absorptive capacity is directly related to 
organizational performance within turbulent 
environments. 
Supported 
11 Modular organizing is directly related to 
organizational performance within turbulent 
environments. 
Supported 
Table 4-7: Hypotheses overview 
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Comparing Operational Commands 
 
Because the ANOVA’s in SPSS had uncovered differences between 
Operational Commands in the mean scores of some of the model variables, 
the next step in AMOS was to find out if these differences would also have 
an effect on the research model as a whole. Therefore, a simultaneous 
analysis of several groups was conducted with AMOS. The Marechaussee 
was not taken into account in this analysis. Only Army, Navy, and Air 
Force Command were compared with each other. This choice was based on 
the fact that the Marechaussee as a group did not have enough respondents 
for this kind of analysis.    
 
After having done the analysis the output again presented a good model fit 
(see unconstrained model in table 4-8). In general, it could be stated that 
the output of this analysis confirms the fact that the path model’s structure 
is equal for all three Operational Commands.  However, when 
concentrating on the parameter estimates, differences emerged between the 
different Commands. In a second step this matter was investigated more 
thoroughly. Additional constraints were imposed to our model to test the 
hypothesis that the regression weights significantly differed across the 
three Operational Commands. The analysis made clear that this was not the 
case, showing another good model fit (see structural weights model in table 
4-8).  
 
 
Model type Chi-
square Df P RMSEA CFI SRMR GFI 
Unconstrained 4.7 3 .195 
.022 
L90: .000 
H90:.057 
.999 .00121 .998 
Structural 
Weights 
 
22.898 21 .349 
.009 
L90:.000 
H90:.026 
.999 .0436 .992 
Table 4-8: Multiple group analysis of Navy, Air force, and Army Command 
 
 
Although the differences between the unstandardized regression weights 
were not significant some of them are still worth mentioning, because they 
The survey findings 
 86 
give insight into the subtle distinctions between the Operational 
Commands. In this respect, the first thing to notice regarding Navy 
Command (see figure 4-3) is that, in line with the ANOVA results, this 
Operational Command deviates most from the refined path model. Perhaps 
most striking is the fact that the explained variance of Performance of .28 
is, compared with the refined path model and the other two Operational 
Commands, considerably higher. This, basically, means that within the 
Navy context the triad of absorptive capacity, modular organizing, and a 
mixture of dynamic capabilities seems to have a more profound effect on 
organizational performance. Moreover, with a regression weight of .26 the 
individual effect that DCM plays within this triad also seems to be more 
important compared with the other Operational Commands.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-3: Navy Command 
 
 
Second, hypothesis 7, which states that Absorptive Capacity has the 
strongest influence on an organization’s Dynamic Capabilities Mixture, is 
only being supported in the Navy context. The direct effect of AC on DCM 
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(β= .31) is stronger than the influences of MO and LC on DCM, 
respectively scoring regression weights of .24 and .19. Moreover, the direct 
effect of AC on P (β= .25), also has a higher regression weight in 
comparison with the refined baseline model and the separate models of Air 
force and Army Command. 
 
A third interesting issue is related to the role of lateral coordination and 
modular organizing as determinants of absorptive capacity. In the refined 
path model 27% of the explained variance of AC is being accounted for by 
only these two variables. Figure 4-3 shows a different situation for the 
Navy; namely, in this specific case only 18% of the explained variance of 
absorptive capacity is being determined by a combination of lateral 
coordination and modular organizing. This decreasing number seems to the 
result of a less profound direct effect of LC (β= .18 instead of β= .26) on 
AC.  
 
Finally, the relationship between lateral coordination and modular 
organizing is also worth mentioning. Of the three Operational Commands 
this path is the most strongest with a score of .43 within the Navy setting. 
This result came a bit as a surprise, mainly because the Navy with its 
maritime task holds a rather independent position within the Netherlands 
armed forces. Of their nature, land and air operations are more directly 
linked, whereas Navy operations often take place independently. If there is 
cooperation, this often takes place in international fleet settings. The ships 
that take part in these fleet settings can, basically, be seen as ideal 
organizational modules. Therefore, one would expect the level of lateral 
coordination to be rather limited in a naval context. After all, standardized 
command and control processes and periodic maneuvers ought to be 
sufficient to integrate the different ships into a well-working larger fleet 
formation.  
 
Figure 4-4 below indicates that Air Force Command does not differ much 
from the refined path model. However, one thing that does attract attention 
is the effect of DCM on P. The regression weight of .13 is not only lower 
than the refined path model suggests but in comparison with the Navy and 
Army Command models this figure is even substantially lower. In general, 
this result seems to indicate that Air Force Command relies less on the 
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existence of a mixture of strategic, structural, and operational dynamic 
capabilities for its crisis response performance.   
 
 
Figure 4-4: Air force Command 
 
 
One interesting remark can be made about the situation of Army 
Command, presented in figure 4-5. Within the Army context Absorptive 
Capacity has an explained variance of .32, which is higher than the refined 
path model suggests. This rise seems to be influenced by an increasing 
effect of MO on AC (β= .41 instead of β= .36). Moreover, Comparing this 
regression weight of .41 with the other two Operational Commands (Navy 
= .32, Air Force = .31), seems to indicate that of the three Commands the 
Army most strongly depends on modular organizing practices for its ability 
to recognize, assimilate, transform, and exploit external knowledge.   
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Figure 4-5: Army Command 
 
Comparing mission contexts 
 
The next phase in the SEM analyses was to investigate whether or not 
differing levels of environmental turbulence would lead to substantial 
changes in the model’s structure and interrelationships. The ANOVA 
results were used to select two crisis response missions, comparable in size 
but with significantly different levels of environmental turbulence. SFOR 
was selected as a representative mission context of moderate 
environmental turbulence and ISAF as a context of high environmental 
turbulence.  
 
Another multiple group analysis was conducted. The output showed a very 
good model fit (see unconstrained model in table 4-9). The next step was to 
analyze if significant differences in parameter estimates between the SFOR 
and ISAF mission would surface. This was not the case. The constrained 
analysis also showed a good model fit (see structural weights model in 
table 4.9). 
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Model type Chi-
square Df P RMSEA CFI SRMR GFI 
Unconstrained .754 2 .686 
.000 
L90: .000 
H90:.065 
1.00 .0111 .999 
Structural 
Weights 
 
14.08 11 .229 
.023 
L90:.000 
H90:.054 
.995 .0382 .990 
Table 4-9: Multiple group analysis of moderate versus high environmental 
turbulence 
 
 
Based on these results it could be concluded that the model’s overall 
structure persists within the two specific environmental contexts of 
moderate and high turbulence. However, a closer look at the 
unstandardized regression weights of the two different unconstrained 
models drew attention to the fact that some of the proposed paths lost their 
statistical significance. To be specific, within SFOR’s moderately turbulent 
task environment modular organizing and a mixture of flexible dynamic 
capabilities still had a profound influence on organizational performance. 
Yet, the other proposed relationship between absorptive capacity and 
performance was no longer significant under these circumstances. In 
contrast with this situation, ISAF’s context of high environmental 
turbulence painted an opposite picture. Under these environmental 
conditions absorptive capacity had become the sole significant contributor 
to organizational performance at the expense of the other two paths.   
 
After these findings it was decided to test the mission models separately. 
The main goal was to analyze if per model a fit could still be found while 
leaving out the not significant relationships. For both the SFOR and ISAF 
context this proved to be the case (see table 4-10). Table 4-10 makes clear 
that all fit-indexes reached satisfactory levels. The RMSEA was the only 
fit index that did not reach its most desirable level of ≤ 05. Kline (2005) 
argues, however, that scores between .05 and .08 are still considered 
reasonably fine. Moreover, he explains that the mixed results of the 
confidence intervals (0↔.147 and 0↔.126), where the lower bounds reach 
a satisfactory level and the upper bounds do not, probably have to do with 
the smaller sample sizes. 
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Model 
type 
Chi-
square Df P RMSEA CFI SRMR GFI 
SFOR 3.593 2 .166 
.056 
L90:.000 
H90:.147 
.993 .0252 .994 
 
ISAF 
 
5.262 3 .154 
.053 
L90:.000 
H90:.126 
.993 .0349 .992 
Table 4-10: Model fit of the SFOR and ISAF models 
 
 
 
The actual models are presented in figure 4-6 and 4-7 below. Apart from 
the alterations that have been made to the refined path model, a second 
topic these models bring forward has to do with the variable lateral 
coordination. A comparison of figure 4-6 and 4-7 makes clear that when 
the level of environmental turbulence increases the influence of LC on 
both MO and AC rises. This seems to indicate that the ability to recognize, 
transform, and exploit new external knowledge and to modularly organize 
comes to depend more strongly on an organization’s lateral coordination 
capabilities. The explained variance of the variables AC and MO support 
this assumption. With LC as a sole predictor variable of absorptive 
capacity the explained variance of AC increases from .24 under moderately 
turbulent circumstances to .31 under highly turbulent circumstances. The 
same trend is applicable to the relationship between lateral coordination 
and modular organizing, where the explained variance of MO has doubled 
from .10 to .20. 
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Figure 4-6: The SFOR model 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-7: The ISAF model 
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Comparing levels of operational experience 
 
The varying levels of mission experience between the respondents served 
as the input for a third multiple group analysis. AMOS was used to find out 
if a distinction between little and much operational experience would have 
an effect on the refined path model and especially on the key variable 
Absorptive Capacity. A multiple group analysis showed no significant 
differences on the model’s overall structure and the interrelationships 
between the model’s variables between a group of moderately experienced 
respondents and a group of highly experienced respondents. Table 4-11 
shows that the unconstrained model and structural weights model both 
obtained a good model fit. 
 
 
 
Model type Chi-
square Df P RMSEA CFI SRMR GFI 
Unconstrained 1.936 2 .380 
.000 
L90: .000 
H90:.055 
1.000 .0092 .999 
Structural 
Weights 
 
5.267 11 .918 
.000 
L90:.000 
H90:.055 
1.000 .0115 .998 
Table 4-11: Multiple group analysis moderate versus high level of operational 
experience 
 
 
However, a closer look at the standardized regression weights pointed to 
some nuances between the two groups when focusing on the effects of the 
variable Absorptive Capacity (see figure 4-8 and 4-9).  The effect of AC on 
DCM is stronger within the group of highly experienced officers than 
within the group of less experienced officers. At the same time, however, 
within this group of highly experienced respondents the effects of AC on P 
and DCM on P are less strong.  
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Figure 4-8: Moderate level of mission experience 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-9: High level of mission experience 
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4.5 DISCUSSING THE RESULTS 
 
After having done the statistical analyses in AMOS the research focus 
shifted to giving explanations for the numerical data that was retrieved. 
The final question of the questionnaire was used as a starting-point for this 
process. This final question was an open question, in which the 
respondents were invited to write down individual comments and other 
relevant information and remarks. After scanning these comments it 
became clear that some very relevant themes were being addressed in this 
undirected part of the questionnaire. Themes emerged that could be linked 
to a number of issues that the AMOS analyses had brought to the surface 
and that could color them with more practical meaning. Table 4-12 below 
gives an overview of the central themes that were being addressed in these 
comments. Moreover, it presents the actual number of relevant comments 
that were written down on the survey form.  
 
 
Themes Number of 
comments 
1. Configuring tailor-made crisis response units 19 
2.  Cooperation between different Operational 
Commands 16 
3. The Netherlands armed forces organizational 
learning ability 19 
4.  Differing task domains between Operational 
Commands 16 
5. Differing mission contexts 4 
Total 74 
Table 4-12: Categorization of comments 
 
 
Explaining lateral coordination’s role in organizational alignment 
 
The fact that a general model fit could only be found when an extra 
relationship between Lateral Coordination and Dynamic Capabilities 
Mixture was added to the model could directly be related to a large number 
of comments that were made. The theoretical assumption underlying this 
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specific relationship of using lateral coordination as a basic organizational 
tool to connect and align different hierarchical levels, functional areas, and 
ideological standpoints was being supported by these comments.  
 
The comments pointed to a specific gap that asked for extra 
communication and coordination efforts. According to 16 respondents a 
command and control gap exists between the Netherlands armed forces’ 
strategic apex in The Hague and the actual military formation that is, or is 
going to be, deployed. The Chief of Defense bears primary responsibility 
for planning and directing crisis response operations. He, however, has no 
national permanent joint headquarters at his disposal to support him in his 
role of commander-in-chief. As a result, during the planning and 
preparation phase of a mission many responsibilities are being delegated to 
the Operational Commands. Depending on the composition of the actual 
crisis response formation the contributor of the largest number of troops is 
appointed Coordinating Operational Command. Because of this approach 
of structural delegation important planning and preparation issues are 
being settled through horizontal, ad-hoc, relations between the 
Coordinating Operational Command and the other Operational Commands 
that are participating in the mission.   
 
Most comments (14) make clear that this process of horizontal 
coordination does not always go smoothly. Conflicts of interest and 
cultural differences between the Operational Commands may lead to 
miscommunication, misunderstanding, delays, and sub-optimal decision-
making. It must, however, also be said that because of the increasing level 
of participation of the Netherlands armed forces in all kinds of crisis 
response operations the organization is at the same time, according to 2 of 
the respondents, gradually making progress when it comes to joint inter-
staff cooperation.  
 
Explaining the strong influence of lateral coordination on modular 
organizing 
 
A second theme that emerged after reading the open remarks could directly 
be related to hypothesis 9. This hypothesis suggests that lateral 
coordination ought to have a moderately positive effect on modular 
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organizing in order to retain the advantages of loose coupling. Yet, looking 
at the refined path model a regression weight of .41, which represents the 
strongest effect within the entire model, indicates a rather profound effect 
of LC on MO. Moreover MO’s explained variance of 17% based on the 
sole contribution of LC is also quite considerable. Moreover, a similar 
situation occurs within the separate models of the different Operational 
Commands. 
 
The open comments offer a probable cause for the stronger than expected 
relationship between LC and MO, namely design constraints. First of all, 7 
respondents explain that the Netherlands armed forces’ permanent 
structure is not attuned to its crisis response role. For each mission tailor-
made configurations have to be composed. The process of mixing and 
matching that follows cuts through all kinds of existing hierarchical and 
functional boundaries. As a result, the tailor-made military formations that 
are being deployed have to deal with the problem of organizational 
unfamiliarity. The fact that they are composed on an ad hoc project basis 
for very specific operational assignments leads to situations in which units 
and individuals have to work closely together, without actually knowing 
each other very well. To overcome this problem the organization has to 
invest time and money in for example extra training programs, but also in 
the deployment of additional staff specialists to successfully coordinate the 
wide variety of functional components that are being deployed.  
 
Regarding the aspect of imperfect modularization it is also useful to 
refocus on the specific model of Navy Command.  Figure 4-3 had shown 
that against all expectations the relationship between lateral coordination 
and modular organizing was most powerful within the Navy context. 
Based on 3 remarks of Navy respondents it could be argued that this has to 
do with fact that Navy personnel are increasingly being deployed for land-
based operations. The three comments specifically referred to ISAF’s land-
based mission in Afghanistan, for which in August 2005 the Navy had to 
man what is known as a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). This PRT 
mission became an organizational eye-opener for the Navy. Because the 
traditional naval building blocks of ships and crews did not fit the work 
force composition of a PRT, many of the people needed were hand-picked 
from the permanent organization to do the job. The implications of this 
approach were twofold. First, the Navy had to invest extra time, money 
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and energy in training and team building programs to create a deployable 
unit out of all the selected individuals. Second, by suddenly withdrawing 
people from their daily jobs, the administrative, functional, and vocational 
processes of the Navy itself suffered dramatically. Given the opportunity to 
do it all over again, the respondents believe that Navy Command probably 
has to stick to its original organizational modules and use a ship’s fixed 
crew on land to take on unfamiliar tasks.  
 
Explaining the strong influence of modular organizing on absorptive 
capacity 
 
All multiple group analyses demonstrated that the relationship between 
modular organizing and absorptive capacity is stronger than the one 
between lateral coordination and absorptive capacity. With this concrete 
empirical evidence hypothesis 8a could be supported and 8b could be 
rejected. On the whole, the outcome seems to indicate that team-based 
structures have a more profound influence on an organization’s absorptive 
capacity than expected.  
 
No concrete remarks could be related to this finding. Perhaps a logical 
explanation could be that coordination capabilities primarily relate to the 
rather swift exchange of knowledge and insights between individuals; 
whereas, modular organizing stimulates a more profound way of learning. 
The cooperation that takes place between different military units, over a 
longer period of time, deepens the understanding of each other’s ways of 
doing things. This probably leads to a situation in which not only new 
knowledge is acquired, but also more detailed insights are gathered about 
the transformation of this new knowledge into concrete, usable routines 
and processes.  
 
Explaining the relative influence of absorptive capacity and modular 
organizing 
 
Hypothesis 7 is based on the idea that because of its learning and 
orchestrator capabilities absorptive capacity has the strongest influence on 
an organization’s strategic, structural, and operational flexible dynamic 
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capabilities. Within the refined baseline model this hypothesis could not be 
confirmed. The effect of AC on DCM proved to be just as strong as MO on 
DCM. Within the large number of open comments no real clue could be 
found on this issue. Yet, the multiple group analysis, in which SFOR’s 
moderately turbulent mission context was compared with the ISAF’s 
highly turbulent mission context, offers relevant additional information on 
the relative power of absorptive capacity in relation to the other key 
determinant modular organizing. 
 
To a large extent the SEM outcome seems to be in line with what 
theoretically has been discussed in paragraph 2.6. Recapitulating, this 
paragraph explains that within a turbulent environment organizations are 
confronted with a wide spectrum of competitive demands. Most of the time 
these demands ask for a prudent organizational approach, but sometimes 
an organization also has to act quickly and decisively. The former 
situation, results in a highly patterned way of reacting based on the 
execution of dynamic capabilities. The latter, stimulates a tactic of 
improvisation and ad hoc problem solving, not necessarily based on the 
activation of existing dynamic capabilities. Absorptive capacity and 
modular organizing are both presented as organizational determinants that 
can deal with the entire spectrum of competitive demands, supporting 
highly patterned but also improvisational organizational reactions. 
 
Especially the refined path model seems to fit this theoretical picture 
extremely well. After all, both AC and MO directly contribute to the 
activation of a broad mixture of flexible dynamic capabilities, but also 
directly influence organizational performance. However, when the level of 
turbulence decreases (the SFOR situation) or increases (the ISAF situation) 
some interesting alternative dynamics emerge. What the results make clear 
is that, when the level of environmental turbulence becomes less extreme, 
reconfiguration capabilities offer the organization enough flexibility to 
successfully react to emerging changes in the environment. In this case it is 
only the orchestrator role of absorptive capacity that adds value, helping to 
create a durable balance between strategic ambitions and organizational 
capabilities. In the research model this leads to a situation in which AC 
only indirectly influences P, and in which a direct effect between AC and P 
no longer exists. At the same time, the results show that, when level of 
environmental turbulence gets really high, absorptive capacity starts acting 
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as the sole contributor to organizational performance. In a general sense, 
this result assumes that within highly turbulent environments the existing 
organizational status quo has to be more or less taken for granted. The real 
difference has to be found in thinking and acting quickly beyond existing 
practices; basically, making it a case of creatively exploiting what you 
have got.  
 
When this outcome is being related to the competitive spectrum presented 
in figure 2.3 it could be argued that AC and MO take up different 
positions. Absorptive capacity seems to be the predominant organizational 
determinant on the right side of the spectrum. Modular organizing plays 
this leading role on the left side of the spectrum and in the mid section both 
determinants are required. So, basically, it is not about being the strongest, 
but far more a matter of being the most appropriate organizational 
determinant given the environmental circumstances.  
 
Explaining the differences between Operational Commands 
 
Much of the differences between the models of Army, Navy and Air force 
Command can probably be related to their different operational domains. 
16 open remarks explicitly emphasize the fact that different task settings 
lead to different organizational dynamics. 
 
First of all, the Navy, with its maritime task, holds a rather independent 
position within the Netherlands armed forces. In their nature, land and air 
operations are more directly linked, whereas Navy operations often take 
place independently. Any form of cooperation will often take place in 
international fleet settings. On account of their autonomous position, it is 
therefore probable for Navy personnel to find it hard to be outspoken on 
the crisis response operations of the armed forces as a whole. Therefore, 
the respondents from Navy Command probably scored significantly lower 
on performance than the respondents from Army and Air force Command.  
 
Next, for the Navy the new crisis response role has not led to drastic 
operational changes compared to the past. Basically, sea time has remained 
sea time, and it does not matter much for Navy personnel whether they are 
employed in a regular maritime patrol, a counter-drug operation in the 
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Caribbean, or in for example CTF150 within the Enduring Freedom 
framework. It could even be argued that the status quo between 
organizational capabilities and strategic capacity has not really been stirred 
up. So, despite the expansion of operational tasks no drastic organizational 
changes were needed. Figure 4-3 supports this idea by showing that of all 
Operational Commands the Dynamic Capabilities Mixture has the 
strongest influence on performance within the Navy setting. Moreover, this 
figure also makes clear that in combination absorptive capacity, modular 
organizing, and a mixture of dynamic capabilities account for a profound 
part of the organization’s performance. Where, these three determinants 
only explain 17% of the performance of the Air force and Army, they 
explain a more substantial part of 28% within the Navy context.  
 
Similar argumentation can be applied to Air force Command. Just like the 
Navy the Air force has encountered less far-reaching changes in its 
operational repertoire than the Army did. Flying an F-16 fighter jet or 
Apache attack helicopter over Europe in a Cold War setting is in a 
practical sense not very different from flying a mission over Bosnian, 
Ethiopian, or Afghan air space. However, one thing that did urge the Air 
force to react was the increasing level of operational deployment. In almost 
all land-based operations aerial support was indispensable. Especially 
helicopters proved to be a crucial operational asset for crisis response 
missions. Given its relative small size, the problem that Air force 
Command, in this respect, encountered was that the increasing demand was 
difficult to satisfy.  
 
The open comments make clear that sometimes only ad-hoc and “creative” 
organizational measures helped the Air force to meet its operational 
demands. One of the respondents explained that F16 technicians had to be 
retrained to create a larger pool of technicians that could do maintenance 
jobs on the Apache attack helicopter. This measure positively contributed 
to the sustainability of Air force Command’s contribution to the ISAF 
mission in Afghanistan.  From a theoretical perspective, the example 
makes clear that the existing mixture of dynamic capabilities was not 
sufficient, which could explain the somewhat weak relationship between 
DCM and P in figure 4-4. Moreover, the example also supports the relative 
strong effect of absorptive capacity on performance. After all, in the end 
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organizational ingenuity was the main reason for the coming about of a 
satisfactory solution.            
 
Focusing on Army Command, the comments make clear that this 
organizational part has faced substantial changes in its operational task-
setting. The traditional context of preparing for a large-scale, mechanized, 
predictable conflict had disappeared. A new environment of unknown and 
asymmetrical threats had caused Army Command to start conducting crisis 
operations along a broad spectrum of conflict types, varying from high 
intensity conflict operations to reconstruction and humanitarian operations. 
Moreover, within a specific mission context the organization has to be 
capable of switching between defense, development, and diplomacy types 
of tasks.  
 
7 open comments stress the fact that of all Operational Commands Army 
Command has embraced the strategy of mixing and matching different 
kinds of units into tailor-made task forces most strongly. The leading 
assumption is that because of the highly changeable character of crisis 
response missions, and the high level of task uncertainty, it is not feasible 
to create organizational units that are perfectly fit for the new crisis 
response task-setting. Therefore, Army Command has decided to stick to 
its traditional building blocks of brigades as the operational backbone of 
the organization. When troops are needed for a certain mission they are 
drawn from all over the organization and not specifically from one and the 
same brigade.  
 
The situation sketched above perhaps explains the strong effect of Modular 
Organizing on Absorptive Capacity in figure 4-5. For Army Command 
each crisis response formation acts as specific operational learning portal. 
After all, the temporary, ad-hoc project structures that are being deployed 
are the organization’s primary link to the actual task environment. During 
the Cold War period the fit between task and organization caused 
organizational learning to be an incremental process within fixed 
operational units, whereas the new deployment approach of customization 
has made organizational learning more a process of learning by doing in 
different operational settings and organizational structures. 
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Explaining the differences between varying levels of mission 
experience  
 
Figure 4-8 and 4-9 have shown that respondents with a high level of 
operational experience, on one hand, assign a strong effect to the 
relationship between AC and DCM, on the other hand, these figures also 
indicate that there is a less profound effect of DCM on P and of AC 
directly on P. This situation could theoretically be explained as follows. 
One of the main goals of the variable absorptive capacity is to create 
alignment in the available mixture of strategic, structural, and operational 
flexible dynamic capabilities. If, however, the result of this matching 
process is not entirely satisfactory it could lead to a mix of capabilities that 
is not completely in line with the operational demands, weakening the 
influence that absorptive capacity directly and indirectly has on 
organizational performance. 
 
The theoretical assumption mentioned above is being supported by open 
remarks that are made by a number of respondents with a high level of 
operational experience. These remarks point in two directions. First, they 
specifically go into the Netherlands armed forces learning capacity in 
general. The main assumption ventilated by 19 respondents is that the 
Netherlands armed forces are too much being swayed by the issues of the 
day that they do not really learn from past experiences. Several times 
respondents have stated that the organization “keeps reinventing the 
wheel”. Second, some of the remarks can be linked to a concrete strategic 
choice that thwarts the idea of a balanced mixture of strategic, structural, 
and operational dynamic capabilities. To be precise, 4 respondents are 
negative about the fact that task generalization is increasingly being 
preferred over functional specialization during crisis response operations. 
Concrete examples that are being mentioned vary from, for example, Navy 
and Air force personnel that have to take on unfamiliar tasks on land, to 
artillery and technical units from the Army that are being deployed to 
conduct certain infantry-like tasks. The overall opinion is that the resulting 
lack of functional qualities ultimately leads to a lesser operational 
performance.   
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4.6 UNCOVERING THE DYNAMIC CAPABILITIES BOX 
 
The final part of this chapter has a theoretical background, referring to the 
variable DCM. DCM plays a central role in the research model, but should 
actually not be treated as a single variable. After all, in reality DCM is 
made up of the variables strategic, structural, and operational flexible 
dynamic capabilities. Since these three scales did not reach the satisfactory 
Cronbach’s Alpha score of .70 separately they have been combined into 
one overall scale. Regretfully, this has resulted in a simplified theoretical 
picture of the organizational dynamics being studied. After all, within the 
refined path model discussed in this chapter it is impossible to make 
concrete statements about the individual effects of absorptive capacity on 
strategic, structural, and operational dynamic capabilities. The same 
applies to the variables modular organizing and lateral coordination. 
Moreover, it is also not possible to say anything about the 
interrelationships between the different flexible dynamic capabilities 
themselves and their effects on performance.  
 
Given the fact that these insights could be of much interest for both the 
academic community and the Netherlands armed forces, it was interesting 
to do some additional analyses incorporating the variables strategic, 
structural, and operational dynamic flexible capabilities into the refined 
path model despite their unsatisfactory Cronbach’s alpha scores of 
respectively .52, .55, and .61. This approach is not uncommon within the 
academic community. See for example Buenger, Daft, Conlon, & Austin 
(1996)  who also held on to a number of variables with too low reliability 
scores, because they had a profound theoretical value and proved to be 
strong factors in the SEM analysis.  
 
The additional hypotheses that make up the advanced model are derived 
from chapter’s 2 theoretical reasoning but also from the insights coming 
from the previous SEM analyses. The combination of existing theory and 
practical clues gives the model an explanatory as well as exploratory 
character. The advanced model is being presented in figure 4-10 and 
explained in more detail below. 
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Figure 4-10: Advanced model 
 
 
Explaining the advanced model 
 
According to the theoretical discussion in chapter 2 absorptive capacity 
acts as an organizational determinant that directs both the organization’s 
strategic maneuvering process and the reorganization of its internal 
resources and processes. Based on these strategic learning and orchestrator 
abilities Absorptive Capacity is expected to contribute to the alignment of 
strategic, structural, and operational dynamic capabilities. Within the 
advanced model this assumption has been schematically concretized by 
drawing three directed arrows, leaving from AC and ending on STRAT 
DC, STRUC DC, and OP DC. Moreover, the powers of these three 
relationships are expected to be roughly the same, emphasizing the fact 
that equal attention is needed in order to create a solid balance between the 
three different types of flexible dynamic capabilities. 
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A same kind of reasoning can be applied to the variable Modular 
Organizing. In chapter 2 it was stated that by using fixed, self-supporting, 
autonomous organizational modules and by controlling only the required 
output of these modules, a loosely coupled system is created that can be 
reconfigured into different forms to react to changing competitive 
circumstances, but that is also capable of dealing with everyday 
operational instabilities and fluctuations. In a more general sense modular 
organizing is being presented as a design approach that deliberately tries to 
recombine the aim for strategic and structural flexibility with the retention 
of organizational stability. Based on this principle, the variable Modular 
Organizing is also expected to, more or less, equally contribute to the 
alignment of strategic, structural, and operational flexible dynamic 
capabilities. Schematically, this has resulted in three directed arrows 
coming from MO and landing on STRAT DC, STRUC DC, and OP DC. 
 
Next, an interesting issue that has, so far, remained underexposed is the 
proposed hierarchical relationship between de different types of flexible 
dynamic capabilities, which has been discussed in Chapter 2. The question 
whether this relationship indeed exists could not be answered with the 
initial path model, in which the different types of flexible dynamic 
capabilities were blended into one overall variable (DCM). Recapitulating, 
Volberda (1998) argues that operational dynamic capabilities lay the 
foundations for a successful activation of the higher order structural and 
strategic flexible dynamic capabilities.  Volberda’s assumption is made 
concrete in figure 4-10 by creating a sort of causal hierarchy between the 
variables OP DC, STRUC DC, and STRAT DC. The directed arrow 
coming from OP DC and landing on STRUC DC assumes that the 
operational flexible dynamic capabilities lay the foundations for the 
organization’s structural flexible dynamic capabilities; and subsequently 
the arrow going from STRUC DC to STRAT DC indicates that structural 
flexible dynamic capabilities influence the coming about of strategic 
flexible dynamic capabilities. 
 
Another issue to address, regarding the proposed paths of the advanced 
model, has to do with the relationship between Lateral Coordination and 
the mixture of dynamic capabilities. Paragraph 4.4 made clear that a direct 
relationship between LC and DCM had to be incorporated into the default 
path model in order to get a good model fit. Moreover, the open comments 
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made clear that these lateral coordination processes primarily related to the 
intra-organizational planning and preparation efforts that had to take place 
in support of the actual deployment of a tailor-made crisis response 
formation. Because these empirical results had pointed out that a direct link 
existed between lateral coordination and operational performance, it was 
decided to only draw one directed arrow between LC and OP DC. 
 
Finally, unpacking the DCM rectangle also has consequences for the 
relationship with performance. Within the initial path model a single arrow 
is drawn from DCM to P. The question within the unpacked version is, of 
course, if all three variables separately contribute to organizational 
performance or that perhaps one or two dominate this specific relationship. 
Based on two reasons it is suggested that especially structural and strategic 
dynamic flexible capabilities contribute to organizational performance.  
 
First, the questionnaire has taken a strategic management perspective on 
organizational performance. The performance scale aims to measure crisis 
response performance in general and not the specific operational 
achievements of individual missions. Basically, respondents are invited to 
judge the performance of the Netherlands armed forces across a wide 
spectrum of operational task-settings. The fact that the Netherlands armed 
forces have to be capable of conducting crisis response operations varying 
from humanitarian aid to large scale combat operations makes the 
availability of strategic dynamic capabilities of crucial importance. 
Therefore, a directed arrow is drawn between STRAT DC and P and no 
direct relationship between OP DC and P is incorporated into the advanced 
model.  
 
Second, based the open comments can be concluded that structural 
dynamic capabilities play a crucial role in supporting the Netherlands 
armed forces’ aim of strategic versatility. Numerous times respondents 
mention the fact that the organization’s versatility is primarily based on a 
process of organizational customization. Therefore, the advanced model 
also suggests a direct relationship between STRUC DC and P. Moreover, 
given the large amount of comments that were made on this issue, it is 
expected that this relationship is stronger than the one between STRAT DC 
and P. 
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AMOS results 
 
Testing the proposed model in AMOS has resulted in a good model fit. All 
fit indexes reached satisfactory scores (see table 4-12), meaning that the 
model’s proposed structure was being supported by the actual empirical 
results.  
 
 
Chi-
square Df P RMSEA CFI SRMR GFI 
7.787 5 .168 
.021 
L90: .000 
H90:.048 
.998 .0135 .998 
Table 4-13: Model fit of the advanced model 
 
 
Figure 4-11 indeed shows that both the variables AC and MO have an 
effect on all three types of dynamic capabilities. However, the standardized 
regression weights show some minor differences in the effects of both 
variables on either STRAT DC, STRUC DC, or OP DC. It seems to be the 
case that AC and MO both have the most profound effect on STRAT DC, 
followed by STRUC DC and then OP DC.  
 
Moreover, the assumption that OP DC acts as an enabler for STRUC DC 
and that STRUC DC does the same for STRAT DC was also being 
confirmed by the empirical data. To be certain of this hierarchical effect, 
two alternative models were tested. One model assumed a reversed 
relationship, in which STRAT DC influenced STRUC DC and STRUC DC 
influenced OP DC; and a second model suggested that STRUC DC 
affected both STRAT DC and OP DC. Testing these two alternative 
models in AMOS led to worse fit indexes. 
 
The influence of LC on OP DC was being confirmed by the data too. Three 
alternative models in which LC influenced either STRAT DC, or STRUC 
DC, or both significantly worsened the statistical results. To be precise, the 
Chi-square increased from 7.8 to respectively 123.3, 123.4, or 122.9. More 
specifically, for these alternative models not even a model-fit could be 
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created, which supported our assumption that only a relationship should be 
drawn between LC and OP DC. 
 
Finally, the proposed effects of STRAT DC and STRUC DC on P were 
being supported by the empirical evidence as well. Moreover, with a 
regression weight of .18 against .08 the predominant role of STRUC DC 
over STRAT DC was also being confirmed. Overall could be stated that 
the Netherlands armed forces have put the emphasis on structural dynamic 
capabilities to become versatile in order to counter the turbulent crisis 
response environment they are confronted with.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-11: Regression weights and variances of the advanced model 
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4.7 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has analyzed the contribution of the organizational 
determinants absorptive capacity, modular organizing, and lateral 
coordination to the crisis response performance of the Netherlands armed 
forces. Based on the information coming from a large scale survey among 
a large sample of Dutch officers, it could be concluded that all three 
determinants play an important role. To be precise, 18% of the perceived 
overall crisis response performance of the Netherlands armed forces is 
being accounted for by only these three variables. The results have also 
made clear that lateral coordination not only acts as a facilitator of 
absorptive capacity and modular organizing, but also directly supports the 
organization’s operational flexible dynamic capabilities. Moreover, these 
operational flexible dynamic capabilities seem to be of crucial importance 
themselves. The empirical findings indicate that they, basically, lay the 
foundation for the activation of structural and strategic dynamic flexible 
capabilities. What the results also show is that when the level of 
environmental turbulence increases the effects of modular organizing and a 
mixture of dynamic capabilities seem to become of marginal importance, 
whereas absorptive capacity becomes the sole significant contributor to 
organizational performance. This probably has to do with the fact that 
within turbulent crisis situations the real difference can be made by 
thinking and acting beyond existing practices; basically making it a case of 
creatively exploiting of what you have got. 
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CHAPTER 5 ASSESSING POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The previous empirical chapter has shown that absorptive capacity, 
modular organizing and lateral coordination are important organizational 
determinants for the Netherlands armed forces to cope with the turbulence 
of the security environment. This chapter digs deeper into the policy 
implications of these determinants. Studying the Defense Bills of 1993, 
2000, and 2003 has been the starting point of this analysis. Yet, the 
chapter’s main goal is to look beyond these written documents by finding 
out how senior officers and civil servants of the Netherlands armed forces’ 
in hindsight judge the practical outcome of these organizational 
determinants. Eighteen high-ranking officials from the Ministry of Defense 
-military and non-military- were interviewed for this purpose.  
 
The chapter is split-up in five main paragraphs. First, the Defense Bills of 
1993, 2000, and 2003 are being discussed to give insight into the 
Netherlands armed forces’ incremental path-dependent absorptive capacity 
process and into the concrete transformation decisions that the organization 
has made. In addition to this rather ‘static’ analysis, interview results are 
used to judge the support for the concrete transformation choices and to 
come up with suggestions to improve the Netherlands armed forces current 
process of knowledge absorption. Second, the variable modular organizing 
is being investigated from a practical point of view by discussing the pros 
and cons with senior officials. Third, the role of lateral coordination, as a 
system integrator to create a well working overall system out of a mixture 
of structurally dependent organizational elements, is being analyzed. 
Fourth, the issue of balancing strategy, structure, and operational practices 
is being discussed. Finally, the chapter will concentrate on the opinion of 
the senior officials regarding the performance outcome that has been 
achieved so far. 
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5.2 THE NETHERLANDS ARMED FORCES’ 
ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY 
 
Studying the Defense Bills of 1993, 2000, and 2003 has been the starting 
point for analyzing the Netherlands armed forces absorptive capacity, 
mainly because, in a general sense, these documents present the official 
and explicit outcome of the organization’s strategic interpretation process. 
When looking at the three Defense Bills from a comprehensive 
perspective, shows that the transformation process itself did not take the 
shape of a systematic, step-by-step, chronological strategic plan. It was far 
more a process of learning by doing, fitting the picture of what Quinn 
(1988) calls logical incrementalism. He (1988: 94) explains logical 
incrementalism as follows: “the full strategy is rarely written down in any 
one place. The processes used to arrive at the total strategy are typically 
fragmented, evolutionary, and largely intuitive. Although one can usually 
find embedded in these fragments some very refined pieces of formal 
strategic analysis [think of the separate Defense Bills], the real strategy 
tends to evolve as internal decisions and external events flow together to 
create a new, widely shared consensus for action among key members of 
the top management team.”  
 
On the whole, when the logical incrementalist nature of the Netherlands 
armed forces’ search and selection process is related to the four distinct 
dimensions of absorptive capacity it could be argued that the Defense Bill 
1993 presents the results of the organization’s knowledge ‘acquisition’ and 
‘assimilation’ processes. What the document shows, is that after the 
collapse of the Berlin Wall it took the West a couple of years to fathom the 
general direction the international security environment would take. The 
emerging tensions in the Balkans and the further disintegration of the 
Soviet Union ultimately made two things clear. First, NATO’s former 
opponent really posed no direct threat anymore. Second, the West could 
not turn away from the different crisis situations that surfaced in Europe 
and other parts of the world. Only after making this basic assessment could 
the Dutch government start explaining to its people that crisis response 
operations had to become the military’s new core business, and genuinely 
begin reorganizing their armed forces in line with this new strategic course. 
Transforming from a conscript into an all volunteer organization became 
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the most essential, first organizational adjustment that had to be initiated 
before the new security ambitions could really take shape. 
 
Next, the plans set out in 2000 can be described as a combination of 
knowledge acquisition, assimilation, and transformation. Generally 
speaking, the policy document’s main goal was to make a big step forward 
with the actual transformation process set in motion in 1993. Concrete 
experiences in conducting crisis response operations made it possible to 
create a clearer picture of the environmental characteristics, task-setting, 
and organizational adjustments needed.  
 
Finally, the Defense Bill of 2003 can be typified as a combination of all 
four dimensions: knowledge acquisition, assimilation, transformation, and 
exploitation. First, urgent budgetary considerations and the threat of 
international terrorism pushed the organization to further refine its strategic 
position and task-setting. Second, based on the increasing level of crisis 
response experience concrete organizational refinements were initiated to 
exploit past organizational choices. Third, from a more long-term 
perspective suggestions were made to anticipate and respond to important 
future developments.  
 
An incremental path-dependent process 
 
On the whole, the policy documents make clear that absorptive capacity 
does not have to be a determinant that gives an organization the possibility 
to, in a one-off manner, rationally predetermine the intended end state and 
systematically break up the way to go in well formulated logical steps. The 
case of the Netherlands armed forces shows a picture of a deliberate 
process outlined by the organization’s senior management that took place 
in a rather sequential order and that followed an incremental 
developmental path in time  
 
More specifically, the policy documents bring forward that, on one hand, 
the Netherlands armed forces faced the challenge of transforming their 
organization in order to counter the continuously changing security 
environment. On the other hand, the organization could not take too many 
risks during the reorganization process, because at the same time it had to 
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actually start fulfilling its new crisis response role. “The shop is not to be 
closed during repairs” was a one-liner posed quite often during these days. 
This situation was probably one of the main reasons why the Netherlands 
armed forces decided not to rock the boat too much and to follow an 
incremental transformation approach. This approach resembles a situation 
that Helfat et al. (2007) refer to as the relationship between path 
dependency and the reality of constrained change. Meaning that it is better 
for an organization to invest in dynamic capabilities that match the context 
in which it operates than to abandon the existing resource base in search of 
drastic strategic renewal. Although, this might narrow the future paths 
available to an organization, it also prevents the heavy organizational 
sacrifices and costs that have to be made in order to pull of a drastic 
change of course. 
  
This incremental, path dependent strategic development process has above 
all been directed by the central assumption that each soldier trained for 
traditional large-scale combat tasks could also take on crisis response tasks 
with a lower level of risk. As a result of this assumption, the organization 
could straightaway use all its soldiers for every crisis response task 
imaginable. Moreover, there was no urgent need to radically alter existing 
training programs, routines, and procedures. So, basically from day one, 
the organization declared its smallest building block, the individual soldier, 
fit for its new task environment without having to make any drastic 
organizational changes.  
 
With the basic idea in mind that the flexibility needed was to a large extent 
already incorporated in its work force, the Netherlands armed forces began 
putting the real transformation effort into three commonly accepted 
organizational subsystems. To be precise, in order to adjust the existing 
resource base to the new crisis response role the organization focused on 
its structural, technological, and cultural design parameters (Zelenovic, 
1982).  
 
The most important lead for change became the organizational structure. 
The old Cold War structure of clearly separated Operational Commands 
(Services) remained largely unchanged throughout the entire 
transformation process. The central question the organization asked itself 
was whether the diversity of crisis response operations could be handled 
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with the existing basic organizational structures. Because of the 
decomposable character of military organizations in general the question 
was ultimately answered with a ‘yes’. Most traditional military structures, 
such as battalions, companies, squadrons and flights, but also weapon 
platforms such as frigates, submarines, fighter jets, and helicopters could 
be seen as separate organizational components. Recombining these 
different components into different temporary structures would give the 
organization enough flexibility to counter the changing and unpredictable 
security environment. So, by more intensively using its existing smaller 
structures in different constellations the organization found an efficient 
way to increase its adaptability without having to dramatically change the 
overarching, permanent organizational design. 
 
Just like the organizational structure the technological means in use were 
still based on the traditional task of fighting a large-scale war on land, at 
sea, and in the air. The question the organization again had to answer was 
whether these technological assets could also be used in the new crisis 
response setting. The assessment that followed made clear that some 
specific new investments were needed, but that to a large extent the 
existing technological assets could very well be used for expeditionary 
crisis response tasks. Having said this, the organization started addressing 
two important issues to improve the flexibility potential of its existing 
technological means. First, in support of the new modular deployment 
strategy technological systems had to become more interoperable. After 
all, to let the smaller organizational structures work successfully together 
much depended on the effective linkage of their (weapon) systems. 
Second, the aspect of multi-functionality gained importance. Not only the 
servicemen and women needed the competences to conduct a wide range 
of crisis response operations. In doing their job properly they relied heavily 
on the multifunctional character of their technological systems. In addition 
to this dimension of an extensive crisis response portfolio, multi-
functionality was also being related to the different climatic and 
geographic circumstances under which the systems had to be used.  
 
Last, the Dutch government started putting much more emphasis on multi-
service (joint) co-operation. During the Cold War Army, Navy, and Air 
force had their own specific military tasks and there was no direct 
operational relationship between them (Cobelens & Gijsbers, 2004). Since 
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the performance of most crisis response operations depended on the joint 
effort of all services, this situation had changed drastically. After all, a 
single Operational Command simply lacked the materiel and competences 
to execute a crisis response operation, from the planning until the 
redeployment, entirely on its own. Furthermore, the units that were being 
deployed were most of the time tailor-made ‘small armies’, built on a 
combination of ground, air, or sea elements. In these smaller operational 
settings Army, Navy, Air force, and Marechaussee units had to work more 
closely together than ever before. The organization estimated that formal 
coordination mechanisms alone would not be enough to realize successful 
cooperation in these joint settings; the willingness and ability of people to 
work together in different constellations was deemed just as important. The 
strategic apex, therefore, coercively stimulated an organization-wide focus 
on cooperation. As a result, high level staff elements were getting a more 
and more joint character with commanders and functional specialists 
coming from all four Operational Commands. Furthermore, the number of 
inter-service organizational elements was pro-actively being increased. 
Concrete examples are the formation of a joint air defense centre, a 
Netherlands Defense Academy, and a Defense Explosives and Ordnance 
Disposal Service.  
 
Absorptive capacity: judging the outcome 
 
Interesting to find out is how senior officials of the Netherlands armed 
forces in hindsight judge the practical value of the outcome of the 
organization’s absorptive capacity process. In this respect, the following 
interview question was asked:  
 
Do you think it is a wise strategy of the Netherlands armed forces to pick 
organizational units from the permanent organization and form them into 
tailor-made constellations that can then be deployed in multinational 
settings? 
 
The table below presents the answers (Y=Yes, N=No) of the respondents 
(R1-R18) to this question. Due to limited interview time this specific 
question has not been posed to 4 respondents (see dark grey shading). The 
Assessing policy implications 
 117 
table shows that the remaining 14 respondents have unanimously answered 
the question with a “yes”. 
 
 
R 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
Y 
                  
N 
                  
Table 5-1: Assessing the modular deployment approach 
 
 
These positive answers can be categorized into two main arguments. First, 
the interviewees explain that the Netherlands armed forces are relatively 
small in size, which makes cooperation more a necessity than a real choice. 
To put it differently, as a member of institutions such as NATO, the EU, 
and the UN, the Dutch government can on one hand make its voice heard 
within the international security community despite the country’s small 
size. On the other hand, being a member of these institutions also creates 
the obligation to make a real contribution. In other words, it is being 
broadly expected of the Netherlands armed forces to participate in this 
manner. Second, modular deployment gives the organization the possibility 
to customize its effort, which is crucial given the current unpredictable 
security environment. As one respondent explains:  
 
“With this new deployment approach the Netherlands armed forces are 
capable of contributing approximately 90 different types of operational 
products. This is a very efficient and flexible way of organizing, because 
otherwise a much larger parent organization would be needed if a 
separate organizational element was used for each operational product. 
The same F-16 fighter jet can now be deployed for close air support over 
Afghanistan, and six month later be used for finding a missing body in the 
Caribbean.”  
 
Regarding the technological resource base, all respondents agreed with the 
fact that taking part in changeable tailor-made crisis response formations 
asks for modern, multifunctional, interoperable technological systems. A 
follow-up question asked to which extent the Netherlands armed forces’ 
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current technological resource base meets these demands. Table 5-2 shows 
that 10 of the respondents have answered this question with “yes” and 4 of 
them with “no”. Due to limited interview time 4 respondents have not been 
able to answer this question (see dark grey shading).  
 
 
R 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
Y 
                  
N 
                  
Table 5-2: Assessing the technological resource base 
 
 
The positive reactions point out that most weapon systems can be used for 
different types of crisis response missions. Moreover, they stress that the 
multi-role character of most main weapon systems supports the new effect-
based approach philosophy. In this respect, one of the respondents explains 
that an Apache attack helicopter can, for example, be used in different 
ways depending on the mission or situations within the mission. This 
helicopter was originally designed as a platform to destroy tanks and other 
armored vehicles. Yet, apart from its ability to generate massive fire 
power, this weapon system can also be used to gather intelligence using its 
advanced sensors or just to deter adversaries by its sheer presence. A 
representative example of these positive sentiments is cited below. 
 
“Generally speaking, we have modern equipment at our disposal that can 
be deployed for different tasks and under different circumstances. Of 
course, the systems have certain domain-specific and technological 
boundaries. Yet, within these boundaries they can be used for different 
roles.” 
 
Three respondents argue, furthermore, that it is not only the multi-role 
character of weapon systems that offers flexibility, but perhaps even more 
so the feasibility to generate varying configurations by mixing and 
matching different multi-role technological assets. One of them puts it as 
follows. 
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“The Cold War principle of having large units with uniform weapon 
systems is being abandoned rapidly. Today’s tailor-made network 
approach asks for a wide variety of different systems, because more 
variation = more configurations = more effects = more flexibility.” 
 
The respondents, who have answered “no”, bring two issues before the 
footlight. First, three respondents explain that regarding certain specific 
assets the Netherlands armed forces are still busy catching up. Strategic 
and tactical airlift capabilities, ICT systems to support network-enabled 
capabilities, and precision guided munitions are examples of these assets. 
Second, one of the respondents states that the organization is not yet where 
it wants to be, but that it is moving in the right direction. He explains that 
most weapon systems have a long life cycle and most procurement 
procedures take a long time, which makes it difficult to adjust the 
technological resource base within a short time span. 
 
The third question, whether a cooperative mindset was present within the 
organization, was also positively being answered by all respondents. They 
all argue that taking part in changeable tailor-made crisis response 
formations makes a cooperative mindset a basic necessity. The only 
marginal comments made stress the fact that cooperation should not 
become a goal in itself. The cooperation effort always has to be related to 
the actual operational task. It could be the case that a crisis response 
operation is being conducted by a single Operational Command. In this 
respect, one respondent mentions TF150 in which only Navy frigates have 
participated.  
 
Interesting is, furthermore, that 10 of the respondents argue that a 
distinction should be made between the organization’s operational and 
strategic level. At the operational level little cooperation problems occur; 
because this is the organizational level responsible for the actual execution 
of crisis response tasks and were people are very conscious of the need to 
cooperate. At the strategic level, however, this awareness is less apparent. 
The respondents explain that at this level conflicts of interest and 
differences of opinion occur between the Operational Commands, 
hampering cooperation during the planning and preparation phase of a 
mission. Some suitable citations on this issue are presented below. 
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“In the preparatory phase of a mission there usually is a lot of hassle 
between the Operational Commands, as soon as the troops are actually 
deployed this all disappears to the background.” 
 
“It is probably fair to say that every organizational part is busy 
safeguarding its own survival. At the operational level survival has a much 
more concrete meaning than at the strategic level. Therefore, cooperation 
develops more naturally at the operational level.” 
 
The interviewees also bring forward a number of problem areas regarding 
the threefold transformation approach. First, too much “Lego-thinking” is 
mentioned as an important disadvantage of the modular deployment 
strategy. In short, fine-grained modularization creates adjustment 
problems. Hence, units that hardly know each other are clicked together 
and are supposed to work as one team during a mission. In general, this 
problem is solved by investing extra time and energy in training programs 
during the preparation phase of a mission. This extra effort, however, 
contravenes the high-readiness, expeditionary ambitions of the Netherlands 
armed forces, since units cannot be deployed straightaway.  
 
Second, the constellation of a crisis response module is above all the result 
of the Netherlands armed forces’ overarching Effect-Based-Operations 
(EBO) philosophy. This philosophy propagates that it is not the weapon 
system that dominates, but far more the operational effect that the 
organization wants to achieve. A main consequence of this thinking in 
effects is that the traditional boundaries between the different services have 
become more and more permeable. Moreover, as a result of this approach 
Air force and Navy units are increasingly being used for operations on 
land. One of the respondents is not very supportive of this development as 
the quote below makes clear: 
 
“A trend is going on in which other services take the place of Army units 
within land-based operations. Because of this choice the wheel is often 
being re-invented. A same development is taking place within the Army 
itself. Based on flexibility considerations all kinds of different Army units 
are increasingly being deployed to conduct basic infantry tasks. The 
question is whether this is wise. Running a PRT differs enormously from 
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the Air force’s and Navy’s core businesses. If someone brings up this issue 
I always pose the following question: Would you rather be operated by a 
surgeon or by an anesthesiologist who has had a crash course in surgery? 
I understand that from a flexibility perspective striving for more 
generalization can be very useful. However, the organization should 
always mind that choices like this endanger the actual core business. I 
don’t know where to draw the line, but I do know that this trend is a cause 
for concern.”   
 
Other respondents also recognize the tension between specialization and 
generalization. They, however, propagate an organization-wide, renewed 
focus on basic soldiering skills. Every soldier is a rifleman has become a 
statement often posed. The following quote deal with this issue. 
 
“Within the current task environment basic military skills have gained 
importance. There is no clear frontline anymore; danger can come from all 
directions. Therefore, possessing basic soldiering skills has become of 
crucial importance for every individual serviceman to secure his own 
safety.” 
 
Third, 4 respondents argue that the organization should not think too 
lightly about the necessary ability to switch between different operational 
tasks. Scaling up and down the level of military force when the level of 
threat increases or decreases is easier said than done and can only work if 
people have the personal flexibility to completely change their mental state 
when the situation requires it. One respondent gives the following 
comment. 
 
“Our organization should start concentrating more on developing the 
mental toughness of its soldiers. The fact that at one moment they are 
fighting and at the next moment they are lending humanitarian aid asks for 
a work force that possesses a lot of mental flexibility. This crucial 
requirement is often publicly expressed, but so far it has hardly gotten any 
concrete attention. Especially now that we are increasingly being deployed 
in fragile and dangerous settings our professional development should 
focus on this issue.” 
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Finally, 3 respondents express their concern about the trend that, knowing 
that the organization is becoming more and more technological advanced, 
it will become harder and harder to attract enough qualified personnel. The 
fight for personnel increasingly has to be fought head-on with large 
commercial organizations that are also confronted with a computerized and 
digitalized competitive environment. It is questionable, according to the 
respondents, if this battle over technological skilled labor can be won by 
the armed forces, knowing that the financial benefits in the commercial 
world are much higher and not accompanied by the physical dangers 
typical of crisis response operations.    
 
Absorptive capacity: assessing the process itself 
 
On the whole, the interview results make clear that there is a lot of support 
for the practical outcome of the organization’s absorptive capacity process. 
Nevertheless, during the interviews some interesting remarks were also 
made that could be related to the different learning dimensions of the 
process itself. 
 
5 respondents stress the fact that knowledge acquisition is a never ending 
process. In their opinion the Netherlands armed forces have made a good 
start in transforming the organization from a traditional, large-scale, 
mechanized Cold War organization into a more flexible military 
organization, suited for expeditionary crisis response tasks. They, however, 
also argue that certain aspects still leave room for improvement, such as 
increasing the organization’s operational endurance and strengthening the 
organization’s transport and logistical capabilities. Moreover, one 
respondent underlines the importance of keeping track of future 
developments.  
 
“We have done quite some benchmarks. These have shown us that with our 
people and systems we have been able to strike a balance between 
ambition and usability.  
However, some aspects still need attention, such as: effect-based 
operations, networking, and information processing. These core aspects of 
future military operations will have certain organizational consequences 
that need reconsidering. For example, the traditional organizational 
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design will be put under pressure and a new type of soldier is needed. As 
yet, we have no clear picture of these consequences but we are conscious 
of the fact that we need to do something.” 
 
Furthermore, 11 respondents explain that working in different 
constellations increases not only the scope of acquiring new knowledge but 
also the depth of the new knowledge that has been acquired. In short, joint 
and combined cooperation makes it possible to use capabilities of other 
services and countries, or even to exchange them. A positive side-effect of 
a more intense cooperation between arms, services, and countries is that 
units increase their frame of reference and can learn from each other. 
Moreover, the cooperation that takes place between different 
organizational groups, over a longer period of time and under extreme 
circumstances, deepens the understanding of each other’s ways of doing 
things. According to the respondents this leads to a situation in which not 
only new knowledge is acquired, but also more detailed insights are 
gathered about the translation of this new knowledge into concrete, usable 
routines and processes. This viewpoint is in line with the strong 
relationship between Modular Organizing and Absorptive Capacity that 
was uncovered in the SEM analysis of the previous chapter. 
 
Concentrating on the process of knowledge assimilation, five respondents 
explain that it is not a purely rational process but to a large extent political 
driven. The respondents bring forward that the decision-making process 
involves many stakeholders, both military and political. Reaching 
consensus between all the different parties takes a long time and does not 
always result in the military’s most preferred option. What makes it even 
more complex is the fact that the process is also being influenced by media 
interference. 
 
Next, three respondents believe that the organization’s preoccupation with 
running missions hampers the assimilation of knowledge in a broader 
context. According to them organizational learning is too much dominated 
by the demands of the most recent crisis response operation, which 
prevents the organization from having a real innovative look in the future. 
One respondent argues in this respect: 
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“During the mid 90s the organization was almost completely focusing on 
peacekeeping tasks. Now, dealing with the dilemma of balancing combat 
and reconstruction tasks is the predominant theme within the organization. 
By continuously focusing on current missions we run the risk of being 
behind the times.” 
 
In relation to the aspect of knowledge transformation four respondents 
argue that the so called lessons-learned organization is too much 
compartmentalized. Each Operational Command has its own lessons-
learned department and the exchange of relevant information between 
them is insufficient. On top of this national criticism, they stress the fact 
that organizational learning in an international context hardly takes place at 
all. In addition, three respondents believe that, in a general sense, the 
Netherlands armed forces are good at identifying important lessons from 
their crisis response deployments. At the same time, they argue that a real 
learning experience fails to occur, because the haze of the day prevents the 
organization from incorporating the lessons-learned firmly within its 
operating routines and training programs. 
 
Focusing on the dimension of knowledge exploitation, three topics are 
being discussed. First, although, according to eleven respondents, the 
cooperation between the Operational Commands has much improved over 
the last decade, there is still room for improvement. Army, Navy and Air 
force Command still do the preparations for most of the crisis response 
missions largely autonomous. This creates overlap in the work to be done, 
but it also leads to situation in which the wheel is being reinvented.  
 
Second, referring to knowledge exploitation three respondents bring up the 
implementation of a new fast track procurement process as a successful 
indicator of this process. Purchasing the Australian Bushmaster armoured 
personnel vehicle to cope with the sudden threat of hidden improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs) in Uruzan was, in this respect, cited several 
times.  
 
“During the ISAF mission in Afghanistan our organization was suddenly 
confronted with a new kind of threat. Within a very short time span the 
opposing Taliban forces changed their operating tactics from a direct 
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assault approach to the use of IEDs. These explosives, buried along the 
roadside, used simple detonation tools that could be activated from a 
distance by using regular mobile phones. This new, invisible, yet 
devastating threat asked for immediate and effective countermeasures. In 
order to waste no time, our first reaction was to find out how partnering 
countries dealt with this threat. After this quick-scan a fast track 
procurement process was initiated to buy the technological means 
available that could help to trace these explosives and to jam their 
electromagnetic signals. Moreover, to defend our personnel against the 
blast of an explosion, in case an IED did go off, new vehicles offering 
better protection were also acquired within a very short time span.” 
 
This example can indeed be seen as good example of the organization’s 
ability to exploit new external knowledge. However, one respondent also 
makes clear that buying these new assets and supplying them to the troops 
in Afghanistan is, basically, just half of the knowledge exploitation story. 
He stresses the fact that knowledge exploitation should exceed the current 
ad hoc, short-term status of supporting running missions. After all, the real 
success of the implementation of new technological assets, such as the 
ones mentioned above, depends above all on a number of crucial 
organizational measures that have to be taken to secure their added value in 
the long-term. To name a few examples, maintenance personnel has to be 
trained, maintenance programs have to be set up, the supply chain has to be 
organized, operating procedures have to be formulated, and operators have 
to be trained. It is important that the organization in an early stage thinks 
about consequences like these and sets up a plan to tackle these issues. 
Otherwise, the organization enters a circle of improvisation to stay on top 
of things, which most certainly will lead to feelings of turmoil within the 
organization.   
 
Third, two respondents believe that the Netherlands armed forces should 
put more energy into regular peace-time training programs to increase 
knowledge exploitation. They explain that the repetitive formation of 
tailor-made organizational modules often leads to situations in which the 
basic structure of the parent organization is abandoned. As a result, the 
larger units staying behind quite often have to miss important sub-units, 
which negatively influences their potential to exercise and train as a 
complete operational unit. In addition to this problem, the organization has 
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the tendency to put most of its energy into running missions. Therefore, too 
often decisions are made that have a negative impact on planned training 
programs of units that stay at home. This could lead to situations in which 
programs are being shortened or even cancelled. According to the 
interviewees, this is a worrisome development because especially training 
programs can help to improve operational effectiveness in the long run. 
After all, during training programs units can get accustomed to working in 
various constellations and within different operational scenarios. 
 
5.3 MODULAR ORGANIZING 
 
The next part of the interview focused on the variable modular organizing. 
From a theoretical perspective modularity theory is strongly based on 
Baldwin and Clark’s work on the development of the IBM System/360 
family of mainframe computers. By speaking in terms of rules and 
parameters, they have adopted a strong ‘engineering’ approach to modular 
design. The interviews make clear that this engineering approach does not 
really comply with the unpredictability of the security environment. 
Especially, architectural questions about which modules have to be part of 
the system and what their functions will be are difficult to answer when 
future operations are uncertain and no clear goals can be formulated.  
 
Consequently, this situation makes it problematic to exactly determine the 
composition of suitable organizational modules. Since the Netherlands 
armed forces are unable to predict what kinds of operational environments 
can be expected in the future they have decided to stick to their traditional 
building block design of brigades, squadrons, and frigates. As a result, the 
standing organization is increasingly being used as a big toolbox, from 
which all kinds of modules with specific operational capabilities can be 
picked. So far, this toolbox has been kept broad, because the bigger the 
number of different functionalities available the better the opportunity to 
create different combinations. One respondent explains the added value of 
the toolbox metaphor as follows:  
 
“We need a broad toolbox with all kinds of different functionalities from 
which we can select and pick to deal with the changing task environment. 
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Important, for modern military operations, is the bundling of different 
capabilities.” 
 
The interview results also make clear that this choice works out differently 
for the Operational Commands. The respondents bring forward that 
regarding the nature of a mission and the design of the crisis response unit, 
basically, two options can occur: (1) the mission is familiar and fits the 
organization’s traditional task-setting, or (2) the mission is new and cannot 
be directly linked to a specific, existing organizational capability. 
Patrolling with a frigate in the Persian Gulf is a good example of the 
former option. Manning a land-based PRT in Afghanistan with Navy 
personnel, as already mentioned in the previous chapter, is a typical 
example of the latter option. In general, Navy Command and Air force 
Command encounter missions of the first kind. Their technological 
character and fixed operational tasks create a natural fit between the 
traditional designs of their permanent organizations and the structure of a 
module that is to be deployed. One respondent, coming from Air force 
Command, formulates it as follows: 
 
“From an organizational point of view the ‘new’ crisis response task does 
not really differ from our traditional one. Basically, there is nothing new 
under the sun for us.” 
 
Army Command, on the contrary, can depend less on the binding effect of 
its technological assets, has encountered dramatic changes in its 
operational repertoire, and is by far least capable of predicting what kind of 
operational environments will be encountered in the future. This situation 
makes it problematic to exactly determine the necessary composition of 
organizational modules. The Army, therefore, stresses the adaptability 
advantage of mixing and matching different functional components into 
customized formations. 
 
Moreover, the mixing and matching process even continues during actual 
deployment. To deal with the unpredictable task environment that Army 
units in many crisis areas encounter, the deployed units often have to look 
for alternative ways of organizing to deal with changing local 
circumstances. Developing such alternatives is often based on a process of 
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tinkering with the available functional components. The Army respondents 
argue that this potential of strategic and operational variability 
counterbalances the disadvantages of a complex assembly process and the 
fact that local adjustments are sometimes necessary. Based on the 
advantage of customization Army Command has decided to put more 
effort in improving the cooperation capabilities of its servicemen and 
women, opposed to abandoning the existing building block design. The 
organization propagates that it far more wants to de-stimulate people 
thinking in traditional building blocks, than the actual way of organizing 
itself.  
 
A second topic being discussed deals with the relationship between 
building block design and ‘operational flexibility’. One respondent 
explains that regarding the architecture of crisis response modules the 
Netherlands armed forces constantly have to balance two contradictory 
requirements: 
 
“On one hand holds that the more complicated the design of a 
combined/joint crisis response unit is the less effective it will be. On the 
other hand it is also true that the more building blocks are being used, the 
more tailored for its task the military formation will be.” 
  
Striking a balance between these two requirements becomes even more 
important because the respondents, furthermore, explain that during 
deployment the actual cooperation between organizational elements takes 
place at the lower organizational levels. Hence, failing cooperation directly 
influences the operational flexibility of a formation deployed. 
Acknowledging that there is no fixed building block size, the general 
opinion the respondents express is that the lower the level of connecting 
units and the smaller the unit size, the more important it becomes to train 
and exercise together to get to know each other. Moreover, when it comes 
to the formation and preparation processes that take place before actual 
deployment three respondents believe that there is a lot to be gained. 
Especially the fact that quite often individual experts or smaller specialist 
groups are added to the larger force structure halfway the preparation 
phase leads to collaboration problems. The time that remains is too short to 
really get to know each other, or to master necessary skills and drills, or a 
combination of both. As a result, a lack of trust develops between the well-
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trained basic units and the badly integrated add-ons. The crisis response 
formation has to make up this leeway during actual deployment, which 
then distracts from the real mission objectives. 
 
Within this discussion, three respondents bring forward that not always 
military-operational considerations determine the functional grouping 
process. Behind the scenes political bargaining influences the coming 
about of a national crisis response contribution. Especially in an 
international context, scarce assets, such as armed helicopters, medical 
units, and intelligence elements, can be a source of clapping hands: if you 
supply the helicopters, you can also become lead-country and appoint the 
task force commander. Moreover, some respondents argue that formation 
decisions are never purely based on modular design considerations. There 
are always specific national, political and organizational considerations 
that play an important role in this process. The fact that for many crisis 
response missions politicians determine a ‘personnel ceiling’ of a 
maximum number of troops to be deployed was an example that, in this 
case, was cited a lot.  
 
5.4 LATERAL COORDINATION 
 
Now that we know that the Netherlands armed forces aim to create a well 
working overall system out of a mixture of structurally dependent 
functional components puts the spotlight on lateral coordination. After all, 
lateral coordination is presented in Chapter 2 as a mechanism that plays an 
important role in integrating the surplus of interdependencies, and by doing 
so probably creates stability within the crisis response formation deployed. 
Three types of lateral coordination mechanisms were mentioned in 
particular by the respondents. 
 
First, Exercises and training programs are brought forward as the most 
important coordination capability to transform a tailor-made mixture of 
different units into a well-oiled machine. 11 respondents explicitly mention 
teambuilding or training programs as a critical factor for making the 
modular deployment strategy work. Some revealing quotes are presented 
below. 
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“You will always need extra training time to give the tailor-made 
formation that is to be deployed the opportunity to develop into a tightly 
coupled unit and to achieve the required level of competence.” 
 
“A disadvantage of the far-reaching customization approach is that the 
organization needs more preparation time. People don’t know each other 
well enough, or are not trained to drive certain vehicles or operate certain 
systems. Training programs, exercises, and courses become crucial to fill-
up these holes.” 
 
“For commanders it is important to get to know each other before the 
tailor-made module is being deployed. By means of teambuilding-like 
activities people can level in an informal setting, which will pay off during 
the operation itself.” 
 
Second, staff relations and liaison positions are being discussed as a second 
important coordination capability that the Netherlands armed forces use to 
integrate a composite crisis response formation. Five respondents explain 
that the SFIR mission in Iraq has learned that for complex composite 
missions the organization has to deploy additional staff capacity to take on 
the task of coordinating the different functional organizational elements. 
During the SFIR mission this task was initially appointed to the battalion 
commander, as head of the largest unit deployed. The battalion 
commander, however, became so much occupied with this coordinating 
task that he was being hampered in his main task of commanding his own 
battalion. During later rotations the organization, therefore, decided to also 
deploy a dedicated command and control element, comparable with a 
traditional brigade-staff, to take over this coordinating task. Based on 
positive experiences the Netherlands armed forces now follow this 
approach in other missions as well.  
 
“What we see in Uruzgan is that we have deployed a task force staff 
specifically for the process of commanding and controlling the different 
contributing functional elements. In our traditional structure we would 
have used a brigade staff for this purpose.”  
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Second, within this staff element liaison officers (LSOs) are appointed to 
take care of all kinds of interdepartmental boundary-spanning roles. They 
can play the role of linking pin between participating countries to deal with 
language, cultural, or procedural problems. They can also have a specific 
functional responsibility. Think in this respect, for example, of an Air force 
LSO functioning in the task force staff to support and advise the task force 
commander on all issues related to air operations. 7 respondents argue that 
this coordination mechanism works very well in an operational setting. 2 of 
these 7 respondents stress, however, that a liaison officer should only be 
selected because of his expertise; randomly picking someone to fill-up a 
vacancy will work contra-productive.  
 
“A random person playing LSO has no added value. A liaison officer only 
positively contributes if he seamlessly understands what you mean and is 
capable of communicating it properly.” 
 
Informal mutual adjustment is the third coordination capability that is 
being mentioned. 9 respondents explain that the presence of an informal 
communication circuit offers flexibility advantages and increases the speed 
of reaction. Yet, they also stress the fact that the informal communication 
processes may never undermine the formal command and control structure 
of a military formation. This view is illustrated by the two phrases below.  
 
“In both a national and international context informal networks emerge. 
These networks are crucial for the performance of a deployed formation. 
They act as lubricant at all the different organizational levels. However, 
that the commander always is the real one in charge and, therefore, may 
never be missed out must remain clear for everybody.” 
 
“Informal lateral adjustment is crucial, especially at the higher 
organizational levels. Commanders and staff officers must strive for a 
situation in which they can look each other straight in the eyes and ask: 
what do you really think of it. If you know and trust each other, you will 
less easy retreat to all kinds of bureaucratic processes and formalities.” 
 
However, apart from the interview’s focus on coordination capabilities the 
respondents also bring up the integrative value other organizational 
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mechanism. The formal hierarchical command structure, typical for every 
military organization, is being mentioned by all respondents as the primary 
source for organizational alignment. Speaking with the words of one 
respondent: 
 
“We remain a military organization, which asks for a clear command 
structure. It must be clear, especially under extreme conditions, who the 
boss is and who makes the decisions.” 
 
The respondents, furthermore, share the opinion that a univocal command 
structure has to be supported by other system integrators than lateral 
coordination alone. They specifically mention ICT-systems, formalization, 
and socialization. Information and communication systems are essential for 
creating technical connectivity. The quote below explains the integration 
advantages of ICT systems within a military operational context. 
  
“Technical connectivity is essential to create situational awareness. The 
interoperability of technical systems is in this respect of crucial 
importance. The plugs and sockets must technically fit together to go 
through the decision-making process faster than the opponent.” 
 
All in all, 11 respondents mention ICT systems as an important system 
integrator. They, however, also conclude that failing compatibility, 
especially in an international setting, is a point of concern. 
 
 “Technical connectivity of data and communication systems is very 
important; there is, however, a lot to be gained in this area. Dutch systems, 
such as TITAN and ISYS, have a huge potential for international 
connectivity. Regretfully the reality is different. Most countries play their 
own game and develop their own national systems. The resulting 
interoperability problems are most of the time being dealt with by using 
extra human interfaces. On the whole, this way of improvising works but 
also leads to delays and quality leaks.”  
 
Yet, of all respondents only one is really negative about the lacking 
interoperability of ICT systems. The general tenor of the remarks is that 
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interoperability can be improved, and that lacking interoperability only 
hampers but not really undermines the operational effectiveness of units 
deployed in a crisis area. One respondent uses the following phrasing: 
 
“ICT systems are important integration mechanisms. It is, however, not the 
case that lacking interoperability leads to insufficient cooperation. 
Cooperation depends far more on a state-of-mind. In other words, the will 
to cooperate dominates. Failing interoperability of ICT systems stimulates 
improvisation and costs more energy to keep the system running. All this, 
however, plays a subordinate part in relation to the will to cooperate.”  
 
Apart from information and communication systems 11 respondents bring 
up formalization as another important system integrator. Overall, could be 
said that rules, regulations, and procedures help to standardize behavior, 
which stimulates organizational connectivity. Two respondents explain the 
added value of formalization as follows: 
 
“Within the profit sector far-reaching formalization is quite often judged as 
stifling, not innovative, and inflexible. In a military organization, however, 
the opposite effect occurs. Common procedures and drills make it easier to 
operate effectively under changing circumstances and within different 
constellations.” 
 
“Common doctrines, tactics, procedures, and drills are crucial for 
speaking the same military-operational language.”   
 
 
Apart from these two alternatives, socialization is brought forward as a 
third crucial system integrator. 8 respondents explain that stimulating a 
shared sense of meaning regarding the openness to other organizational 
and national cultures must lead to, what is called, cultural connectivity.  
 
“Cultural interoperability must also be mentioned in this respect. Cultural 
differences exist between arms, services and other organizational parts. 
That is not a problem if, on the whole, people try to understand one 
another. The differences in perception must not work contra-productive. 
This means that people must be open to others, listen to others, and look 
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for win-win situations. This also applies to cultural differences between 
countries.” 
 
The main conclusion expressed regarding cultural connectivity is that 
culture itself cannot and must not be standardized. After all, culture creates 
identity, which stimulates esprit de corps. What, however, should be 
standardized is a shared sense of openness to other countries and 
organizational cultures. 3 respondents again stress the fact that training and 
exercising together helps to improve cultural openness. Furthermore, the 
interview results make clear that, regarding international cultural 
connectivity, the Netherlands armed forces are gradually following a 
course that leads away from modularity towards more synergistic 
specificity. Synergistic specificity has to do with the fact that some 
combinations of components function better together than other 
configurations, leading the system away from modularity and towards 
more integration. The move from stand-alone software products (e.g. Word 
Perfect and Excel) to integrated software packages (e.g. Microsoft Office) 
is a good example of this phenomenon (Schilling, 2000). Regarding, crisis 
response operations a situation is developing in which established bilateral 
relations, but also positive crisis response experiences, have created 
preferences in multinational cooperation. The Netherlands armed forces 
prefer to go on a mission, especially when there is a high level of risk 
involved, with established partners, such as Germany, the United 
Kingdom, the Nordic countries, Canada, and Australia. The general idea is 
that cultural, political, and organizational like-mindedness offers a shared 
frame of reference, which stimulates mutual trust and eases cooperation. 
 
“In Uruzgan the Dutch troops work together with troops from the UK, 
Canada, and Australia. Basically, these countries have the same political 
and cultural preferences and possess the same can-do mentality as we do.  
In the future this development will probably continue, creating sub-groups 
within the NATO alliance when it comes to international cooperation.”  
 
Organizational, technical, and cultural connectivity 
 
Recapitulating, in their approach to stimulate the integration of different 
functional components the Netherlands armed forces follow a three track 
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policy. First, they aim for organizational connectivity through formal and 
informal coordination mechanisms. Second, they focus on technical 
connectivity by means of compatible ICT systems. Third, they strive for 
cultural connectivity in terms of creating a common mindset of openness 
towards other organizational and national cultures. All three courses have 
standardization implications and the general assumption the respondents 
propagate, in this respect, is that the better and broader these aspects are 
standardised the easier it becomes to cooperate. Moreover, the following 
quote makes clear that the “softer” issues are deemed at least as important 
as technological connectivity.  
 
“Technological standardization is important. Compatible means and 
systems make it easier to cooperate and, thus, improve the overall 
performance. At the same time cost advantages can be obtained. However, 
technological standardization is not the most important aspect. Speaking 
the same operational language is far more important.” 
 
When focusing on the “softer” issues, 6 respondents stress that English, as 
the official language, is an important facilitator for both organizational and 
cultural connectivity. They, however, also emphasize that from a national 
and international perspective there is enough room for improvement on this 
issue: 
 
“In my opinion language plays a key role. The Western security community 
should press for higher demands regarding English as the official military 
language.” 
 
“Language is important but also a problem. The Netherlands armed forces 
should put more energy into improving English language skills. The Dutch 
speak English not as well as they themselves think they do; for example, to 
destroy is definitely not the same as to defeat.” 
 
“Although NATO partners from the south of Europe speak it not as well as 
the northern countries do, on the whole, English as the official language 
works good enough. However, one remark I would like to make in this 
respect is that, apart from the fact that we manage to get our message 
Assessing policy implications 
 136 
across, the Dutch seem to overrate their competence level of the English 
language. On the whole, we express ourselves in English rather bluntly.” 
 
 
5.5 BALANCING STRATEGY, STRUCTURE, AND 
OPERATIONS 
 
Given the fact that during the interview the respondents indicated that the 
modular deployment strategy to increase the organization’s strategic 
flexibility clearly had some drawbacks, it became interesting to find out if 
these disadvantages hampered the crisis response performance of the 
troops on the ground. Therefore, the following question was asked.  
Is the actual execution of crisis response tasks in a mission area negatively 
being influenced by the fact that the Netherlands armed forces on a 
continuous basis pick units from the permanent organization and group 
them into tailor-made crisis response formations?  
The answers to this question (Y=Yes, N=No, ?= Neutral) are shown in the 
table below. One respondent (R16) was not taken into consideration due to 
a shortage of interview time.  
 
 
R 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
Y 
                  
N 
                  
? 
                  
Table 5-3: Assessing the balance between strategy, structure and operations 
 
 
According to the 6 respondents who voted “Yes” the current deployment 
strategy indeed causes a loss of operational effectiveness. At the same time 
they argue that this loss of effectiveness is inevitable given the uncertain 
crisis environment the organization is confronted with. They explain that 
when the world is certain it becomes feasible to fine tune the organization 
to its predictable task, which in the end leads to an effective and efficient 
organization. However, when uncertainty increases a need for more 
freedom of choice develops. This focus on freedom of choice has a 
negative impact on organizational effectiveness and efficiency. Yet, the 
respondents also believe that the flexibility that is gained by creating 
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alternative courses of action compensates for this loss of effectiveness and 
efficiency. Moreover, they stress that the concessions that sometimes have 
been made have never led to real dangerous situations for the troops 
deployed in a crisis area. These respondents, furthermore, bring forward 
that cutting through existing organizational boundaries has negative 
operational consequences. At the same time, they believe that many of the 
negative effects can be counterbalanced by investing extra time and money 
in training programs and interoperable materiel. 
 
The 5 respondents that do not recognize a loss of operational effectiveness 
stress, in the first place, that the operational-tactical level and the political-
strategic level are two completely different worlds. The collaboration and 
adjustment problems occur far more empathically at the political-strategic 
level than on the work floor. Very soon after a formation has been assigned 
for a certain crisis response task a joint task culture evolves. Basically, 
every individual soldier knows that cooperation is an operational and 
tactical basic military necessity, especially under volatile circumstances. 
Two revealing quotes are presented below. 
 
“It is common knowledge that in a military operation lacking cooperation 
can cost human lives. To put it briefly, everybody going on a mission 
realizes that cooperation is a basic necessity to survive”  
 
“The saying ‘to cooperate is to survive’ is part of every soldier’s soul.  
 
The ones who have voted ‘No’ also stress that the Operational Commands 
experience the formation problems differently. Because Navy Command 
and Air Force Command have structured their organizations along the lines 
of their technological platforms, such as ships and airplanes, cutting 
through critical organizational boundaries does not happen as much as 
within troop-dominated organizations like Army Command and the Royal 
Marechaussee. Therefore, the design and linking problems mentioned 
earlier are being recognized less by the respondents from Navy and Air 
Force Command. The only cause for concern they express, in this regard, 
has to do with the formation practices that take place for those missions 
that do not comply with their original task-setting, such as manning a land-
based PRT. 
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The 6 respondents who have not given a clear ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ answer bring 
forward that the flexibility gain that is being achieved with the modular 
deployment approach counterbalances the limited loss of operational 
effectiveness. At the same time, they argue that the political-strategic and 
the military-operational level should not be treated as separate worlds. 
After all, political-strategic decision-making could influence the military-
operational task execution. According to one of the interviewees it is very 
important that military advice on a certain mission should be translated 
better to the level of the political decision-makers. If consensus between 
politicians and the military about the do’s and don’ts of a military crisis 
response operation is reached sooner, the military crisis response formation 
will certainly benefit from it, not only during the preparation phase of a 
mission but also during the mission itself. 
 
 
5.6 EVALUATING CRISIS RESPONSE PERFORMANCE 
 
The interview ended with the question whether the crisis response 
performance of the Netherlands armed forces has been successful so far. 
On the whole, the respondents gave a rather univocal answer to this 
question, as none of the respondents calls it unsuccessful (see table 5-4). In 
general, there is a positive assessment. Furthermore, it is striking that 5 
respondents do not give an unequivocal “Yes” or “No”, but leave their 
opinion in the middle. In fact, these neutral-voters do not deviate far from 
the yes-voters, as all respondents indicate that assessing the success of a 
crisis response operation is difficult. The multitude of factors of influence 
makes it impossible to make objective statements on the effectiveness of 
this kind of operations. Nevertheless, for 12 respondents the balance is 
positive, while the 5 mentioned above do not come to a definite yes or no. 
On the whole, it could be concluded that in answering the performance 
question the senior officials go through a sort of self-evaluation, in which a 
summing up of various arguments leads to a mainly positive self-image of 
the operational achievements of the armed forces. The arguments given 
can be reduced to the five categories that will be discussed below. 
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R 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
Y                   
N                   
?                   
Table 5-4: Successfulness of the Netherlands armed forces crisis response 
performance 
 
 
First, success is linked to the fact that the Netherlands armed forces have 
participated in a large number of missions over the past few years. Looking 
back on these operations, 9 out of 17 interviewees indicate that, generally 
speaking, the Netherlands armed forces have realized their tasks and 
ambitions well. As one respondent states: 
 
“Looking at Bosnia, Iraq and Afghanistan it can be concluded that, given 
our possibilities, we have been successful.”  
 
This sort of general statements is complemented with remarks such as: 
 
 “We reach the objectives that have been set, in spite of the fact that those 
objectives are not always clearly demarcated, measurable and are highly 
political.”  
 
“We see the results of what we have set out to do in a mission; our being 
there made a difference.” 
 
Second, according to nine respondents international recognition is also an 
expression of the success of the Dutch effort. Often heard statements in 
this respect are: 
 
“We are a valued partner in the eyes of other countries.” 
 
“Internationally, the Netherlands armed forces are taken very seriously, 
indeed.” 
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“We are in the major league.” 
 
 Nevertheless, one respondent stresses that it is not wise to rely too much 
on the opinions of other countries, as they may be expressions of (political) 
courtesy. 
 
Third, personal experience constitutes a measure for the success of the 
operations. Almost all interviewees have mission experience in leadership 
positions and three of them indicate that in their role as military 
commanders they measure success according to their own standards. Thus, 
one interviewee states: 
 
“I view “success” more in relation to the concrete improvements I have 
seen during my stint in the mission area, such as the restoration of social 
life in the streets and the number of new companies started.”  
 
Another interviewee uses more general terms to express his successful 
judgement of his operational activities as a commander in the sense that 
together with his people he has made a contribution to the creation of 
stability and reconstruction in a mission area, and everybody returned 
home safely. 
 
Quality of personnel and materiel of the Netherlands armed forces is a 
fourth argument brought forward. Five interviewees say things like:  
 
“The Netherlands armed forces are professional and well-equipped.” 
“We have good, professional, level-headed people who reach the result 
they have to reach.” 
“Missions have led to an enormous improvement of our own armed 
forces.” 
 
The fifth category is shaped by political-social considerations. In this 
respect two interviewees stress the political appreciation the armed forces 
receive when they state:  
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“In general the Dutch Parliament praises the achievement of the armed 
forces” 
“Our political leadership is very satisfied about our effort”. 
 
The usefulness of measuring crisis response performance 
 
The answers make clear that objective criteria are lacking, which gives the 
aspect of organizational performance a preponderantly subjective trait. The 
interview, therefore, shifted to finding out why objective criteria are 
lacking and whether it would be useful to spend more time, money and 
effort on making the crisis response performance of the armed forces 
measurable. Hence, two additional open interview questions were posed to 
the senior leaders of the Netherlands armed forces (see tables 5-5 and 5-6 
below). 
 
 
R 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
Y                   
N                   
?                   
F                   
Y=Yes; N=No; ?=Neutral; F=Focusing 
Table 5-5: Is it possible to measure crisis response performance? 
 
 
R 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
Y 
                  
? 
                  
N 
                  
Y=Yes; N=No; ?=Neutral 
Table 5-6: Is measuring crisis response performance desirable? 
 
 
In answering the question whether it is possible to measure operational 
performance, broadly speaking, four categories emerge. The yes-voters 
stress that in practice the armed forces have already been acquiring 
experience in measuring operations. The no-voters are of the opinion that it 
is precisely the complex, often political distribution of power relations, 
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within which crisis response operations take place that makes performance 
measurement virtually impossible. The third group does not give a clear 
answer either way, but these interviewees stress the difficulty of measuring 
operational performance, because of the complex mix of influencing 
factors. The fourth group holds that measuring operational effectiveness is 
only partially possible and the armed forces should focus (F) on those 
specific aspects that are best suited to measurement. In this respect, they 
explicitly mention reconstruction and humanitarian tasks as being best 
suited for formulating measurable performance indicators. In table 5-7 
below the answer categories are colored with some concrete statements. 
 
 
Yes “Since the 1990s the Netherlands armed forces have been increasingly 
emphasizing the achievement of concrete objectives, such as the number 
of returned refugees, the reconstruction of employment and the number of 
confiscated weapons.”  
No “In my view measuring the operation is impossible. You can measure on 
different levels, which makes the results level-bound and subjective. 
Performance itself is not measurable, because when the shooting starts, 
different rules apply. Rules that cannot be phrased managerially, such as 
efficiency and effectiveness. I also do not see the point of measuring from 
a so-called beneficiary perspective. You know beforehand that when you 
come to a very poor country with a bag full of money, the local 
population itself will not react objectively either” 
Neutral “Making performance measurable is difficult in case of a crisis response 
operation. On the one hand, it is a good thing to be able to account for 
what you have done to reach your objectives. On the other hand, it is very 
hard to prove that you have employed the available resources effectively. 
Can you map the wellbeing of people? Can security be measured ade-
quately?” 
Focusing “What you do in an operation cannot be made fully measurable. When 
the number of ambushes decreases, does that mean it is safer? 
Conversely, it is possible afterwards to systematically analyze the preset 
tasks, such as disarming, demobilizing, elections, number of policemen 
trained, establishing a demarcation zone.” 
Table 5-7: Different opinions on the possibility to measure crisis response 
performance 
 
 
In spite of their unequivocal reaction to the first question on performance 
measurement, eleven out of seventeen interviewees answer positively to 
the follow-up question (see table 5-6). One of them summarizes this shared 
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opinion, on the desirability of performance measurement in a military-
operational context, very well when he states:  
 
“The tendency for making our performance measurable must be continued. 
Not only does it ensure structure in our operations, it is also a continuous 
reminder of our primary task.”  
 
Apart from these proponents of performance measurement, there are three 
respondents who feel that making operational performance measurable is 
not a good idea. Two of these no-voters (respondents 13 and 18) 
emphatically base their opinion on their answer to the preceding question. 
According to them, measuring operational performance is simply not wise, 
in view of the aspect of violence, which will always come into play, and 
the complex mix of influencing factors. The third no-voter, respondent 15, 
introduces an interesting new perspective with his argument with respect to 
performance measurement: 
 
“I think that we must accept that military operations cannot be made 
measurable. My objections focus much more on the effectiveness of the 
entire armed forces. Crisis response operations are our core-business and 
yet we only send out 10% of our personnel annually, and only 15 % of our 
money is spent on this main task. Sending out about 5,000 persons a year 
may meet our ambition level, but are we not making things a bit too easy 
for ourselves?” 
 
By benchmarking the Netherlands armed forces to other countries that 
have similar armed forces, in quantity and quality, by applying more 
rigorously the readiness tables and by reaching a higher effectiveness from 
certain weapon systems, he believes, the total effectiveness of the armed 
forces can be increased enormously. With this argument, however, the idea 
of performance measurement shifts from the output to the input-side.  
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5.7 CONCLUSION 
 
Based on this chapter’s results it could be concluded that the Netherlands 
armed forces’ senior management is on the whole quite positive about the 
concrete choices that their predecessors have been made to transform from 
a traditional Cold War large-scale military organization into a smaller, 
flexible crisis response organization. However, based on almost two 
decades of conducting crisis response operations current managers have 
identified some interesting policy implications regarding the organizational 
determinants absorptive capacity, modular organizing, and lateral 
coordination. 
 
First, regarding absorptive capacity the interviews make clear that the 
organization is perhaps too much focused on running missions. As a result, 
the process of knowledge absorption has a short-term focus, which leads to 
improvisation and superficial learning and prevents the organization from 
keeping track of important future developments. 
 
Second, regarding modular organizing the interviews have pointed to the 
challenge of balancing organizational customization and operational 
effectiveness. Furthermore, it becomes clear that Navy and Air Force 
Command can better deal with this dilemma than Army Command. The 
Air force and Navy are both technology-driven organizations and have 
rather fixed operational tasks, creating a natural fit between the design of 
their parent organizations and the structure of the units that they have to 
deploy. The Army, on the contrary, can depend less on the binding effect 
of its technological assets, and has encountered dramatic changes in its 
operational repertoire. Given the unpredictable security environment, 
Army Command has decided to stick to its existing organizational structure 
and put its effort in improving the cooperation capabilities of its 
servicemen and women. Hence, the search for alternative, useable, multi-
task modules is not being pursued. 
 
Third, regarding lateral coordination the interviews results indeed show 
that this organizational mechanism is an important system integrator. 
Especially, training programs are deemed crucial to cope with the above 
mentioned dilemma of balancing organizational customization and 
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operational effectiveness. However, the interviews also make clear that 
solely relying on lateral coordination is not enough. The organization also 
uses other, indispensable mechanisms to integrate, such as ICT systems, 
formalization and socialization.  
 
Fourth, regarding organizational performance the feeling prevails that 
measuring the output of crisis response operations should be given more 
attention. A majority of the interviewed senior officials feels the need for 
meaningful indicators to grant their activities some transparency, 
especially when faced with reconstruction or humanitarian - parts of - 
missions. Compared to the overall mission objectives, often couched in 
vague language, reconstruction and humanitarian tasks usually are of 
enough substance to be operationalized into concrete targets or indicators. 
Over the past few years the armed forces have made some progress in this 
respect, but the process will have to acquire more profundity of content 
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CHAPTER 6 DISCUSSION 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Chapter 1 started with Aupperle’s (1996) military historical example of 
Xenophon’s Anabasis. Based on this Greek epos he concluded that 
incorporating Morgan’s (1986) brain and organism metaphor could 
probably help commercial organizations to establish a cultural ethic of 
spontaneous renewal and adaptability, which they need to compete 
successfully in today’s turbulent business environment. The aim of this 
study was to find out whether or not contemporary Western armed forces 
have adopted Aupperle’s range of thoughts in their striving to become 
quick response crisis response organizations. Moreover, the study’s main 
assumption is that specifically Western armed forces could serve as an 
interesting case for commercial organizations to learn from, because their 
core being is about the repetitive initiation of adequate quick responses to 
cope with a highly volatile and varied global security environment. 
Basically, they have to activate organizational dynamics similar to the ones 
commercial organizations have to strive for when in hypercompetition. 
 
With this study’s empirical evidence in the back of our minds, it could be 
concluded that in line with Aupperle’s (1996) assumption the Netherlands 
armed forces, as a typical example of a contemporary Western military 
organization, have followed a two-track transformation approach. First, the 
organization has actively stretched its absorptive capacity to renew itself in 
order to keep pace with the continuously changing security environment. 
Second, the organization has embarked upon a modular deployment 
strategy to make its architectural framework more adaptable in response to 
the unpredictable and extremely varied task-setting.  
 
However, one remarkable distinction between the historical Greek and the 
current Dutch situation has not been addressed so far. The fact is that the 
Greek were faced with a one-off challenge of avoiding large-scale societal 
destruction, whereas the Netherlands armed forces repetitively have to go 
on missions in foreign countries as the protectors of universal human rights 
and international law. This contrast is very interesting for commercial 
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organizations as well, knowing that they, when confronted with 
hypercompetition, just like the Netherlands armed forces have to aim for 
winning consecutive, short-term, innovative ‘competitive battles’ instead 
of dealing with a strong known competitor in a once-only situation.  
 
Based on the study’s empirical findings this chapter will start a discussion 
on how absorptive capacity and modular organizing deal with the issue of 
repetitiveness. Within this discussion the role of lateral coordination is not 
separately expounded, but perceived as a crucial organizational facilitator 
incorporated in both the functioning of absorptive capacity and modular 
organizing. The discussion will have a threefold character. First, it will be 
discussed in what way absorptive capacity and modular organizing support 
the repetitive activation of adequate organizational responses. Second, the 
organization’s speed of reaction will be addressed. In other words, do 
absorptive capacity and modular organizing not only facilitate repetitive 
appropriate action but also help to respond within a short time frame, over 
and over again. A third important aspect that, as yet, has remained 
untouched, and that this chapter will further discuss, is whether absorptive 
capacity and modular organizing also help organizations to preserve 
organizational stability. Apart from this focused theoretical discussion, the 
chapter will, furthermore, go into the limitations of this study and the 
study’s general contributions to existing theory on dynamic capabilities, 
absorptive capacity, modular organizing, and lateral coordination. The 
chapter will conclude with discussing some avenues for further research.  
 
 
6.2 ADEQUATE ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSES 
 
This study’s empirical results offer some intriguing insights to further 
elaborate on the general organizational ability to repetitively activate 
adequate responses. Moreover, they indicate that the variables absorptive 
capacity and modular organizing both seem to play a profound part in this 
matter. In chapter 2 it was argued that within the general characteristics of 
a turbulent business arena organizations have to be capable of dealing with 
a wide spectrum of competitive demands, varying in the level of urgency 
and predictability. In line with this assumption the Netherlands armed 
forces’ overall crisis response environment can be typified as turbulent. 
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Yet, the survey results indicate that within this overarching context the 
separate mission circumstances can vary enormously when it comes to the 
level of turbulence. Therefore, just like in the commercial world, the 
Netherlands armed forces should possess the basic organizational skills to 
deal with a mishmash of environmental characteristics. What this study has 
uncovered, is that depending on the external forces that have to be dealt 
with the Netherlands armed forces rely either on absorptive capacity or on 
modular organizing to come up with an adequate response. When the 
external forces encountered are unequivocal and incorporated into the 
existing mixture of flexible dynamic capabilities, modular organizing 
seems to have the upper hand in supplying an adequate response. When, 
however, the environmental dynamics are ambiguous, critical and do not 
fit the existing dynamic capabilities mixture, absorptive capacity gets to 
play the leading role in offering an appropriate solution.  
 
Concentrating on the latter situation sketch, the ISAF model makes clear 
that when the organization, within its general crisis response task-setting, is 
confronted with an extremely unpredictable crisis response operation that 
on a continuous basis asks for quick and decisive action, the Netherlands 
armed forces lapse into a process of improvisation to respond adequately to 
suddenly changing, local operational circumstances. The organization, 
basically, enters into a process of conscious experimenting behavior and its 
absorptive capacity, which follows the principles of learning by doing and 
trial and error, is primarily being directed at the operational demands of 
that specific mission. At the same time, the necessary mixture of 
operational, structural, and strategic dynamic flexible capabilities, which is 
primarily related to the organization’s overall crisis response role, is more 
or less taken for granted. It does not actively seem to contribute to mission 
performance. 
 
Opposed to the ISAF context, the Netherlands armed forces can also be 
facing low turbulent mission contexts. The SFOR model serves as a good 
example of how the organization engages more predictable and less critical 
circumstances. In short, in comparison to the ISAF situation the opposite 
occurs. Absorptive capacity loses its significant direct effect on 
organizational performance. It is in this situation only the orchestrator role 
of absorptive capacity that remains significant. Its sole concern seems to 
have become to keep investing in balancing the mixture of flexible 
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dynamic capabilities. What the results also make clear is that, when the 
level of environmental turbulence is less extreme, the reconfiguration 
merits of the modular organizing approach offer the organization enough 
flexibility to successfully react to emerging changes in the environment. 
This probably has to do with the fact that creativity and innovativeness are 
of less importance when the level of unpredictability, dynamism, and 
complexity is negligible. In many cases small-scale interventions that fit or 
complement the existing strategy, structure, and operating processes will 
do. In this respect one could think of adequate responses, in terms of 
bringing down the number of troops, withdrawing certain offensive 
weapon systems, or changing the composition of the crisis response 
formation deployed. 
 
In addition to these two extreme mission contexts, the refined path model 
makes clear that when the Netherlands armed forces encounter an average 
level of environmental turbulence they basically follow a dual approach. It 
must, at the same time, be said that according to the survey results the 
majority of the crisis response operations that the Netherlands armed forces 
have, so far, participated in fall into this category. Under these 
circumstances, where the organization has to be prepared to simultaneously 
cover the left as well as the right side of the spectrum earlier discussed, 
modular organizing and absorptive capacity play an equally important role. 
Even more interesting is the fact that the available mixture of dynamic 
flexible capabilities seems to fulfill a crucial mediating role between the 
two determinants. Based on the AMOS model it could be argued that the 
prevailing dynamic capabilities mixture serves as a solid organizational 
platform, from which innovative and straightforward interventions alike 
can safely be activated and monitored. Generally speaking, it offers an 
organizational foundation that prevents everything from being put upside 
down over and over again in order to repetitively achieve temporary 
advantages.  
 
 
6.3 SPEED OF REACTION 
 
Based on the empirical results it could, furthermore, be concluded that 
absorptive capacity and modular organizing have had separate, yet clear, 
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effects on the Netherlands armed forces’ speed of reaction. Both effects 
will be discussed separately, referring to both the quantitative and 
qualitative empirical result. 
 
Absorptive capacity and speed of reaction 
 
Refocusing on absorptive capacity as a theoretical construct, chapter 2 
made clear that this organizational determinant plays a twofold role. First, 
it stimulates creative thinking and open-minded organizational learning to 
derive new competitive advantages from externally obtained knowledge. 
Second, it orchestrates the transformation of the competitive plans thought-
out into concrete, usable organizational practices. Based on these two roles 
Zahra and George (2002) make a distinction between two dimensions of 
absorptive capacity. First, they distinguish potential absorptive capacity, 
which refers to an organization’s ability to acquire valuable new external 
knowledge and to assimilate this new knowledge into usable ideas. It 
could, basically, be described as the creative thinking part of absorptive 
capacity. Second, they identify realized absorptive, which is not about 
thinking but about acting. This second dimension refers to an 
organization’s ability to transform and exploit the newly acquired 
knowledge into concrete organizational practices to create a real 
competitive advantage. The general assumption is that under 
hypercompetitive circumstances organizations have to be capable of 
dealing with the two sequential dimensions within a very short time frame. 
 
Complementary to the ISAF model, the interview results make clear that 
within a highly turbulent mission context the Netherlands armed forces 
have the capacity to go through absorptive capacity’s sub processes rather 
quickly. There seems to be a sort of common organizational understanding 
that the organization has to do everything in its power to act quickly and 
decisively in support of a running mission, when the going gets tough and 
the external influences can not be sufficiently counterbalanced with the 
existing organizational resource base. In this respect, the organizational 
reaction to the suddenly emerging IED threat, discussed in the previous 
chapter, is a good example to refocus upon. The example makes clear that 
the Netherlands armed forces very rapidly activated the knowledge 
acquisition, assimilation, transformation, and exploitation processes to 
fathom the ins and outs of the IED threat, come up with alternatives, 
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acquire usable assets, and to implement them within the task force 
deployed. 
 
Between the lines the example perhaps even more explains that settling the 
sequence from potential to realized absorptive capacity in a matter of 
weeks instead of months depends to a large extent on the organizational 
will to do so. This will is most likely to depend upon the level of 
agreement that exists within the organization and the amount of time that it 
takes to reach this level. In short, when a broadly shared sense of urgency 
develops quickly within the organization its drive to do something will 
certainly benefit. This, however, also implies that when organizational 
conformity is lacking, or it takes longer to develop, the organization 
probably misses the boat because the absorptive capacity processes are not 
focused enough or are too much spread out in time. 
 
Modular organizing and speed of reaction 
 
According to this study’s findings modular organizing can both positively 
and negatively influence a quick organizational response. The positive 
influence of modular organizing can be related to the different dimensions 
of absorptive capacity discussed above. The Netherlands armed forces’ 
modular deployment approach has led to an organizational situation in 
which the Dutch units quite intensively have to work together with other 
military and non military partners, coming from different national, 
professional, functional, and ideological backgrounds.  
 
The sum of all the partnerships in which the Dutch have participated serves 
as an extensive knowledge pool from which the organization can learn in 
all sorts of ways. In short, the organization’s knowledge acquisition, 
assimilation, transformation, and exploitation processes all benefit from 
using partnership experiences as a sort of general database or as a concrete 
point of reference. Moreover, because the organization does not have to 
find everything out for itself, the sequential learning steps can also be 
taken a lot quicker. It is obvious that one of the main reasons why the 
Netherlands armed forces were able to react so quickly and decisively to 
the IED threat was because the organization could respond on the basis of 
concrete experiences of its coalition partners. In terms of Zahra and George 
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(2002), the efficiency factor to transform potential absorptive capacity into 
realized absorptive capacity could be increased considerably because the 
Netherlands armed forces were able to answer very important questions 
rather easily based on explicit, available evidence, such as: what kind of 
technology, offensively as well as defensively, do our partners use? How 
do their procedures work? What tactical problems have they encountered 
so far?  
 
For the negative influence of modular organizing on the organization’s 
speed of reaction a national instead of a mission perspective has to be 
taken. The empirical results have made clear that, on a national level, 
differences occur between the Operational Commands in living up to 
modularity theory’s basic principle of near-decomposability. 
Recapitulating, Simon (1962) describes near-decomposability as breaking 
up the system in separate modules, whereas the interactions among the 
modules are weak but not negligible. According to modularity theorists 
near-decomposability is a crucial organizational property to strive for, 
because it creates autonomous sub-units that can easily be recombined into 
other configurations. As Weick (1990; 1976) puts it, by relying on self-
supporting, autonomous organizational modules and by controlling only 
the required input and output of these modules, a system is created that can 
benefit from the advantages of loose coupling. 
 
When concentrating on the Netherlands armed forces a strong distinction 
regarding this near-decomposability demand exists between Army 
Command on one hand, and Air Force and Navy Command on the other 
hand (De Waard & Kramer, 2008). It could be argued that Navy and Air 
Force units to a large extent resemble what one might call ‘proper 
modules’. Based on their rather fixed operational task-setting, which on top 
of that is dominated by the technological systems in use, they are able to 
function rather autonomously within larger troop formations. As a result of 
their largely modular character the process of assembly for crisis response 
deployment becomes rather straightforward. Units can be taken out of the 
parent organization quickly and easily and be added to a task force to 
perform a specific task in an autonomous way.  
 
Opposed to that, army units are not what one would call ‘proper modules’. 
Instead, it would be better to speak of components. They are 
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distinguishable organizational parts that, given their functional character, 
are not made to function autonomously. For each mission Army Command 
picks its units from all over the organization and composes a mixture of 
organizational functional parts that is capable of dealing with the specific 
operational demands of that particular deployment. Army Command 
stresses the importance of adaptability, because it is virtually impossible 
for the organization to predict what kind of operational task-setting can be 
expected in the future. This situation makes it problematic to create fixed 
organizational modules within the parent organization that can be used for 
each crisis response operation imaginable.   
 
Mainly based on this aspect of uncertainty, Army Command has decided to 
stick to its existing organizational structure and to invest heavily in joint 
exercises and training programs to transform a tailor-made mixture of 
different functional units into a well-oiled machine before actual 
deployment takes place. Although this choice seems logical, in the end this 
extra training effort contravenes the high-readiness, quick response 
ambitions of the Netherlands armed forces, since units cannot be deployed 
straightaway.  
 
 
6.4 PRESERVING ORGANIZATIONAL STABILITY 
 
In chapter 2 it was explained that organizations in hypercompetition have 
to be capable of balancing search and stability, or in other words should try 
to become ambidextrous. Concentrating on the issue of organizational 
ambidexterity, the empirical findings also point to different roles for the 
organizational determinants absorptive capacity and modular organizing, 
especially regarding the aspect of safeguarding organizational stability. 
Below these separate roles will be discussed.  
 
Absorptive capacity and preserving organizational stability 
 
The fact that a too strong focus on aligning strategic, structural, and 
operational flexible dynamic capabilities may take too long under 
extremely turbulent circumstances seems quite self-evident. It could be 
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argued that immediate action is often more urgently needed than well-
considered interpretation, transformation, and exploitation. Therefore, it is 
understandable that, within ISAF-like mission contexts, decisions on, for 
example, implementing new technologies, cooperating with alternative 
strategic partners, altering existing operating routines, etc. sometimes have 
to be made without having the time to assess all their pros and cons within 
a broader and longer term organizational context.   
 
Although this thinking outside of the box and acting quickly could on one 
hand be perceived as a praiseworthy achievement, on the other hand it also 
involves a certain level risk and asks for cautiousness. The ISAF model 
showed that a mixture of flexible dynamic capabilities no longer directly 
contributed to organizational performance and was pushed to the 
background. The organization had, basically, put all its eggs in the basket 
of absorptive capacity to deliver useful answers quickly. Yet, by doing this 
on a regular basis the organization runs the risk of giving absorptive 
capacity too much a short-term status. If there is no plan on how to embed 
newly acquired technological systems or newly invented processes beyond 
the time-span of a running mission into the overarching organizational 
system their initial blessing can ultimately turn into an organizational 
nuisance. Especially the interview results address this issue. The fact that 
technological systems are sometimes bought without having really thought 
about, for example, firmly embedding them into the organization’s supply 
chain, maintenance processes, or training programs, often leads to a series 
of ad-hoc organizational adjustments to reach a workable situation 
altogether. Most of the time, the end result is an organizational 
compromise that is constantly being questioned because of the remaining 
practical drawbacks.  
 
The example makes clear that it is important for organizations to find the 
rest to take a step back to think about how the action taken could be fitted 
in the organization’s existing dynamic capabilities mixture. Basically, the 
key goal should be to transfer the short-term advantage gained into a 
longer term organizational merit. In this respect, a pitfall that, apart form 
the Netherlands armed forces, all organizations should be careful of when 
confronted with environmental turbulence, is not to led the haze of the day 
take control. This may lead to situations in which organizations are unable 
to distance themselves from a certain situation or action, which ultimately 
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prevents them from learning in the long run. In this regard, the interviews, 
furthermore, point to the added value of a well structured organizational 
learning process. A number of interviewees expressed their concerns about 
the fact that the Netherlands armed forces’ overall learning process is 
negatively being influenced by too much compartmentalization. 
 
Modular organizing and preserving organizational stability 
 
All in all, the empirical results on modular organizing have led to the 
conclusion that the Netherlands Armed Forces are confronted with two 
contradicting types of organizational flexibility demands. On one hand the 
armed forces need ‘composition flexibility’, because the organization has 
to be capable of deploying task forces of different sizes, composed of 
different units, to different part of the world in order to perform a variety 
of tasks. On the other hand, the armed forces need, what could be called, 
‘operational flexibility’ for the deployed task force to cope with its 
dynamically complex task environment. That is to say, a task force is most 
likely to operate in an environment in which it is confronted with uncertain 
and ambiguous inputs, and with other intelligent actors actively trying to 
undermine its goals. Consequently, it should work as a well-oiled machine 
and be able to fluently adapt and remain adaptable to local condition. This, 
however, implies more than just efficiently ‘clicking’ together 
organizational building blocks. The real challenge lies in the fact that the 
clicking itself must also lead to what Weick (1993; 2001) would call 
‘heedful interrelating’ between individuals. 
 
The current effect-based approach strategy of the Netherlands armed forces 
strongly relates to the first type of organizational flexibility. Composition 
flexibility is deemed most important to give a rather small military power, 
such as the Netherlands, the ability to cover a broad spectrum of military 
operational tasks. Especially for Army Command this approach has 
stimulated a process of mixing and matching units to into tailored mixtures 
of different functionalities. The formation process to create tailor-made 
organizational modules often leads to situations in which the basic 
structure of the parent organization is abandoned. The empirical results 
point to the fact that this customized way of deploying units has an effect 
on organizational stability, which is threefold.  
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First, the organization has to invest heavily in all kinds of coordination 
mechanisms to transform the mixture of different functional units into a 
well working machine. For example, preceding actual deployment training 
programs and joint exercises have to take place; during deployment staff 
elements and liaison officers are needed for the effective integration of the 
different functional contributions; and at the technical level, extra time and 
effort goes into informal command and control consultation between the 
commanders of the different units to create an operational shared sense of 
meaning. It is questionable whether this energy consuming approach will 
ultimately lead to sufficient operational flexibility, meeting Weick’s idea 
of heedful interrelating. After all, to interrelate heedfully a tight 
professional bond is deemed necessary to, for example, sense problems 
before they occur or to straightaway recognize deviations from normal 
routine. In this respect, it could be argued that a parent organization built 
upon a limited number of autonomous modules that could be deployed 
integrally will probably yields a better effect, because the level of inter-unit 
and inter-personal unfamiliarity will be considerably lower.   
 
Second, in order to form tailored crisis response modules the Netherlands 
armed forces have to cut through existing organizational boundaries, 
stripping brigades, main operating bases and maritime taskforces that stay 
behind. As a result, the regular training programs of these units, in which a 
variety of military operational tasks have to be trained, suffer, because 
important organizational elements are being missed. In the medium and 
long run this may lead to organizational fatigue, because units never get 
the chance to train to their full potential and, therefore, probably never 
reach the military professional level they are supposed to reach. Moreover, 
knowing that the exercising and training cycle must lay the foundation for 
future deployments, it could even be argued that crisis response 
effectiveness in the long term is gradually being eroded.   
 
Third, the process of mixing and matching that continuously takes place 
stimulates feelings of turmoil within the organization’s workforce. The 
empirical results made clear that especially by suddenly withdrawing 
people from their daily jobs all kinds of peace-time administrative, 
functional, managerial, and educational processes were being frustrated. 
This situation has had a negative effect on organizational stability in 
several ways. For example, the organization was being forced to improvise 
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by temporarily filling-up crucial vacancies, creating new vacancies 
somewhere else; certain vocational training courses had to be postponed or 
even cancelled, developing queues and a higher workload further in time; 
and unintentionally the critical paths of all kinds of administrative 
procedures increased considerably. Moreover, all these indicators together 
stimulated a widely shared feeling of the organization being captured in an 
ongoing cycle of improvisation.  
 
 
6.5 LIMITATIONS 
 
During the research process a number of deliberate but also pragmatic 
choices have been made. On one hand these choices have structured the 
research process; on the other hand they have limited the validity of the 
empirical results in a number of ways. The limitations of this study can be 
related to the following issues: (1) the study’s focus, (2) the methods used, 
(3) the sample population, and (4) the measurement scales. Below, this 
categorization will be used to address the study’s main methodological 
problem areas.   
 
The study’s focus 
 
The thesis has taken a strategic management perspective in finding out 
how the Netherlands armed forces organizationally deal with the turbulent 
security environment they encounter. This means that the organizational 
determinants and dynamic capabilities identified are of a strategic 
aggregation level. Therefore, all kinds of functional and micro-level 
resultants of the chosen transformation approach have not been discussed. 
In this respect, one could think of specific technological (weapon)systems 
that the organization has acquired, the leading philosophy of decentralized 
mission command, or the fixed career paths for commissioned and non-
commissioned officers. Moreover, the thesis specifically focuses on the 
relationship between organizational determinants and the actual crisis 
response performance of the Netherlands armed forces. As a result, all 
kinds of ‘peace-time’ management developments to support the 
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organization’s demand for greater flexibility, such as the implementation 
of SAP and Peoplesoft ERP packages, have not been taken into account. 
 
The methods used 
 
Both interviews and questionnaires are basically about self-evaluations, 
which has given the study a subjective trait. It must, however, also be said 
that the questions were posed to a very large, representative group of 
military incumbents who know what they are talking about and who have 
actual operational experience. It would, therefore, be too facile to 
disqualify their assessments as too subjective and therefore useless. In a 
general sense the thesis serves as a strategic diagnosis, which can give 
impetus to follow-up analyses, in which the results gathered from the 
surveys and interviews can be shared and discussed between the different 
communities within the Defence organisation.  
 
Moreover, to somewhat counterbalance the subjective approach of 
analyzing how the Netherlands armed forces have transformed into a 
military crisis response organization, the findings were cross-checked with 
another study conducted by the ‘Clingendael’ research institute, in which 
the usability of a number of smaller European armed forces for 
expeditionary crisis response operations is being assessed (Van den Doel, 
2004). The main conclusion is that, in comparison with the others, the 
Netherlands armed forces have transformed very successfully. Therefore, 
the positive sentiments coming out of this study do not seem to be standing 
on their own.   
 
The sample population 
 
Empirically the thesis is based on the opinion of the Netherlands armed 
forces’ middle and senior management. This choice was driven by the fact 
that the questions asked, on the organization’s crisis response performance, 
were of a strategic level, making it necessary for the respondents to have 
both operational military experience and knowledge of strategic 
organizational issues.  A drawback of this choice is, first of all, that the 
specific views of junior staff members have not been taken into account. 
Discussion 
 160 
This creates a noteworthy gap in the study’s explanatory power, because 
the actual execution of concrete crisis response tasks increasingly takes 
place at the military technical and tactical level, where the lower ranks play 
the leading role. A second issue to mention is that since the mid-1990s it 
has become increasingly clear that modern crisis response operations 
require a multi-actor effort in which international and host-nation civil and 
military actors, at headquarters and field level, cooperate to achieve a 
common set of goals to benefit afflicted populations (Bollen & Rietjens, 
2008). As such, complementing the research findings with the opinions of 
other actors involved in crisis response operations would have given a 
more balanced understanding of the Netherlands’ armed forces overall 
performance. 
 
The measurement scales 
 
This study consciously used scales that had already been validated in 
earlier research contexts. Yet, originally all of these scales had been 
developed for research projects that focused on commercial businesses; 
meaning that for this study the individual scale-items had to be translated 
to a military setting. Regretfully, transforming the scales has resulted in a 
decreasing level of statistical power. Although, in most cases the 
Cronbach’s alpha scores reached the minimum level of .70, their initial 
reliability values were much better. Volberda’s (1996) scales for measuring 
operational, structural, and strategic flexible dynamic capabilities  were the 
only ones that did not reach the required minimum level. To overcome this 
problem the scales were combined into one overall variable: dynamic 
capabilities mixture (DCM). Although it could be perceived as a pragmatic 
choice, from a conceptual and statistical point of view it is, of course, an 
admission of weakness.  
 
The theoretical focus on the relatively new construct of absorptive capacity 
also raised a major measuring issue. The main problem that emerged was 
that no validated scale existed to measure absorptive capacity. A 
compromise was found in Volberda’s (1996) scale for measuring 
metaflexibility. If the research would have taken place during these days 
this problem would not have occurred, because in the meanwhile Jansen et 
al. (2005) have developed a scale that actually measures the sequential 
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processes of knowledge acquisition, assimilation, transformation, and 
exploitation that make up the absorptive capacity construct.   
 
 
6.6 GENERAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO EXISTING THEORY 
 
In general, the study has contributed to improving the status of the 
Dynamic Capabilities Approach. More particular, the study has extended 
the existing theoretical knowledge base on absorptive capacity, modular 
organizing, and contemporary military organizations. Next, these 
theoretical contributions will separately be discussed. 
 
Contributions to the Dynamic Capabilities Approach 
 
Some interesting insights arise from this study’s framework. To start with, 
prior research on dynamic capabilities has placed little emphasis on the 
underlying processes that an organization requires in order to move from 
its starting position to a new ‘desired’ state.  In this respect, Helfat et al. 
(2007: 116) believe that the Dynamic Capabilities Approach would benefit 
from comprehensive empirical analyses that clarify the topic of asset 
orchestration. That is precisely what this study has aimed to do by 
introducing absorptive capacity, modular organizing, and lateral 
coordination as three basic underlying organizational processes that, in 
combination, influence the organization’s search, selection, configuration, 
and deployment capabilities. 
 
A second weak spot in dynamic capability research, so far, has been the 
element of performance measurement to find out how well or poorly 
certain dynamic capabilities have actually performed in practice. As a 
result, Helfat et al. (2007) propose to employ underutilized conceptual 
yardsticks for measuring performance. According to them one performance 
yardstick to investigate is evolutionary fitness, which should concentrate 
on indicators such as growth, survival, and value creation. By using 
Jaworski and Kohli’s (1993) scale this study statistically measured whether 
the proposed organizational determinants did indeed offer added value to 
the Netherlands armed forces crisis response performance. The results have 
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shown that the organization’s repetitive crisis response performance for a 
profound part relies on the variables absorptive capacity, modular 
organizing, and lateral coordination.   
 
The relationship between path dependency and the reality of constrained 
change is a third important underexposed research topic that has been 
addressed in this study. The findings make clear that the transformation 
approach of the Netherlands armed forces was primarily based on investing 
in organizational capabilities that matched the existing resource base. With 
this rather incremental and conservative approach the organization was still 
capable of rather successfully changing from a large-scale, mechanized 
Cold War deterrence power into a small, flexible and versatile crisis 
response organization. This is a valuable theoretical contribution, because 
it supports the emerging idea that for an organization to renew itself, 
because of hypercompetitive pressures, it is not always necessary to aim 
for a one-off ‘big bang’-like turnaround to shake of the competitors 
(Helfat, et al., 2007; Teece, et al., 1997). Moreover, it offers a practical 
view on the challenging situation that most organizations face of having to 
break out of their existing status-quo.  
 
Contributions to the absorptive capacity construct 
 
First, the study has uncovered that the four learning dimension (acquiring, 
assimilating, transforming, and exploiting) that make up absorptive 
capacity can not only be divided into the sub dimensions potential and 
realized absorptive capacity (Todorova & Durisin, 2007; Zahra & George, 
2002),  but can also have either a short-term or a long-term focus. The 
study has taught us that, when it comes to dealing with environmental 
turbulence, organizations should be aware of the fact that having a short-
term focus and going for the “quick-win” could in the medium or long run 
work counterproductive. The key, to deal with this time dimension of 
absorptive capacity, can probably be found in the sequential processes of 
transforming and exploiting newly acquired knowledge. Within these 
processes the organization should concentrate on both the long-term and 
short-term consequences of the competitive alternatives that have been 
thought-out.  
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Second, in line with Todorova and Durisin’s (2007) refined model of 
absorptive capacity this study has proven that social integration 
mechanisms indeed influence the sequential learning processes of 
acquiring, assimilating, transforming, and exploiting new knowledge. 
Moreover, the study has also demonstrated that power relations have a 
profound influence on the process of knowledge exploitation. Regarding 
the social integration mechanisms, the empirical results make clear that the 
way in which the organization internally has organized its learning 
processes especially influences long-term knowledge absorption. 
Regarding power relationships, could be argued that organizational will 
works as a catalytic agent for the knowledge exploitation process.  
 
Third, Van den Bosch et al. (1999) argue that both coordination 
capabilities and the matrix form are important antecedents for absorptive 
capacity, because they have a positive influence on an organization’s 
flexibility and scope of knowledge absorption. The empirical results of this 
study support this general idea, but also go one step further. By 
demonstrating that the relationship between modular organizing and 
absorptive capacity is stronger than the one between lateral coordination 
and absorptive capacity, a new dimension of knowledge absorption 
becomes apparent. It could be argued that rather autonomous 
organizational parts that have to work together in temporary organizational 
forms for a longer period to reach a common goal improve, what could be 
named, the depth of knowledge absorption. Whereas, coordination 
capabilities primarily relate to the rather swift exchange of knowledge and 
insights between individuals, modular organizing stimulates a more 
profound way of learning. The cooperation that takes place between 
different organizational groups, over a longer period of time, deepens the 
understanding of each other’s ways of doing things. This leads to a 
situation in which not only new knowledge is acquired, but also more 
detailed insights are gathered about the translation of this new knowledge 
into concrete, usable routines and processes.  
 
Contributions to modularity theory 
 
The study also complements the existing stream of research on modularity. 
A general aspect that has remained underexposed in the academic debate 
on modularity is whether its foundations coming from modular product 
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design can also be applied in a context of social systems, such as project-
based firms (Baldwin & Clark, 1997).  
 
Some work already exists on the dynamics of recombining organizational 
units (Helfat & Eisenhardt, 2004; Karim, 2006). Yet, these contributions 
focus on the aggregation level of the business unit. Generally speaking, 
business units carry the overall responsibility over a single product-market 
combination. Because of this autonomous position, they are spared from all 
kinds of task related external interdependencies and, therefore, seem to 
comply with modularity’s basic rule of near-decomposability. However, 
within the hypercompetitive business arena organizations increasingly rely 
on project-like temporary organizations to react quickly to changes in the 
environment. These intra and inter organizational cooperation structures 
are most of the times formed within the business unit level, directly 
addressing the competitive frontline. This study addresses this gap. The 
main conclusion drawn is that the repetitive reconfiguration of smaller 
organizational elements into varying constellations depends above all on 
dealing with ambiguous social processes.  
 
The strong relationship between lateral coordination and modular 
organizing the study uncovers, demonstrates that the aspect of loose 
coupling that is being presented as one of the major advantages of a 
modular system is probably less applicable at these lower organizational 
levels. This result supports earlier work that says that the new reality of 
increased horizontal cooperation puts far more emphasis on “softer” 
coordination skills than before. After all, to motivate change and deal with 
task uncertainties within a team-based project-context, without having 
formal hierarchical authority, makes it more important to focus on 
relational aspects, such as negotiating with others, enhancing social bonds 
and building up trust (Hoegl & Gemuenden, 2001; Sinha & Van de Ven, 
2005). 
 
Contributions to military business science 
 
As mentioned in chapter 1, the need to cope with the increasingly turbulent 
security environment is not a unique Dutch phenomenon, but part of a 
major trend influencing the entire transatlantic security community. The 
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buzz word of this new global security environment has become 
uncertainty. Uncertainty exists about the potential sources of military 
threats, their time and place of occurrence, and the form that threats and 
attacks will eventually take. Not surprisingly, among military business 
scholars a debate has emerged on the do’s and don’ts of contemporary 
military deployment. In this respect, Evans (2003: 139-140) states that: “in 
an era when all security issues are interconnected and when the national 
security of Western States has become critically dependent on international 
security, single-scenario strategies and rigid military force structures have 
become anachronistic……Military analysts and force-structure specialists 
need to concentrate on the multifunctional use of force in highly complex 
operations……The task is to learn how to fight efficiently across the 
spectrum of conflict.” Overall could be said that Western armed forces 
faced a similar challenge as many organizations in profit sector did: 
Creating an organization with enough built-in flexibility to generate and 
mobilize different organizational alternatives in order to counter the 
continuously changing security environment.   
 
Dandeker (2003: 414) explains that the answer to this problem has been 
found in modular design: “Uncertainty as to the environment, objectives, 
and conditions of missions to come has lead the United States (through 
“building blocks”), the United Kingdom (through “force packages”), and 
France (through “a modular configuration of forces”) to the idea of 
organizing military assets in advance into a series of coherent, self 
contained, mix-and-match sets of units borrowed from the various organic 
commands for a give mission. Such modules can be assembled at short 
notice to form a mix of force appropriate for the specific demands of an 
unforeseen crisis demanding the use of armed forces.”  
 
This study has added some useful insights to this discussion. Based on the 
modularity discussion larger countries have reinvented the army brigade 
for the new crisis response role. All Western land forces are hierarchically 
divided into standard sub-units. In terms of Mintzberg (1983) the 
configuration of these organizations is divisional, which means that they 
are built up of a number of ‘smaller armies’. These ‘smaller armies’ come 
in different sizes. For example, a division consists of several brigades. 
Subsequently, a brigade can be sub-divided into battalions, and a battalion 
can be split up into companies. Important to mention, in this respect, is that 
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the smaller the unit becomes the smaller its manoeuvre, fire support, 
logistical support, and command elements will be. The brigade is known as 
the smallest organizational building block that possesses a sufficient 
combination of functional elements to conduct military operations 
autonomously for a longer period of time. With this characteristic the army 
brigade complies to modularity theory’s rule of near-decomposability, and 
is, therefore, pre-eminently fit for force tailoring (Bonin & Telford, 2004).  
 
Yet, for smaller countries, such as the Netherlands, a brigade is a rather 
large organizational part. To give an idea, the entire Netherlands armed 
forces’ land component consists of only three manoeuvre brigades. 
Deploying a single brigade for each crisis response operation would be a 
too heavy operational burden for the organization to carry. Therefore, 
opposed to the larger countries, The Netherlands is abandoning the brigade 
as the Army’s main combat structure and, instead, is primarily relying on 
battalion-size structures to conduct crisis response operations. As a result, 
modularity theory’s mixing and matching philosophy is being executed 
with smaller organizational elements that do not have complete 
organizational autonomy. Consequently, the organization has to put extra 
energy into creating a well-working overall organizational system. Military 
business scholars can take advantage of the organizational dynamics this 
study has uncovered regarding the mixing and matching of units operating 
at the military tactical level.  
 
 
6.7 AVENUES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
The study has also uncovered ample research themes that deserve further 
academic attention. These future scholarly contributions have been 
categorized into the following four main research scopes: (1) Dynamic 
capabilities Approach, (2) absorptive capacity, (3) modular organizing, and 
(4) performance measurement. The concrete topics to address within these 
overarching scopes are discussed below. 
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Dynamic Capabilities Approach 
 
Now that we know that absorptive capacity and modular organizing are 
two important organizational determinants for the activation of a mixture 
of strategic, structural and operational dynamic capabilities, an intriguing 
direction for further research would be to investigate if and how different 
organizations deliberately try to develop such a mixture. Within this 
discussion, it would, furthermore, be interesting to focus on the specific 
dynamic capabilities that organizations deploy to balance the strategic, 
structural, and operational flexibility demands. When this academic 
challenge is taken up, the result could also add to the issue of industry 
evolution, which Helfat et al.(2007) put forward as an interesting research 
theme to strengthen the scientific position of the Dynamic Capabilities 
Approach.  
 
Absorptive capacity 
 
Finding out how, within different organizations or organizational contexts, 
the absorptive capacity processes have been organized would be useful to 
colour the theoretical construct with more empirical insights. Following 
Lane et al.’s (2006) process model of absorptive capacity the focal point of 
this research should be the relationship between the organization’s 
knowledge structures and the sequential learning processes of acquiring, 
assimilating, transforming, and exploiting new knowledge. Sub themes that 
could be addressed are for example how the learning processes separately 
are organized; how the sequential steps are interconnected; and how the 
transfer of short-term knowledge absorption into long-term absorption in 
practice is being dealt with.  
 
Modular organizing 
 
The relationship between lateral coordination and loose coupling is an 
interesting theme to focus on in future research. Based on existing theory 
this relationship could be typified as being curvilinear. In short, an 
increasing level of lateral coordination eventually leads to chaotic 
communication, which will then have a negative impact on the smoothness 
of cooperation. However, the Netherlands armed forces strongly rely on 
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training as a specific type of lateral coordination to ease inter-unit 
collaboration. It could be argued that the possibility for organizational 
elements to train within a safe and artificial context with each other will by 
definition be advantageous, because they can level and learn without the 
pressures of the real-time task environment. This makes it interesting to 
distinguish between different types of lateral coordination and to 
investigate how they separately influence the performance of modular 
organizational systems.  
 
In addition to this theoretical debate on coordination capabilities, it also 
interesting to shift to a higher aggregation level and elaborate on the 
different interfaces that organizations can use to create a well-working 
system out of a mixture of smaller organizational elements. Kogut and 
Zander’s (1992) subdivision of system, coordination, and social 
capabilities could be the starting point of a discussion on the relative power 
of these combinative capabilities within a modularly built organizational 
system. 
 
A further exploration of the relation between the design of the parent 
organization and the temporary modular “project-organization” is also 
recommendable. The knowledge gained about the way in which the 
Netherlands armed forces organize their temporary task forces for crisis 
response missions could be expanded with insights coming from other 
organizations that frequently use inter-organizational project structures to 
achieve business goals. Especially organizations that contribute larger 
organizational elements, and not just individuals, to these kinds of 
structures will probably add value to this theoretical debate. In both the 
public and commercial sector organizations can be found that work in such 
a way. In the public sector, for example, the increased focus of many 
Western governments on homeland security and disaster relief capabilities 
has stimulated tighter project-like cooperation between public services at 
the operational level (Denning, 2006). In the commercial sector the 
construction and entertainment industry come to mind first, because large-
scale infrastructural projects or major movie productions are organized in a 
way that semi-autonomous functional groups from different organizations 
have to work together (Ekstedt, Lundin, & Wirdenius, 1992; Genus, 1997; 
Hirsch, 1972).  
 
Discussion 
 169 
Performance measurement 
 
Apart from Likert-type scales the study used semi-structured interviews to 
qualitatively measure performance. The interview results touched upon the 
topic of performance measurement in situations or contexts where the 
output can only be defined in qualitative and vague terms (Hofstede, 1981: 
195). To offer a brief review of the findings: a number of senior officers 
are hesitant about the usefulness of measuring the effectiveness and 
efficiency of crisis response operations, because according to them the 
context in which the operations are being executed is too complex. Others, 
however, are convinced that measuring effectiveness and efficiency is 
useful and should be improved. These military leaders express a strong 
need for criteria to assess their performance on the job. They feel the 
Netherlands armed forces, mainly in its reconstruction role, should use 
specific criteria to map its effectiveness. 
 
These empirical findings may help to deepen the academic debate within 
the New Public Management (NPM) research stream on performance 
measurement in the public sector. NPM aims at ‘lessening or removing 
differences between the public and the private sector and shifting the 
emphasis from process accountability towards a greater element of 
accountability in terms of results’ (Hood, 1995: 94). This study has, 
however, stumbled upon a discussion on the added value of actually 
measuring performance within an ambiguous political setting. This 
concern may fuel an emerging theme within the NPM community on the 
disadvantages of measuring performance ‘in settings of deficient output 
control’ (Beeres, De Waard, & Bollen, 2010; Mol & Beeres, 2005). 
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6.8 CONCLUSION 
 
Based on the study’s empirical findings this chapter has started a 
discussion on the role that absorptive capacity and modular organizing play 
in repetitively activating adequate and quick organizational responses. This 
is a very interesting issue for commercial organizations as well, knowing 
that they, when confronted with hypercompetition, just like the 
Netherlands armed forces have to aim for winning consecutive, short-term, 
innovative ‘competitive battles’ instead of dealing with a strong known 
competitor in a once-only situation. The discussion makes clear that in 
essence absorptive capacity and modular organizing can be useful 
organizational determinants to invest in. What, however, organizations 
should be aware of is that absorptive capacity can have short-term and 
long-term focus. When organizations focus too much on the short-term 
dimension without taking the long-term consequences into account, they 
run the risk of becoming stuck into a continuous circle of improvisation. 
Another main point of concern is that when organizations rely heavily on 
fine-grained modularization, abandoning the principle of near-
decomposability, they have to put a lot of extra time and energy into 
coordination capabilities to still create a well-working overall 
organizational system. As a result, the organization’s capacity to quickly 
respond suffers.     
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CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter will conclude the study. In order to answer the study’s central 
research question, three sub-questions have been formulated. First, the 
answers found to these three questions will be summarized. Second, based 
on their combined information outcome the central research question will 
be answered. Third, the chapter will end with making recommendations to 
the Netherlands armed forces for improving their ability to adequately deal 
with and quickly respond to their unpredictable, complex and dynamic 
crisis response environment. 
 
 
7.2 ANSWERING THE SUB-QUESTIONS 
 
Recapitulating, in a step-wise approach to answer the study’s central 
research question three sub-questions have been posed. The first question 
has been worked out in chapter 2. The chapters 4 and 5 have respectively 
discussed the second and third question. Below, their separate outcomes 
will be summarized.  
 
Sub-question 1 
 
Existing strategic management theory makes clear that three organizational 
determinants play an important role in the competitive challenge of 
realizing innovative organizational learning and architectural 
reconfiguration within hypercompetitive business circumstances. First, 
absorptive capacity has been identified as a determinant of great value 
because it steers the critical process of searching and selecting usable 
dynamic capabilities. Modular organizing has been presented as a second 
important determinant, because it supports the process of mixing and 
matching new or existing resources and capabilities into alternative system 
configurations. Lateral coordination is a third determinant of major 
importance that has been derived from the theoretical analysis. Lateral 
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coordination not only facilitates the knowledge absorption process needed 
for innovativeness, but it also positively influences the reconfiguration 
capabilities of a modular organizational system.  
 
The main contribution of these three determinants is that together they are 
capable of activating a necessary mixture of strategic, structural and 
operational flexible dynamic capabilities. This mixture is deemed 
important to balance the organization’s search and selection function with 
its configuration and deployment function. The crucial point is that too 
much emphasis on strategic change, innovation and renewal, without 
properly embedding the change strategies in the organization, may, on one 
hand, create chaos. On the other hand, a too strong focus on improving 
existing organizational routines stimulates conservatism and may lead to 
rigidity in the organization. Therefore, a general assumption is that 
organizations should aim for ambidexterity as the key to repetitive success. 
Existing strategic management theory has taught that in connection 
absorptive capacity, modular organizing, and lateral coordination 
contribute to achieving this goal of organizational ambidexterity. 
Moreover, absorptive capacity and modular organizing not only affect 
organizational performance by activating a mixture of dynamic 
capabilities; they can also exert a direct influence.  This second outcome 
effect is determined by the fact that these two determinants can play a 
facilitating role when the organization has to convert from a prudent to a 
more ad hoc way of problem solving. 
 
Sub-question 2 
 
The contribution of these organizational determinants to the Netherlands 
armed forces’ crisis response performance has been investigated by means 
of a large-scale survey among a large sample of Dutch officers. Based on 
the information coming out of this survey it can be concluded that 
absorptive capacity, modular organizing, and lateral coordination 
considerably contribute to the Netherlands armed forces crisis response 
performance. To be precise, 18% of the overall crisis response 
performance of the Netherlands armed forces is being accounted for by 
only these three variables. The results have also made clear that lateral 
coordination not only acts as a facilitator of absorptive capacity and 
modular organizing, but also has a direct effect on the organization’s 
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operational dynamic capabilities. Moreover, these operational dynamic 
capabilities seem to be of crucial importance themselves. The empirical 
findings indicate that they, basically, lay the foundation for the activation 
of structural and strategic dynamic capabilities.  
 
What the results also show is that when the level of environmental 
turbulence increases, the effects of modular organizing, and a mixture of 
dynamic capabilities, seem to become of marginal importance, whereas 
absorptive capacity remains the sole significant contributor to 
organizational performance. This probably has to do with the fact that 
within turbulent crisis situations the real difference can be made by 
thinking and acting beyond existing practices; basically making it a case of 
creatively exploiting what one has got. 
 
Yet, when the level of environmental turbulence decreases the opposite 
occurs. In brief, absorptive capacity loses its significant role at the expense 
of the existing flexible dynamic capabilities mixture and the modular 
organizing approach.  This probably has to do with the fact that creativity 
and innovativeness are of less importance when the level of 
unpredictability, dynamism, and complexity is negligible. In many cases, 
small-scale interventions that fit or complement the existing strategy, 
structure, and operating processes will do.  
 
In addition to these two extreme mission contexts, the Netherlands armed 
forces can, of course, also encounter an average level of environmental 
turbulence. Under these circumstances modular organizing and absorptive 
capacity play an equally important role. Even more interesting is the fact 
that the available mixture of flexible dynamic capabilities seems to fulfil a 
crucial mediating role between the two determinants. Basically, it serves as 
a solid organizational platform, from which innovative and straightforward 
interventions alike can safely be activated and monitored. Generally 
speaking, it offers an organizational foundation that prevents everything 
from being put upside down over and over again in order to repetitively 
achieve temporary advantages.  
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Sub-question 3 
 
Based on the qualitative interview results it could be concluded that the 
Netherlands armed forces’ senior management is, on the whole, quite 
positive about the concrete choices that their predecessors have been made 
in transforming from a traditional Cold War large-scale military 
organization into a smaller, flexible crisis response organization. However, 
almost two decades of conducting crisis response operations has also 
resulted in some interesting policy implications regarding absorptive 
capacity, modular organizing, lateral coordination, and organizational 
performance. 
 
First, regarding absorptive capacity the interviews make clear that the 
organization is perhaps too much focused on running missions. As a result, 
the process of knowledge absorption tends to have a short-term focus, 
which leads to improvisation and superficial learning; and prevents the 
organization from keeping track of important future developments. 
 
Second, regarding modular organizing the interviews have pointed to the 
challenge of balancing organizational customization and operational 
effectiveness. It has also become clear that Navy and Air force Command 
can deal better with this dilemma than Army Command. The Air force and 
Navy are both technology-driven organizations and have rather fixed 
operational tasks, creating a natural fit between the design of their parent 
organizations and the structure of the units that they have to deploy. The 
Army, on the contrary, can depend less on the binding effect of its 
technological assets, and has encountered dramatic changes in its 
operational repertoire. Given the unpredictable task environment that has 
to be dealt with, Army Command has decided to stick to its existing 
organizational structure and focus on a process of mixing and matching 
existing smaller, functional sub-units into different configurations. As a 
result, the main organizational emphasis has been put on improving the 
cooperation capabilities of the work force. Hence, a search for alternative, 
useable, multi-task modules is not being pursued. 
 
Third, regarding lateral coordination the interview results indeed show that 
this organizational mechanism is an important system integrator. Training 
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programs, especially, are deemed crucial to cope with the above mentioned 
dilemma of balancing organizational customization and operational 
effectiveness. At the same time, the interviews make clear that solely 
relying on lateral coordination is not enough. The organization also uses 
other, indispensable mechanisms to integrate, such as ICT systems, 
formalization and socialization.  
 
Fourth, regarding organizational performance the feeling prevails that 
measuring the output of crisis response operations should be given more 
attention. A majority of the interviewed senior officials feels the need for 
meaningful indicators to grant their activities some transparency, 
especially when faced with reconstruction or humanitarian - parts of - 
missions. Compared to the overall mission objectives, often couched in 
vague language, reconstruction and humanitarian tasks usually are of 
enough substance to be operationalised into concrete targets or indicators. 
Over the past few years, the armed forces have made some progress in this 
respect, but the process will have to acquire more profundity of content. 
 
 
7.3 ANSWERING THE CENTRAL RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
The outcome of the three sub-questions discussed above has offered the 
information to give a balanced answer to the study’s central research 
question. Recapitulating, this question sounds as follows:  
 
How do organizational learning and reconfiguration determinants 
matter in quickly responding to and adequately dealing with 
environmental turbulence when taking a typical Western military crisis 
response organization as an example? 
 
When answering this question, the study’s empirical findings have, first of 
all, shown that the Netherlands armed forces indeed focus on 
organizational learning and reconfiguration to deal with environmental 
turbulence. At the corporate level, the organization has actively stretched 
its absorptive capacity to renew itself in order to keep pace with the 
continuously changing security environment. Furthermore, it has embarked 
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upon a modular deployment strategy to make its architectural framework 
more adaptable in response to the unpredictable and extremely varied task-
setting.  
 
Concerning the issue of repetitively coming up with adequate 
organizational responses, the organizational determinants absorptive 
capacity and modular organizing seem to play an important part. The 
Netherlands armed forces’ overall crisis response environment can be 
typified as turbulent. Yet, the survey results also indicate that within this 
overarching context the separate mission circumstances can vary 
enormously when it comes to the level of turbulence. Therefore, just like in 
the commercial world, the Netherlands armed forces should possess the 
basic organizational skills to deal with a mishmash of environmental 
characteristics. Depending on the nature of the external forces encountered 
during a mission, the Netherlands armed forces rely either on absorptive 
capacity or on modular organizing to come up with an adequate response. 
When the external forces encountered are unequivocal and incorporated 
into the existing mixture of flexible dynamic capabilities, modular 
organizing seems to have the upper hand in supplying an adequate 
response. When, however, the environmental dynamics are ambiguous, 
urgent, and do not fit the existing dynamic capabilities mixture, absorptive 
capacity gets to play the leading role in offering an appropriate solution.  
 
Concentrating on the organization’s speed of reaction, the study has found 
that absorptive capacity and modular organizing also have had separate, 
yet clear, effects. The empirical results show that within highly turbulent 
mission contexts the Netherlands armed forces have the capacity to go 
through absorptive capacity’s sub processes of knowledge acquisition, 
assimilation, transformation, and exploitation rather quickly. Settling the 
sequence from potential to realized absorptive capacity in a matter of 
weeks, instead of months, seems to depend to a large extent on the 
organizational will to do so. This will is most likely to depend upon the 
level of agreement that exists within the organization and the amount of 
time that it takes to reach this level. In short, when a broadly shared sense 
of urgency develops quickly within the organization its drive to do 
something innovative will certainly benefit.  
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At the same time the study makes clear that when the organization puts all 
its eggs in the basket of absorptive capacity to deliver useful answers 
quickly, it runs the risk of giving absorptive capacity too much a short-
term status. If there is no plan on how to embed newly acquired 
technological systems or newly invented processes beyond the time-span 
of a running mission into the overarching organizational system their initial 
blessing can ultimately turn into an organizational nuisance. 
 
The relationship between speed of reaction and modular organizing is also 
an interesting one. According to this study’s findings modular organizing 
can both positively and negatively influence a quick organizational 
response. The positive role refers to the fact that the sum of all the 
partnerships in which the Dutch have participated serves as one extensive 
knowledge pool from which the organization can learn in all sorts of ways. 
In short, the organization’s knowledge acquisition, assimilation, 
transformation, and exploitation processes all benefit from using 
partnership experiences as a sort of general database or as a concrete point 
of reference. Moreover, because the organization does not have to find 
everything out for itself, the sequential learning steps can also be taken at a 
higher pace.  
 
The negative influence of modular organizing on the organization’s speed 
of reaction relates to modularity theory’s basic principle of near-
decomposability. According to modularity theorists this is a crucial 
organizational property to strive for, because it creates autonomous sub-
units that can easily be recombined into other configurations. The results 
have shown that especially for Army Command it is difficult to live up to 
the demand of near-decomposability, because it is virtually impossible for 
the organization to predict what kind of operational task-setting can be 
expected in the future. This situation makes it problematic to create fixed 
organizational modules within the parent organization that can be used for 
each crisis response operation imaginable.  Mainly based on this aspect of 
uncertainty, Army Command has decided to pick smaller, functional 
organizational elements from its existing organizational structure and to 
group them into tailor-made crisis response modules. As a consequence, 
the organization has to invest heavily in joint exercises and training 
programs to transform these tailor-made mixtures of different functional 
units into well-oiled machines, before actual deployment takes place. 
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Although this choice seems logical, in the end this extra training effort 
contravenes the high-readiness, quick response ambitions of the 
Netherlands armed forces, since units cannot be deployed straightaway.  
 
 
7.4 RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Two key recommendations are made that are directly derived from the 
study’s main findings. One recommendation focuses on improving 
organizational learning, the other one on improving the organization’s 
reconfiguration ability.  
 
Improving organizational learning 
 
This study has shown that an important question that needs to be addressed 
by the Netherlands armed forces is how to transfer short-term innovative 
organizational responses into long-term organizational benefits. It could be 
argued that, on one hand, the organization’s so-called can-do mentality has 
been a crucial driver for the rather successful crisis response effort that 
started after the ending of the Cold War. On the other hand, this mentality 
has stimulated an ongoing organizational attitude of problem-solving that 
has left too little room for genuine reflection. It must, however, also be said 
that this has never been a question of unwillingness, but more a case of 
being pushed by a demanding organizational context. Nevertheless, the 
empirical results make clear that the time has come for the organization to 
break out of this cycle, to take a step back, and to really start exploiting the 
knowledge potential available.   
 
One of the options to do this is by improving the way in which the 
organizational learning processes are structurally embedded within the 
organization. The modular deployment approach has created a huge 
knowledge pool. After all, the Dutch units participate in different 
constellations, with different partners, in different regions of the word, 
under different climatic circumstances, and within different military-
operational task settings. Yet, so far the sequential processes of 
recognizing the most relevant learning experiences, assimilating, 
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transforming, and exploiting them to the organization’s long-term 
advantage in many cases seem to have had an ad-hoc character. Moreover, 
their interrelationship is being hampered by too much 
compartmentalization between the different Operational Commands. What 
the Netherlands armed forces need to do is to make a detailed assessment 
of how the separate learning processes have currently been organized. The 
assessment should, furthermore, take into account how the processes are 
linked and where knowledge leaks occur. After this analysis has been 
done, possibilities for improvement can be investigated, and after that step 
a concrete reorganization process can be initiated.  
 
Military exercises and training programs are a second issue to address 
when it comes to the improvement of organizational learning. The ability 
to practice safely within a framed context is quite unique to military 
organizations. After all, commercial organizations do not have the ‘luxury’ 
to rehearse their competitive moves in an artificial setting. To improve the 
processes of knowledge transformation and exploitation, the Netherlands 
armed forces should take more advantage of this unique learning vehicle. 
Knowing that training programs lay the foundation for actual deployment, 
the Netherlands armed forces, first of all, has to give training programs the 
same status as an actual deployment. In a practical sense this means to 
exercise restraint in departing from planned exercises and training 
programs due to all kinds of external pressures. Second, the training 
programs themselves have to be improved. They should not only focus on 
reaching different levels of organizational readiness (platoon, company, 
battalion, or brigade), but also pay more profound attention to the different 
task-environments that can be encountered. Moreover, within these 
different operational scenarios the aspect of combined and joint 
cooperation has to play a central role in order to allow units to become 
accustomed to working in different constellations.   
 
Improving organizational reconfiguration 
 
The study has uncovered that the Netherlands armed forces simultaneously 
have to secure two different types of flexibility: composition and 
operational flexibility. With a deployment strategy of mixing and matching 
different functional components into tailor-made task forces the 
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organization has placed the emphasis on composition flexibility. To limit 
the loss of operational flexibility extra time and energy is spent on joint 
exercises and training programs in preparation of a mission. What the 
study has, furthermore, found is that extra energy is not only needed for the 
operational flexibility of the crisis response formation that is being 
deployed, but also to safeguard the operational performance of the units 
that stay behind or to keep all sorts of  ‘peace-time’ administrative, 
educational, and supporting processes running. 
 
A possible step forward in better coping with the challenging situation of 
pursuing strategic and repetitive operational flexibility without becoming 
organizationally unstable, is the development of a new overarching 
organizational framework, especially for Army Command. Such a new 
framework becomes important all the more, because Sinno (2008) makes 
clear that within the current complex security environment, which is 
dominated by non-traditional conflicts such as guerrilla wars and 
insurgencies, organizational structure significantly contributes to the 
success of a military force deployed. The point is that organizational 
structures with inherent deficiencies due to the process of mixing and 
matching unfamiliar units into tailor made organizational systems will 
have a hard time coping with the resilient, fragmentized, and atomized 
structures of most of today’s opponents. 
 
Based on modularity theory the key assumption is that the new framework 
has to be made up of smaller basic building blocks that can largely 
function autonomously. Such a framework could bring more stability to the 
parent organization’s functioning, ease the assembly process that has to 
take place before deployment, safeguard the operational autonomy, and 
thus effectiveness, of the units that stay behind, and improve the 
operational effectiveness of a temporary crisis response task force that is 
being deployed.  
 
As yet, Army Command has been reluctant to make this move because of 
its unpredictable task environment. The main argument put forward is that 
this unpredictability aspect makes it impossible to compose fixed 
organizational units that are by nature capable of covering the vast array of 
crisis response operations. Although this way of reasoning sounds logical, 
there is also something to be said against it. Exploratory research has 
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uncovered that for every major crisis response operation the Netherlands 
armed forces have participated in, since the ending of the Cold War, Army 
Command has each time deployed a similar combination of functional 
components. To be precise, each formation consisted of a manoeuvre, fire-
support, combat-support, logistical support, and command and control 
element. Moreover, within the vast majority of these missions a reinforced 
battalion determined the size of the tailor-made organizational module. So, 
the argumentation that everything is unclear and that the organization is, 
therefore, beforehand unable to predict what kind of constellation is 
needed seems a bit too easy.  
 
Moreover, the challenge of combining customization with operational 
flexibility is not unique to the Dutch. Many smaller Western armed forces 
are facing the same dilemma. In fact, a number of them have already begun 
to experiment with creating more versatile organizational units below 
brigade level. Thus, practical experiences on this issue of modular 
restructuring are available, which means that the Netherlands armed forces 
do not have to invent everything for themselves, but can take advantage of 
the insights that already exist. For example, the Australian Defence Force 
(ADF) is also reconsidering its basic force structure in order to become 
better able to deal with today’s wide range of crisis situations (A. Ryan, 
2003). In this discussion the expeditionary task force (M. Ryan, 2003) and 
the motorized battle group (Hutcheson, 2003) are being introduced as 
possible organizational building blocks for the future.  
 
Interestingly enough, the Australian basic assumptions are to a large extent 
applicable to the Netherlands armed forces as well. Michael Ryan puts it as 
follows (2003: 86-87): “given the small size of the ADF, the future 
Australian land force must achieve a combat effect that is disproportionate 
to its size. The central war fighting organisation of today’s Army—the 
brigade—must be transformed into a smaller but more lethal and precise 
instrument of combat: the Expeditionary Task Force (ETF). An ETF needs 
to be adopted as the principal war fighting organisation for the Australian 
Army by 2020. This new combat organisation would, over the next fifteen 
years, replace the light infantry and light mechanised brigades around 
which the Army is currently structured. Such a taskforce formation would 
be smaller than a brigade, with approximately 2000 troops, but it would be 
structured and equipped to achieve combat effects greatly superior to the 
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Army’s current combat structures. A proposed ETF would be designed in 
such a way that it could be employed across the spectrum of conflict in 
scenarios ranging from low- to mid-intensity conflict. The taskforce’s 
organisation would be designed to be structurally flexible, and capable of 
being reorganised depending on the scale, intensity and duration of any 
given conflict. In addition, the proposed taskforce would be able to operate 
independently or as part of a larger joint or combined force”. 
 
 
7.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Balogun and Hope Haily (2004) make a distinction between organizational 
realignment and transformation. They explain that realignment applies to 
all changes occurring within the current paradigm of an organization. Only 
if a paradigm shift takes place it is, according to them, appropriate to speak 
of organizational transformation. Levy and Merry (1986: 5) support this 
view by defining an organizational transformation as “a multidimensional, 
multilevel, qualitative, discontinuous, radical organizational change 
involving a paradigmatic shift”. Based on this definition and the results of 
this study it can be concluded that the Netherlands armed forces have 
undergone a transformational development after the ending of the Cold 
War. 
 
First, the new crisis response course has indeed influenced most, if not all, 
functional areas. To name a few: conscription was abolished and the 
organization has started recruiting professional soldiers; the planning 
process changed from a threat-driven to a capacity-driven approach (De 
Wijk, 2004); the new slogan “quality over quantity” meant that the loss of 
troops and materiel had to be counterbalanced by the advanced 
performance of modern technologies, stimulating investments in high-tech 
weapon, information and communication systems; new functional 
capabilities, such as CIMIC (Civil Military Cooperation) had to be 
incorporated in the organization; military education and training programs 
had to be altered; a new fast-track procurement procedure had to make it 
possible to purchase extra equipment and materiel within a very short time 
span if needed; the routines of all the operational elements (e.g. 
manoeuvre, fire support, combat support, logistical support and command 
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and control) had to be changed to live up to the new multi-task 
environment and be brought in line with the organization’s expeditionary 
ambitions.  
 
Second, the change process has also had an effect on all organizational 
levels. At the strategic level multinational (combined) and multi-service 
(joint) cooperation has become the new standard. Just like the Dutch, most 
European countries have gone through major downsizing operations 
leading to a significant loss of national military capacity. Combined 
cooperation was seen as the best way to safeguard common security 
ambitions despite these reductions. This development has given most crisis 
response operations a multinational character. Furthermore, since 
embracing the crisis response role, joint cooperation has increased 
enormously. Every single Operational Command simply lacks the materiel 
and competences to execute a crisis response operation, from the planning 
until the redeployment, entirely on its own. Compared to the Cold War 
period the need for tighter joint cooperation is quite new, for the services 
used to have their own specific military tasks and there was no direct 
operational relationship between them (Cobelens & Gijsbers, 2004). At the 
military operational level, the Netherlands armed forces have started 
deploying ‘tailor-made expeditionary task forces’. Given the fact that the 
composition of these task forces differs each mission and sometimes even 
changes during the mission itself, that the participating units do not always 
have enough the time to train and do the preparations together, and that 
they are from different nationalities and cultures, one can image that an 
open and co-operative mindset is expected from the strategic down to the 
individual level. 
 
Third, the shift to crisis response operations has asked for values and 
norms different from the ones used during the Cold War period. In the new 
crisis response role a serviceman or woman has become more than a 
combat soldier. He or she also has to be a technologically skilled 
professional and a sort of ‘diplomat’ and ‘aid worker’ who is capable of 
cooperating with foreign military partners, non-governmental 
organizations, local authorities, as well as winning the hearts and minds of 
people in a crisis area.  
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Fourth, the organizational change has indeed been discontinuous and 
radical. Fifty years of deterrence and preparing for conflict suddenly 
changed into a situation of actual deployment, drastically increasing the 
operational utilization of the Netherlands armed forces. Furthermore, 
opposed to the traditional context of preparing for a large-scale, 
mechanized, well-known conflict, the new environment of unknown and 
asymmetrical threats has urged the Netherlands military to start conducting 
operations along a broad spectrum of conflict types, varying from high 
intensity conflict operations to reconstruction and humanitarian operations. 
Moreover, even within a specific mission the military organization has to 
be capable of switching between these different types of operations.  
 
Finally, a paradigmatic shift seems quite apparent. During the days of the 
Cold War the organization precisely knew its opponent, military strategy, 
and area of operations. This predictable environment made it possible to 
calculate with almost scientific precision the necessary size and 
composition of the organization’s resource base. Furthermore, it stimulated 
the use of bureaucratic principles, such as a strict functional grouping, 
hierarchical control, and formalization, to fine-tune the organization to its 
well-know task. In the new crisis response setting the operating context has 
become far more obscure. The organization has to be capable of deploying 
military taskforces of different sizes, composed of different units to 
different areas of the world in order to perform different kinds of tasks. 
What complicates this process even further is that – to a certain extent – 
future operations are impossible to predict, let alone the specific military 
configurations and competences that are needed. Optimizing the 
organization for this unpredictable task environment called for a new 
paradigm of organizational flexibility throughout the entire organization.  
 
Over the past two decades the Netherlands armed forces have deployed 
numerous military formations, in the new crisis response role, to countries 
such as Cambodia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Eritrea, Iraq, and Afghanistan. 
Leaving the predictable path of the mass-mechanized military business 
model, and stepping, within a very short time-span, onto the new crisis 
response path of flexibility and adaptability has been a major 
accomplishment - especially for a type of organization that is normally 
perceived as bureaucratic, inert, closed, and traditional. All in all, the 
organization can be proud of this achievement.  
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Yet, what this study in the end makes clear is that there is no real time to 
celebrate. The situation as it is today is that the organization is actively 
engaged in a complex mission in Afghanistan and rumours about a 
stronger military commitment to the African continent are becoming 
stronger and stronger. So, the old slogan “the shop is not to be closed 
during repairs” still holds, and, given its main crisis response task the 
organization has to realize that this situation will probably never change. It 
is, therefore, of crucial importance to actively and deliberately find ways 
and to make time for reflection in order to keep making organizational 
progress. Continuously stretching the organization’s flexibility potential to 
the maximum, without creating sufficient stability within the 
organization’s underlying resource base, will hamper the organization in 
the long run. What, in this respect, must never be forgotten is that the line 
between improvisation and disaster can be a very thin one. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The increasing level of environmental turbulence has put a strain on 
organizations to become more innovative and proactive. Making sense of 
what the business environment is about and relating these ideas to one’s 
own strategic position, paradigm, and way of doing things is an ongoing 
process for every organization. In a rather stable, simple, and predictable 
environment organizations probably have little trouble in mapping out their 
competitive moves. Under turbulent circumstances this process is less 
straightforward. Generally speaking, organizations then face the challenge 
of deliberately trying to shape the competitive landscape to their own 
advantage, and thus have to play an active interpretation role. 
 
With this competitive challenge in mind, D’Aveni (1994) has introduced 
the term hypercompetition. He defines hypercompetitive behavior as a 
“process of continuously generating new competitive advantages and 
destroying, obsoleting, or neutralizing the opponent’s competitive 
advantage, thereby creating disequilibrium, destroying perfect competition, 
and disrupting the status quo of the marketplace” (D'Aveni, 1994: 218). 
His general idea comes down to the fact that under turbulent circumstances 
organizations continuously and deliberately need to challenge the existing 
status quo with their environment, aiming for consecutive, short-term, 
competitive advantages (D'Aveni, 1994; Sanchez, 1995; Teece, et al., 
1997; Tushman & O'Reilly, 1996). 
 
In the following academic debate on temporary advantages survival or 
organizational success is being presented as a result of activating 
innovative, quick response, flexible capabilities (Volberda, 1996). Teece et 
al. (1997) use the term dynamic capabilities. So far, literature on dynamic 
capabilities has had a strong conceptual character; for the main concern has 
been to firmly position the concept within its academic field (Eisenhardt & 
Martin, 2000; Helfat & Peteraf, 2003; Makadok, 2001; Winter, 2003; Zollo 
& Winter, 2002; Zott, 2003). An aspect that, as yet, has remained rather 
underexposed in this academic debate refers to the underlying 
organizational determinants that may help to quickly and decisively render 
the activation of dynamic capabilities on a continuous basis. 
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The point is that on meta-level organizations, confronted with 
hypercompetition, need specific organizational determinants that can deal 
with the paradox of duality (Volberda, 1996). On one hand too much 
managerial emphasis on strategic renewal and innovation can create chaos. 
On the other hand a too strong focus on existing rules, routines, and 
procedures can lead to rigidity in the organization. The dilemma that 
organizations face is to balance these two contradictory requirements. In 
this respect, one important practical question left open, in the theoretical 
debate on dynamic capabilities, is which organizational determinants 
matter in the challenging process of quickly and repetitively initiating 
strategic changes and at the same time avoiding to become organizationally 
unstable.  
 
This study aims to make progress on this issue by introducing the 
contemporary Western expeditionary military organization as a typical 
example of a quick response organization for commercial firms to learn 
from. Today’s Western armed forces are facing the complex challenge of 
quickly and effectively responding to unforeseen threats or crisis situations 
(De Waard & Kramer, 2008; De Waard & Soeters, 2007). As a result they 
have been pushed to find ways to simultaneously deal with strategic and 
operational turbulence (Evans, 2003). First, Western armed forces are 
confronted with a highly changeable strategic security context, asking for 
organizational competences that support the generation and mobilization of 
different operational alternatives. Second, this demand of operational 
customization has to be combined with an effective military performance 
during each individual mission, over and over again. What makes it even 
more complex is that most missions have hypercompetitive-like 
characteristics themselves.  
 
The Netherlands armed forces are selected as a typical example of a quick 
response Western military organization. The study’s main assumption is 
that giving insight into the way in which the Netherlands armed forces 
apply commonly accepted organizational determinants to activate learning 
and reconfiguration abilities for combining strategic flexibility and 
continuous operational effectiveness, could serve as an interesting case for 
other organizations to take advantage of. 
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The reasoning above has resulted in the following central research 
question: How do organizational learning and reconfiguration 
determinants matter in quickly responding to and adequately dealing with 
environmental turbulence when taking the Netherlands armed forces as a 
typical example of a quick response organization? 
 
Research approach 
The thesis follows the eight general steps of the passive observation 
research method (Remenyi, et al., 2002). The study has started with a 
literature review on the theoretical concept of dynamic capabilities. This 
step has led to a twofold conclusion. First, the concept is still missing 
necessary empirical comprehensibility. Second, the organizational 
practicalities to facilitate the everyday functioning of dynamic capabilities 
over a longer period of time have remained largely untouched in the 
academic debate so far (phase 1). Next, a more focused assessment of 
existing strategic management theory has been set in motion to find out 
which organizational determinants specifically matter in dealing with the 
challenges of environmental turbulence. The key variables absorptive 
capacity, modular organizing, and lateral coordination have been derived 
from this analysis (phase 2). A deeper investigation into the outcome 
effects of these determinants has led to the conclusion that in combination 
they support the activation of a necessary mixture of operational, 
structural, and strategic dynamic capabilities. Together, these first two 
phases have resulted in a theoretical conjecture in the form of a research 
model that can be split up into eleven separate hypotheses (step 3 and 4).  
The next step has been to translate the research model into a questionnaire 
and an interview protocol (phase 5). The former has been distributed 
among a large group of officers to develop a broad understanding of the 
interrelationships between the determinants being studied. The latter has 
been developed to complement the large scale quantitative survey 
approach with more specific in-depth qualitative knowledge on whether or 
not the proposed determinants indeed support repetitive successful 
operational performance (phase 6). The data coming out of the 
questionnaire have been statistically analyzed, using SPSS and AMOS 
structural equation modeling techniques. The interview results have been 
analyzed by using first level and pattern coding techniques (phase 7). 
Finally, reflecting on the complete set of evidence gathered has led to a 
refinement of the dynamic capabilities theory, by explaining why and how 
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organizational determinants matter in challenging process of quickly 
responding to and adequately dealing with environmental turbulence 
(phase 8). 
 
Findings 
This study’s empirical results offer some intriguing insights to further 
elaborate on the general organizational ability to repetitively and quickly 
activate adequate responses. The variables absorptive capacity and 
modular organizing, with lateral coordination being a crucial antecedent, 
seem to play a profound part in this matter. In general, the Netherlands 
armed forces’ overall crisis response environment can be typified as 
turbulent. Yet, the survey results indicate that within this overarching 
context the separate mission circumstances can vary enormously when it 
comes to the level of turbulence. Therefore, the Netherlands armed forces 
need basic organizational skills that can deal with a mishmash of 
environmental characteristics. What this study has uncovered is that, 
depending on the external forces that have to be dealt with, the Netherlands 
armed forces rely either on absorptive capacity or on modular organizing 
to come up with an adequate response. When the external forces 
encountered are unequivocal and incorporated into the existing mixture of 
flexible dynamic capabilities modular organizing seems to have the upper 
hand in supplying an adequate response. When, however, the 
environmental dynamics are ambiguous, critical, and do not fit the existing 
dynamic capabilities mixture absorptive capacity gets to play the leading 
role in offering an appropriate solution.  
 
Based on the empirical results it could, furthermore, be concluded that 
absorptive capacity and modular organizing have had separate, yet clear, 
effects on the Netherlands armed forces’ speed of reaction. The interview 
results make clear that within a highly turbulent mission context the 
Netherlands armed forces have the capacity to go through absorptive 
capacity’s sub processes rather quickly. There seems to be a sort of 
common organizational understanding that the organization has to do 
everything in its power to act quickly and decisively in support of a 
running mission, especially when the going gets tough and the external 
influences can not be sufficiently counterbalanced with the existing 
organizational resource base. Settling the sequence from potential to 
realized absorptive capacity in a matter of weeks instead of months seems 
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to depend to a large extent on the organizational will to do so. This will is 
most likely related to the level of agreement that exists within the 
organization and the amount of time that it takes to reach this level.  
 
According to this study’s findings modular organizing can both positively 
and negatively influence a quick organizational response. The positive 
influence of modular organizing can be related to the different dimensions 
of absorptive capacity. The Netherlands armed forces’ modular 
deployment approach has led to an organizational situation in which the 
Dutch units quite intensively have to work together with other military and 
non military partners, coming from different national, professional, 
functional, and ideological backgrounds. The sum of all the partnerships in 
which the Dutch have participated serves as an extensive knowledge pool 
from which the organization can learn in all sorts of ways. In short, the 
organization’s knowledge acquisition, assimilation, transformation, and 
exploitation processes all benefit from using partnership experiences as a 
sort of general database or as a concrete point of reference. Moreover, 
because the organization does not have to find everything out for itself, the 
sequential learning steps can also be taken a lot quicker.  
 
For the negative influence of modular organizing on the organization’s 
speed of reaction a national instead of a mission perspective has to be 
taken. The empirical results have made clear that, on a national level, 
differences occur between the Operational Commands in living up to 
modularity theory’s basic principle of near-decomposability. It could be 
argued that Navy and Air force units to a large extent resemble what one 
might call ‘proper modules’. Based on their rather fixed operational task-
setting, which on top of that is dominated by the technological systems in 
use, they are able to function rather autonomously within larger troop 
formations. As a result of their largely modular character the process of 
assembly for crisis response deployment becomes rather straightforward. 
Units can be taken out of the parent organization quickly and easily and be 
added to a task force to perform a specific task in an autonomous way. 
Opposed to that, Army units are not what one would call ‘proper modules’. 
It would be better to speak of components. They are distinguishable 
organizational parts that, given their functional character, are not made to 
function autonomously. For each mission Army Command picks its units 
from all over the organization and composes a mixture of organizational 
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functional parts that is capable of dealing with the specific operational 
demands of that particular deployment. Army Command, therefore, has to 
invest heavily in joint exercises and training programs to transform such 
tailor-made mixtures of different functional units into well-oiled machines, 
before actual deployment takes place. In the end this extra training effort 
contravenes the high-readiness, quick response ambitions of the 
Netherlands armed forces, since units cannot be deployed straightaway.  
 
Concentrating on the issue of preserving organizational stability, the 
empirical findings also point to different roles for the organizational 
determinants absorptive capacity and modular organizing. The survey 
results have shown that within extremely turbulent mission contexts a 
balanced mixture of dynamic flexible capabilities no longer directly 
contributed to organizational performance. The organization, basically, 
puts all its eggs in the basket of absorptive capacity to deliver useful 
answers quickly.  By doing this, however, the organization runs the risk of 
giving absorptive capacity too much a short-term status. If there is no plan 
on how to embed newly acquired technological systems or newly invented 
processes beyond the time-span of a running mission into the overarching 
organizational system, their initial blessing can ultimately turn into an 
organizational nuisance. Especially the interview results address this issue. 
The fact that technological systems are sometimes bought without having 
really thought about, for example, firmly embedding them into the 
organization’s supply chain, maintenance processes, or training programs 
often leads to a series of ad-hoc organizational adjustments to reach a 
workable situation altogether. Most of the time, the end result is an 
organizational compromise that is constantly being questioned because of 
remaining practical drawbacks.  
 
The empirical results on modular organizing have led to the overarching 
conclusion that the Netherlands Armed Forces are confronted with two 
contradicting types of organizational flexibility demands. On one hand the 
armed forces need ‘composition flexibility’, because the organization has 
to be capable of deploying task forces of different sizes, composed of 
different units, to different part of the world in order to perform a variety 
of tasks. On the other hand, the armed forces need, what could be called, 
‘operational flexibility’ for the task force deployed to cope with its 
dynamically complex task environment. The current effect-based approach 
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strategy of the Netherlands armed forces strongly relates to the first type of 
organizational flexibility. Composition flexibility is deemed most 
important to give a rather small military power, such as the Netherlands, 
the ability to cover a broad spectrum of military operational tasks. Mainly 
for Army Command this approach has stimulated a process of mixing and 
matching units into tailored mixtures of different functionalities. The 
formation process to create tailor-made organizational modules often leads 
to situations in which the basic structure of the parent organization is 
abandoned.  
 
The empirical results point to the fact that this customized way of 
deploying units has an effect on organizational stability, which is threefold. 
First, the organization has to invest heavily in all kinds of coordination 
mechanisms to transform the mixture of different functional units into a 
well working machine. It is questionable whether this energy consuming 
approach will ultimately lead to a high level of operational flexibility. 
Second, in order to create tailored crisis response modules the Netherlands 
armed forces have to cut through existing organizational boundaries, 
stripping brigades, main operating bases and maritime task forces that stay 
behind. As a result, the regular training programs of these units, in which a 
variety of military operational tasks has to be trained, suffer, because 
important organizational elements are being missed. In the medium and 
long run this could lead to organizational fatigue, because units never have 
gotten the chance to train to their full potential and, therefore, probably 
will never reach the military professional level they are supposed to reach. 
Moreover, knowing that the exercising and training cycle must lay the 
foundation for future deployments, it could even be argued that crisis 
response effectiveness in the long term is gradually being eroded. Third, 
the process of mixing and matching that continuously takes place 
stimulates feelings of turmoil within the organization’s workforce. The 
research findings indicate that especially by suddenly withdrawing people 
from their daily jobs all kinds of peace-time administrative, functional, 
managerial, and educational processes are being frustrated. This situation 
has had a negative effect on organizational stability in several ways. For 
example, the organization was being forced to improvise by temporarily 
filling-up crucial vacancies, creating new vacancies somewhere else; 
certain vocational courses had to be postponed or even cancelled, 
developing queues and a higher workload further in time; and 
unintentionally the critical paths of all kinds of administrative procedures 
  210 
increased considerably. Moreover, all these indicators together have 
stimulated a feeling of the organization being captured in an ongoing cycle 
of improvisation. 
 
Recommendations 
Based on these findings two recommendations are made. First the 
Netherlands armed forces have to increase their long-term organizational 
learning ability by: (a) improving the internal organization of the 
sequential learning processes of knowledge acquisition, assimilation, 
transformation, and exploitation, and (b) recognizing military exercises as 
unique learning vehicles and giving them a more prominent role in the 
organization’s ability to learn. Second, the Netherlands armed forces 
should start developing a new overarching organizational framework that 
better complies with modularity’s general rule of near-decomposability. 
Such a framework could bring more stability to the parent organization’s 
functioning, ease the assembly process that has to take place before 
deployment, safeguard that operational autonomy of the units that stay 
behind, and improve the operational effectiveness of the military unit that 
is being deployed. For this second recommendation, the study suggests that 
the Netherlands armed forces can take advantage of countries that are 
already working on a similar organizational challenge, such as Australia 
with its Expeditionary Task Force design. 
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SAMENVATTING (SUMMARY IN DUTCH) 
 
De toegenomen omgevingsturbulentie heeft organisaties gedwongen tot 
meer proactief en innovatief handelen. D’Aveni (1994) heeft in dit kader 
de term hyperconcurrentie geïntroduceerd. Hij stelt dat om te overleven 
organisaties in staat moeten zijn om herhaaldelijk en doelbewust de 
heersende concurrentie status-quo te doorbreken. In de daaropvolgende 
theoretische discussie over het behalen van deze tijdelijke 
concurrentievoordelen wordt gewezen op het belang van zogenaamde 
flexibele dynamische vaardigheden (Teece, et al., 1997; Volberda, 1996). 
Tot op heden heeft het academische debat over dynamische vaardigheden 
een nogal conceptueel karakter gekend. De belangrijkste doelstelling was 
om het concept wetenschappelijk goed te positioneren binnen het 
strategisch management domein.  
 
Een belangrijk praktisch aspect dat vooralsnog onaangeraakt is gebleven, 
betreft de onderliggende organisatorische determinanten om snel en 
doelbewust dynamische vaardigheden te activeren. Het overkoepelend 
gedachtegoed in deze is dat organisaties tweeledig moeten kunnen zijn. 
Enerzijds is er behoefte aan innovatief vermogen, anderzijds is ook 
organisatorische stabiliteit gewenst om de innovatiedrang niet te laten 
doorslaan in chaos. De veronderstelling is dat organisatorische 
determinanten benodigd zijn die dit duale karakter van organisaties kunnen 
ondersteunen. 
 
Naar aanleiding van bovenstaand vraagstuk introduceert deze studie de 
huidige Westerse krijgsmacht als een typisch voorbeeld van een quick 
response organisatie, waar commerciële organisaties mogelijk iets van 
kunnen leren. Westerse krijgsmachten zien zich namelijk vandaag de dag 
geconfronteerd met een zeer turbulente veiligheidsomgeving, waarin 
verschillende soorten crises zich heel snel kunnen aandienen en steeds 
weer kunnen vragen om nieuwe en andersoortige organisatorische reacties. 
Naast de roep om strategische flexibiliteit en organisatorisch maatwerk 
moeten de krijgsmachten tijdens elke afzonderlijke missie in staat blijven 
om hun operationele effectiviteit te waarborgen. Het feit dat de meeste 
missiecontexten op zichzelf ook een hoge mate van turbulentie kennen, 
maakt het hele krachtenspel nog complexer. Kortom, de eis van dualiteit 
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die gesteld wordt aan commerciële organisaties om te kunnen overleven in 
een hypercompetitieve concurrentieomgeving is in de kern vergelijkbaar 
met het organisatorische dilemma waar Westerse krijgsmachten zich mee 
geconfronteerd zien. In deze studie wordt de Nederlandse krijgsmacht 
gebruikt als een representatief voorbeeld van een moderne Westerse 
krijgsmacht met een crisisbeheersingstaak. De bovenstaande redenering 
heeft geleid tot de volgende centrale onderzoeksvraag: Welke rol spelen 
organisatorische leer- en configuratiedeterminanten binnen de 
Nederlandse krijgsmacht bij het snel reageren op en het adequaat omgaan 
met omgevingsturbulentie? 
 
In antwoord op deze vraag heeft het onderzoek uitgewezen dat de 
organisatorische determinanten absorptievermogen en modulair 
organiseren, met laterale coördinatie als antecedent, een sleutelrol spelen. 
Het onderzoek laat zien dat de algemene veiligheidsomgeving waarbinnen 
de krijgsmacht moet functioneren, getypeerd kan worden als turbulent. 
Wanneer, echter, gefocust wordt op de individuele missiecontexten blijken 
er verschillen te zijn in de mate van omgevingsturbulentie. Deze 
gevarieerdheid maakt het noodzakelijk voor de krijgsmacht om zowel 
onder hoog als laag turbulente missieomstandigheden effectief te kunnen 
optreden. Het onderzoek wijst uit dat, afhankelijk van de mate van 
turbulentie, hetzij absorptievermogen hetzij modulair organiseren een 
dominante rol vervult in het initiëren van een adequate organisatorische 
reactie. Als de omgevingskrachten eenduidig zijn en te ondervangen zijn 
met de bestaande mix van dynamische vaardigheden, biedt het modulaire 
organisatievermogen voldoende flexibiliteit om tot een passende reactie te 
komen. Wanneer de omgevingsdynamiek ambigu, vluchtig en kritisch is, 
en ook niet aansluit bij de dynamische vaardigheden mix, speelt juist 
absorptievermogen de hoofdrol.  
 
Als het gaat om de reactiesnelheid toont het onderzoek aan dat 
absorptievermogen en modulair organiseren een afzonderlijk maar wel 
duidelijk effect uitoefenen. Ten eerste blijkt dat de organisatie heel snel 
kan handelen als de situatie daarom vraagt. Vooral tijdens gevaarlijke 
missies is de organisatie heel slagvaardig in het aanpakken van 
veranderingen in de lokale veiligheidsituatie. De druk om slachtoffers te 
voorkomen, zorgt voor een bepaalde eensgezindheid binnen de organisatie, 
waardoor de opeenvolgende leerprocessen (kennisacquisitie, -assimilatie, -
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transformatie en –exploitatie) van absorptievermogen heel snel en bewust 
worden doorlopen. Ten tweede, blijkt ook modulair organiseren een 
positieve invloed te hebben op de snelheid van kennisabsorptie en 
uiteindelijk dus op een snelle organisatorische reactie. De modulaire inzet 
van Nederlandse eenheden in multinationale militaire troepenmachten 
heeft namelijk geleid tot een uitgebreide kennispool, waar op een versnelde 
manier uit geleerd kan worden.  
 
Naast deze positieve invloed kan modulair organiseren eveneens een 
negatief effect hebben op de snelheid van handelen. De belangrijkste reden 
hiervoor is gelegen in het feit dat voor het creëren van maatwerkmodules 
de organisatie, in het bijzonder de landmacht, menigmaal door bestaande 
organisatiegrenzen heen moet snijden. Om een dergelijke niet organieke 
militaire task force voldoende ingespeeld te laten zijn, investeert de 
organisatie in oefen- en trainingsprogramma’s voorafgaand aan de 
daadwerkelijke inzet. De extra tijd die hiermee gemoeid is, verlaagt 
natuurlijk de reactiesnelheid van de organisatie.  
 
Ten aanzien van het waarborgen van de organisatiestabiliteit laat het 
onderzoek zien dat de determinanten absorptievermogen en modulair 
organiseren wederom een belangrijke rol spelen. Het survey-onderzoek 
heeft getoond dat binnen hoog turbulente missiecontexten de bestaande 
mix van dynamische vaardigheden niet langer direct bijdraagt aan de 
prestatie van de organisatie. Het absorptievermogen moet primair leiden tot 
een hele snelle bruikbare respons. De tijd om de gemaakte keuze af te 
zetten tegen en te verankeren in de bredere mix van dynamische 
vaardigheden ontbreekt of wordt niet genomen. Hoewel deze handelswijze 
begrijpelijk is, gezien de fysieke gevaren van crisisoperaties, kleeft er ook 
een nadeel aan. Een punt van zorg is namelijk dat het leervermogen van de 
organisatie te veel een korte termijn focus krijgt doordat het voornamelijk 
gericht is op de lopende missie.  
 
De empirische resultaten over modulair organiseren hebben duidelijk 
gemaakt dat de Nederlandse krijgsmacht zich geconfronteerd ziet met twee 
tegenstrijdige vormen van flexibiliteit. Enerzijds heeft de organisatie 
samenstellingsflexibiliteit nodig om maatwerk oplossingen te generen, om 
zo het gevarieerde takenpakket aan te kunnen. Anderzijds heeft de uit te 
zenden militaire formatie behoefte aan operationele flexibiliteit om 
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adequaat in te kunnen spelen op de locale omgevingsdynamiek van de 
afzonderlijke missiecontexten. Met de Effect-Based-Approach strategie 
heeft de organisatie primair ingezet op samenstellingsflexibiliteit. Het 
gevolg hiervan is dat voor de meeste uitzendingen een complex 
samenstellingsproces moet plaatsvinden om de juiste eenheden bij elkaar te 
brengen.  
 
Uit de interviewresultaten blijkt dat deze manier van inzet een drietal 
gevolgen heeft voor de organisatiestabiliteit. Ten eerste moet de 
organisatie extra investeren in allerlei coördinatiemechanismen om de 
samengestelde eenheid samen te smeden tot een goed geoliede machine. 
Het valt te betwijfelen of al deze pogingen leiden tot de hoge mate van 
operationele flexibiliteit die benodigd is om te kunnen excelleren binnen 
complex dynamische missiecontexten. Ten tweede moet door de 
maatwerkstrategie de organisatie ook extra energie stoppen in de 
achterblijvende eenheden. Veelal moeten brigades, squadrons, en 
maritieme task forces eenheden af staan in verband met een uitzending. 
Het gevolg hiervan is dat deze grotere organieke verbanden essentiële 
eenheden missen om hun oefen- en trainingsprogramma naar behoren te 
kunnen uitvoeren. Op middellange en lange termijn kan dit schadelijk zijn 
voor de organisatiestabiliteit. Op middellange termijn doet zich het 
probleem voor dat de grotere eenheden hun gewenste professionele niveau 
niet kunnen bereiken, waardoor ze eigenlijk minder bruikbaar worden. Op 
lange termijn kan het ook gevolgen hebben voor crisisbeheersingsinzet van 
de krijgsmacht in het algemeen, bijvoorbeeld doordat bepaalde 
taakgebieden in de breedte van de organisatie niet voldoende beoefend 
zijn. Ten slotte ontstaan door de continue samenstellingsperikelen 
gevoelens van onrust binnen de organisatie. Het gevoel dreigt te ontstaan 
dat de organisatie gevangen zit in een vicieuze cirkel van improvisatie.  
 
Op basis van deze bevindingen wordt een tweetal aanbevelingen gedaan. 
Ten eerste moet de Nederlandse krijgsmacht proberen het lange termijn 
leervermogen te verbeteren. Ze kan dit doen door de wijze waarop de 
verschillende leerprocessen zijn gestructureerd en ingebed in de organisatie 
te reorganiseren. Daarnaast kan de organisatie meer leervoordeel halen uit 
haar oefen- en trainingsprogramma’s. Ten tweede verdient het de voorkeur 
om een nieuw organisatorisch raamwerk te ontwikkelen dat beter tegemoet 
komt aan de autonomie-eis van modulair ontwerp, zodat er minder 
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vergaand gemixt hoeft te worden met eenheden. Een dergelijk raamwerk 
zou meer stabiliteit kunnen opleveren voor de moederorganisatie omdat 
bedrijfsvoerings- en onderwijsprocessen niet worden doorkruist, 
voorafgaand aan een missie een minder complex samenstellingsproces 
nodig is, de eenheden die achterblijven niet worden aangetast in hun 
operationele zelfstandigheid en de uitgezonden eenheid een beter 
ingewerkt systeem vormt. Hierbij wijst de studie op het feit dat voor deze 
ingrijpende organisatorische verandering de krijgsmacht kan terugvallen 
op de aanpak en ervaringen van landen die zich geconfronteerd zien met 
een gelijksoortig probleem. Heel concreet valt hierbij te denken aan de 
Australische krijgsmacht.  
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APPENDIX I: OVERVIEW OF INTERVIEWEES 
 
 
No. Rank Organizational Part 
1 Colonel Representative DOBBP 
2 Lieutenant colonel Representative DOPS 
3 General Representative OPS Army Command 
4 Lieutenant colonel Representative OPS Royal Marechaussee  
5 General Representative DAOG 
6 Colonel Representative DOBBP 
7 Civilian Representative DOBBP 
8 General Representative DAOG 
9 General Representative DOBBP 
10 General Representative CDS 
11 General Representative DOPS 
12 General Representative OPS Army Command 
13 General Representative OPS Navy Command 
14 General Representative OPS Navy Command 
15 Civilian Representative CDS 
16 General Representative OPS Air force Command 
17 Colonel Representative OPS Royal Marechaussee 
18 Lieutenant colonel Staff officer Task force Uruzgan 
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APPENDIX II: MEASUREMENT SCALES 
 
 
 
MODULAR ORGANIZING (MO) 
1 To execute crisis response operations the Netherlands armed 
forces merge units, parts of units, and individuals into tailor-
made formations. 
2 The composition of Dutch crisis response formations depends 
primarily upon the task that has to be executed. 
3 Dutch crisis response formations mostly participate in larger 
multinational task forces. 
4 During crisis response operations the composition of a Dutch 
formation can be altered if the operational circumstances 
require this. 
5 During crisis response operations standardized work 
processes, such as doctrines, SOP’s, and drills make it 
possible to co-operate with units from other services and 
countries. 
6 During crisis response operations our Dutch tailor-made 
formations rely on structured systems for planning and 
command & control. 
7 During crisis response operations the division of work within 
our Dutch tailor-made formations is defined in detailed 
descriptions of jobs and tasks.  
8 During crisis response operations everything in our Dutch 
tailor-made formations has been laid down in rules. 
9 During crisis response operations consulting takes place 
between different organizational levels within the Netherlands 
armed forces. 
10 Dutch servicemen and women master multiple tasks, SOP’s, 
drills, skills, and techniques. 
11 Dutch servicemen and women are up to date regarding 
technology and necessary know-how. 
12 Dutch technological assets can be used for different types of 
missions and tasks. 
13 The technological assets of the Netherlands armed forces are 
to a large extent compatible. 
14 Dutch technological assets are to a large extent compatible 
with the equipment of partnering countries.  
α = .70 
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 ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY (AC) 
1 The Netherlands armed forces regularly analyze how 
partnering countries conduct crisis response operations.  
2 Armed forces from partnering countries have no major secrets 
for the Netherlands armed forces regarding their 
organizational strengths and weaknesses. 
3 The Netherlands armed forces systematically keep track of 
technological developments that could influence operational 
tasks and performance. 
4 The lessons learned during actual deployment are 
systematically being registered within the Netherlands armed 
forces. 
5 The lessons learned during actual deployed are systematically 
being internalized by the Netherlands armed forces. 
6 The Netherlands armed forces belong to the trendsetters in the 
international military sector. 
α = .74 
 
LATERAL COORDINATION (LC) 
1 During crisis response operations interrelated processes, tasks, 
and activities are well coordinated with units from other 
services. 
2 During crisis response operations interrelated processes, tasks, 
and activities are well coordinated with units from other 
countries. 
3 During crisis response operations duplicated and overlapping 
activities amongst our own participating services are avoided. 
4 During crisis response operations duplicated and overlapping 
activities amongst participating countries are avoided. 
5 During crisis response operations Dutch units have no 
problems in coordinating with each other. 
6 During crisis response operations Dutch units have no 
problems in coordinating with units from other countries. 
7 During crisis response operations conflicts amongst our own 
Dutch units are settled quickly. 
8 During crisis response operations conflicts between Dutch 
units and units of participating countries are settled quickly. 
9 During crisis response operations discussions between our 
own Dutch units are conducted constructively. 
10 During crisis response operations discussions between Dutch 
units and units of participating countries are conducted 
constructively. 
α = .74 
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DYNAMIC CAPABILITEIS MIXTURE (DCM) 
1 During crisis response operations Dutch units can 
easily divide essential operational activities amongst 
each other. 
2 During crisis response operations Dutch units can 
easily leave certain essential operational activities to 
units from other countries. 
3 During crisis response operations Dutch units can 
easily adjust to changing operational circumstances. 
4 During crisis response operations Dutch tailor-made 
formations possess a certain amount of slack that 
can be used to handle fluctuating operational 
demands.  
5 Whatever service Dutch units belong to, they co-
operate easily with one another during crisis 
response operations. 
6 During crisis response operations Dutch units co-
operate easily with units from other countries. 
OP 
DC 
(α = .61) 
7 The Netherlands armed forces have the capacity to 
easily shift functions and tasks in case a crisis 
response operation requires this. 
8 Dutch servicemen and women can easily take on 
alternative roles and tasks in case a crisis response 
operation requires this. 
9 From its permanent structure the Netherlands armed 
forces are capable of repetitively adjusting to 
changing mission contexts. 
STRUC 
DC 
(α = .55) 
10 If needed the Netherlands armed forces can add new 
types of missions to its existing operational product 
portfolio. 
11 The Netherlands armed forces regularly implements 
new technologies. 
12 The Netherlands armed forces are pro-active in 
seeking a fit between what they can offer and what 
our politicians are expecting. 
13 The Netherlands armed forces try to secure their 
added value by being capable of dealing with all 
kinds of crisis situations. 
STRAT 
DC 
(α = .52) 
α = .70 
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PERFORMANCE (P) 
1 The Netherlands armed forces perform well during crisis 
response operations. 
2 Compared to other national armed forces the Netherlands 
armed forces perform well during crisis response operations. 
3 Other armed forces are positive about the Netherlands armed 
forces’ operational achievements during crisis response 
operations. 
α = .80 
 
 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL TURBULENCE (ET) 
1 Changes in the area of operation were very intense. 
2 Our crisis response formation was frequently asked by 
partnering countries and/or other parties in the area of 
operation to start conducting completely new tasks. 
3 In the area of operation changes happened continuously. 
4 Our national contribution of tasks/services to partners and 
other parties in the area of operation changed continuously. 
5 Fluctuation in the number of troops and materiel frequently 
took place in the area of operation. 
6 Everyday something important changed in the area of 
operation. 
7 In the area of operation many factors had to be taken into 
account when making a decision. 
8 In the area of operation new developments could come from 
various directions. 
9 In the area of operation everything was interrelated. 
10 In the area of operation a decision taken effected numerous 
other aspects. 
11 In the area of operation it was hard to make decisions based 
on reliable information. 
12 In the area of operation operational and tactical information 
was present, but not always available. 
13 It was very hard to predict what was going to happen in the 
area of operation. 
α = .84 
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APPENDIX III: INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 
 
 
INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 
 
Date / time 
 
Location 
 
Name / Rank 
 
No.:   …………………. 
Function 
 
Opertional 
Command 
□Army □Air force □Navy □ Marech. 
 
 
A.  ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY: JUDGING THE OUTCOME 
1 Do you think it is a wise strategy of the Netherlands armed forces to 
pick organizational units from the parent organization and form them 
into tailor-made constellations that can then be deployed in 
multinational settings? 
2 Does the Netherlands armed forces’ technological resource base meet 
the demands of being modern, multifunctional, and interoperable?  
3 Can the Netherlands armed forces rely on a workforce with a 
cooperative mindset? 
 
 
B  ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY: ASSESSING THE PROCESS 
4 How have the Netherlands armed forces transformed over the last two 
decades in response to the new crisis response role? 
5 Where do you see room for improvement? 
 
 
C  MODULAR ORGANIZING 
6 On which architectural principles are Dutch crisis response formations 
built?  
7 What are the advantages and disadvantages of this approach? 
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D  LATERAL COORDINATION 
8 Which role does lateral coordination play in transforming a Dutch 
crisis response formation into a well-working system? 
9 Which role does formalization play in transforming a Dutch crisis 
response formation into a well-working system? 
10 Which role does socialization play in transforming a Dutch crisis 
response formation into a well-working system? 
11 Which of these combinative capabilities has the upper hand? 
 
 
E BALANCING STRATEGY, STRUCTURE, AND OPERATIONS 
12 Is the actual execution of crisis response tasks in a mission area 
negatively being influenced by the fact that the Netherlands armed 
forces on a continuous basis pick units from the permanent 
organization and group them into tailor-made crisis response 
formations?  
 
 
F  PERFORMANCE 
13 Has the Netherlands armed forces’ crisis response effort been 
successful so far? 
 13a. Is it possible to measure crisis response performance? 
 13b. Is measuring crisis response performance desirable? 
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APPENDIX IV: CHECKLIST MATRIX AND CODING 
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ORGANIZATIONAL DETERMINANTS FOR REPETITIVE, QUICK AND ADEQUATE
RESPONSES
A common challenge organizations face is how to remain successful in a competitive
arena that is becoming increasingly turbulent. Resourcefulness and adaptability are presented
as crucial organizational abilities to strive for. This study introduces the contemporary
military organization as a typical example from which commercial organizations could
learn. After all, in order to repetitively conduct crisis response missions all over the globe,
under all kinds of climatic and operational circumstances, resourcefulness and adaptability
have become basic elements for successful expeditionary deployment. The study assumes
that giving insight into the way in which military crisis response organizations apply
commonly accepted organizational determinants to activate learning and reconfiguration
abilities, could serve as an interesting case for commercial organizations to take advantage
of. For most contemporary military organizations modular organizing has become an
important approach to increase operational adaptability. The cover photo presents a
typical outcome of this approach. It shows a combined arms team, from the Netherlands
armed forces, on its way to the village of Ferocia to search for improvised explosive devices.
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